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A READING BOOK
IN
MODERN PHILOSOPHY

BY
G. E. PARTRIDGE, Ph.D.
Formerly Lecturer in Clark University

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PREFACE

WITH the exception of the passages from Hobbes and Schelling, the extract from Fichte's *Vocation of Man*, and Spencer's *Definition of Philosophy*, which were added as the manuscript was being revised for publication, this book was compiled in 1906. As originally outlined it was somewhat different in scope, and was to have been done in coöperation with President E. C. Sanford of Clark College, but owing to a change of plans on his part, I have myself compiled the book, and now publish it with the hope that it will fill a place in the philosophical student's equipment that still seems vacant.

What this place is can best be observed by noticing the classes of books which should fall within reach of the student of philosophy in his earlier years. First, there is the systematic outline of the problems of philosophy. Second, the historical account of the subject, both biographical and topical. Third, some classical writer, or treatise, such as Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, studied as a whole. Fourth, a current system, that will introduce the student to as broad as possible an area of present problems, methods, and results. Fifth, current philosophical discussion. Sixth, a wide selection of original classical texts. And last, it seems, there should be close at hand to the

student, a smaller selection of standard writings, that shall be read and re-read until they become possessions of the mind.

It is obviously this last place that my book is intended to fill, and in the preparation of it, several pedagogical requirements have been in mind. I have wished to make as brief as possible a hand-book, in the hope that brevity might appeal to many students who would otherwise rebel at so formidable reading. But yet I have wished to include a sufficient number of writers, and of the most representative passages, that the book might have a systematic connectedness, and a certain kind of completeness. To this end the attempt has been made to group the selections about the most fundamental problems, and to give both the methods and the main results of each philosopher. The advantages of such a condensed philosophy seem to be several. Everyone knows how difficult it is to gain an adequate insight into the mechanism of philosophical thought by the study of books *about* philosophy or philosophers; and on the other hand to read at first a great quantity of text is hopelessly confusing. But if a smaller amount of original writings be read consecutively and comparatively, the values both of the personal acquaintance and of the systematic treatment may be preserved. By frequent re-reading of such text, more can be accomplished than by the study of "notes," which are very likely to degenerate into mere symbols of thought. At the least, such reading will keep the mind freshly influenced by the method and style of the philosophers, and will maintain points

of contact for wider and deeper reading. A problem of learning is involved here, upon which we have still something to discover, but we can hardly be wrong in insisting upon the value of a close companionship with the very words of the great thinkers.

Since the book is intended for frequent and consecutive *reading*, I have not provided much in the way of systematic references, or mechanical devices for aiding the eye and the memory. Such a book is not to be used for hasty reviews of main points,—its influence upon the student should be of a more indefinite and yet deeper kind. Furthermore I have not tried especially to select *easy* passages. There is of course a certain amount of almost light reading in philosophy, but one cannot thus reach the fundamental problems, although it is true enough that fundamental truths are not *necessarily* difficult to grasp. If mental confusion result from such reading, it ought to be a wholesome confusion for the student who has any potentiality of the subject in him; it is a good experience, at least for hardy minds, to be brought squarely face to face at the outset of a task with some of its most real difficulties. Such passages as Spinoza's treatment of substance, Fichte's introduction to the science of knowledge, Hegel's exposition of the dialectic, may seem to some out of place in a book that is intended to fall into the hands of beginners; but all of these certainly represent direct modes of approaching to the very heart of philosophy, and the teacher may be content, if he wishes, to explain in simpler terms what this problem is. Later the student

may understand fully the technique of these famous methods, and the mechanism of the minds that employed them, but even if he does not he will have had an opportunity.

Probably no two students of philosophy would select precisely the same materials in trying to present the main results of modern philosophy, and I cannot hope that I have been fortunate enough to discover the best in every case, or the correct proportions, or have presented the whole in the highest possible degree of connectedness. Simple as the task may seem, there are real difficulties in executing it. Twice or three times as much matter might have been chosen, and the work made correspondingly easier, but I have wished to make a hand-book small enough to be *used* in the manner I have indicated. Of course it would be absurd to maintain that the essence of modern philosophy has thus been put into a nutshell, but anyone who understands well, even in a general way, the contents of the book will have a good introductory knowledge of the main issues of modern thought.

If there can be said to be a *main point* in such a book as this, it may be stated somewhat as follows, and I should say that the student who does not grasp it in something like its full meaning has failed to read intelligently: — In its sequence from Descartes almost to the end of the classical period, philosophy centers about the problem of the *nature* of reality, its *substance*. It has aimed to dissect the universe as it stands at any moment, to catalogue its entities, or to describe its configuration. Its method, therefore, is

logical, analytical, critical. Its problem may be called *static*. But the course of this modern philosophy as a whole has been a successive elimination of substances and entities, of unknown quantities and realities, by interpreting them in terms of ideas or experience; and later, beginning with the practical philosophy of Kant, more significantly and more deeply, in terms of purpose and *meaning*. Parallel with this movement, within the problem of reality, another development has taken place:—toward a *dynamic* philosophy. This occurs, in fact, in every science, and is a result of the progress in which entities are reduced, either to terms of experience (and are therefore shown in their inner and more intimate relations to one another) or, in general, to any common basis. This is a tendency toward a *dynamic* science or philosophy, in the sense that now the *lawfulness* of the universe, the principle of its activity, emerges as the great central problem. It is significant, therefore, that our classical period may be observed to end in two great systems, the most comprehensive we have yet seen, in both of which the new and dominant thought is the world's lawfulness as contrasted with its nature or structure,—and it is inspiring that it is with this thought we can turn to our present problems. For this result marks the greatest advance toward a philosophy in which the concrete reality of the world as a whole becomes the subject-matter, and in which the terms are those of experience and meaning. This means a union of philosophy with the sciences and with life, such as must be maintained by our new gen-

eration of philosophers, if they are to advance upon the classical systems, and escape from the circle of epistemological problems that still threatens to engulf the best of the new thought. If I might venture so sweeping an assertion I should say, indeed, that it will be by *combining the results of Spencer and Hegel*, that our new and greater philosophy will be created. By combining the *vision* of Hegel with the *method* of Spencer: the vision of a world wholly intelligible, spiritual—at least upon hypothesis—and through and through a system of rationally related moments,—investigated by the broadest methods of induction from all its concrete facts, and of deduction from the most immediately perceived truths.

In preparing the book I have incurred several obligations which must be mentioned. President Sanford first suggested the book, and I am indebted to him for the original plan and for advice at several points. The Librarians of Clark University, of the Worcester Free Public Library, and of Dalhousie College in Halifax have assisted me generously. Several American teachers of philosophy, among them Professor Calkins of Wellesley College, Professor Rogers of the University of Missouri, and Professor Murray of Dalhousie College, have given me helpful suggestions. I am indebted to the Open Court Publishing Co., to the Clarendon Press, Oxford, to W. M. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, for the privilege of using their excellent texts, and to my own publishers for their most efficient coöperation. And, last, I am

under obligations to my wife, who has assisted me in revising manuscript and proofs.

I have indicated in the proper places the sources from which the selections have been derived, and have usually given references to pages so that the reader may find the passages in their original settings. In some cases my text will be found to vary slightly from that to which the reader is referred. This is due to the fact that I have sometimes used more than one edition, or translation. There are also minor deviations in punctuation, capitalization, and the use of italics; and rarely I have changed a word in the translated matter, or in the case of the English selections, have preferred a modern to an obsolete term, as less likely to distract the attention of the reader.

August 5, 1913.

G. E. PARTRIDGE.

Worcester, Massachusetts.

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RENÉ DESCARTES

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

RENÉ DESCARTES

1596-1650

There are three reasons at least for beginning an account of modern philosophy with Descartes, although any separation of old from new in philosophy must be arbitrary. Descartes' method of universal doubt, his attention to the data of the sciences, his new statement of the great problem of reality, entitle him to the distinction of being regarded as the founder of a new philosophy, having new methods and new problems. He deserves credit, therefore, not only for his own immediate results, but for the intellectual awakening that followed.

Descartes arrived at the conclusion, early in life, that all existing knowledge was confused and uncertain; therefore he decided to start anew, at first doubting everything, proceeding slowly, content to know but little, provided that little be beyond all possible doubt. In accordance with this purpose he laid down four rules of procedure. The first was never to receive anything as a truth that he could not himself perceive to be such, and so clearly that he could have no occasion to entertain a doubt of it. The second was to divide every difficulty into as many parts as possible, or as the nature of the difficulty might require. The third was to think always in an orderly manner, beginning with objects that were the most simple, and most easily understood; and ascending by

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natural steps to a knowledge of the most composite objects, assuming that there must be relations between things that did not appear at first to be connected. The fourth rule was to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so comprehensive, that he would be certain of omitting nothing.

How great and how many were the difficulties of establishing such certain knowledge, Descartes but little knew.¹

From "Discourse on Method" ²

I AM in doubt as to the propriety of making my

¹ If one would have at the outset a guiding thread through the systems, he may observe that, speaking broadly, the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, and Leibniz, are all founded upon the conceptions of cause and substance, regarded as external to and different in nature from the experience of man. Their methods are the methods of logic, and of mathematics and the physical sciences. The critical period that follows these systems comprises Locke, Berkeley, Hume and the earlier period of Kant. Now the methods are psychological and critical, and the tendency is to interpret everything in the terms of ideas, although these systems never rise to metaphysical proportions. The third period includes Kant's later philosophy, and his followers, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel. In this period the effort is made to combine the results of the critical philosophy and the substance philosophy into wide systems in which the objective and the subjective factors are brought under the same concepts. The methods are not consistent, and there is much confusion of logical, psychological, and metaphysical problems. Hegel, in his greater work, and also Spencer, indicate a movement toward a still broader philosophy, dealing with the fullness of the universe as the object of the sciences, and with life itself, in all its concrete meanings and purposes.

² From *The Method, Meditations and Selections from the Principles of Descartes*, translated by John Veitch.

first meditations in the place above mentioned matter of discourse; for these are so metaphysical, and so uncommon, as not, perhaps, to be acceptable to everyone. And yet, that it may be determined whether the foundations that I have laid are sufficiently secure, I find myself in a measure constrained to advert to them. I had long before remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions that we discern to be highly uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my attention solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of Geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations: and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But

immediately upon this I observed that, while I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, *I think, hence I am*, was so certain, and of such evidence, that no ground for doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the Philosophy of which I was in search.

In the next place I attentively examined what I was, and as I observed that I could suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world nor any place in which I might be; but that I could not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very circumstance that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that "I," that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.

After this I inquired in general into what is essential to the truth and certainty of a proposition; for since I had discovered one which I knew to be true, I thought that I must likewise be able to discover the ground of this certitude. And as I observed that in the words *I think, hence I am*, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive.

In the next place, from reflecting on the circumstance that I doubted, and that consequently my being was not wholly perfect (for I clearly saw that it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt), I was led to inquire whence I had learned to think of something more perfect than myself; and I clearly recognized that I must hold this notion from some Nature which in reality was more perfect. As for the thoughts of many other objects external to me, as of the sky, the earth, light, heat, and a thousand more, I was less at a loss to know whence these came; for since I remarked in them nothing which seemed to render them superior to myself, I could believe that, if these were true, they were dependencies on my own nature, in so far as it possessed a certain perfection, and, if they were false, that I held them from nothing,

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that is to say, that they were in me because of a certain imperfection of my nature. But this could not be the case with the idea of a Nature more perfect than myself; for to receive it from nothing was a thing manifestly impossible; and, because it is not less repugnant that the more perfect should be an effect of, and dependence on the less perfect, than that something should proceed from nothing, it was equally impossible that I could hold it from myself: accordingly, it but remained that it had been placed in me by a Nature which was in reality more perfect than mine, and which even possessed within itself all the perfections of which I could form any idea; that is to say, in a single word, which was God. And to this I added that, since I knew some perfections which I did not possess, I was not the only being in existence (I will here, with your permission, freely use the terms of the schools); but, on the contrary, that there was of necessity some other more perfect Being upon whom I was dependent, and from whom I had received all that I possessed; for if I had existed alone, and independently of every other being, so as to have had from myself all the perfection, however little, which I actually possessed, I should have been able, for the same reason, to have had from myself the whole remainder of perfection, of the want of which I was conscious, and thus could of myself have become infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, all-powerful, and, in fine, have possessed all the perfections which I could recognize in God. For, in order to know the nature of God

(whose existence has been established by the preceding reasonings) as far as my own nature permitted, I had only to consider in reference to all the properties of which I found in my mind some idea, whether their possession was a mark of perfection; and I was assured that no one which indicated any imperfection was in him, and that none of the rest was wanting. Thus I perceived that doubt, inconstancy, sadness, and such like could not be found in God, since I myself would have been happy to be free from them. Besides, I had ideas of many sensible and corporeal things; for although I might suppose that I was dreaming, and that all which I saw or imagined was false, I could not, nevertheless, deny that the ideas were in reality in my thoughts. But, because I had already very clearly recognized in myself that the intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal, and as I observed that all composition is an evidence of dependency, and that a state of dependency is manifestly a state of imperfection, I therefore determined that it could not be a perfection in God to be compounded of these two natures, and that consequently he was not so compounded; but that if there were any bodies in the world, or even any intelligences, or other natures that were not wholly perfect, their existence depended upon his power in such a way that they could not subsist without him for a single moment.

I was disposed straightway to search for other truths; and when I had represented to myself the object of the geometers, which I conceived to be a

continuous body, or a space indefinitely extended in length, breadth, and height or depth, divisible into divers parts which admit of different figures and sizes, and of being moved or transposed in all manner of ways (for all this the geometers suppose to be in the object they contemplate) I went over some of their simplest demonstrations. And, in the first place, I observed, that the great certitude which by common consent is accorded to these demonstrations, is founded solely upon this, that they are clearly conceived in accordance with the rules I have already laid down. In the next place, I perceived that there was nothing at all in these demonstrations which could assure me of the existence of their objects: thus, for example, supposing a triangle to be given, I distinctly perceived that its three angles were necessarily equal to two right angles, but I did not on that account perceive anything which could assure me that any triangle existed: while, on the contrary, recurring to the examination of the idea of a Perfect Being, I found that the existence of the Being was comprised in the idea in the same way that the equality of its three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle, or as in the idea of a sphere, the equidistance of all points on its surface from the center, or even still more clearly; and that, consequently, it is at least as certain that God, who is this Perfect Being, is, or exists, as any demonstration of Geometry can be.

But the reason which leads many to persuade themselves that there is a difficulty in knowing this truth, and even also in knowing what their mind really is,

is that they never raise their thoughts above sensible objects, and are so accustomed to consider nothing except by way of imagination, which is a mode of thinking limited to material objects, that all that is not imaginable seems to them not intelligible. The truth of this is sufficiently manifest from the single circumstance, that the philosophers of the Schools accept as a maxim that there is nothing in the Understanding which was not previously in the Senses, in which, however, it is certain that the ideas of God and of the soul have never been; and it appears to me that they who make use of their imagination to comprehend these ideas do exactly the same thing as if, in order to hear sounds or smell odors, they strove to avail themselves of their eyes; unless, indeed, that there is this difference, that the sense of sight does not afford us an inferior assurance to those of smell or hearing; in place of which, neither our imagination nor our senses can give us assurance of anything unless our Understanding intervene.

Finally, if there be still persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of the soul, by the reasons I have adduced, I am desirous that they should know that all the other propositions, of the truth of which they deem themselves perhaps more assured, as that we have a body, and that there exist stars and an earth, and such like, are less certain; for, although we have a moral assurance of these things, which is so strong that there is an appearance of extravagance in doubting of their existence, yet at the same time no one, unless his intellect

is impaired, can deny, when the question relates to a metaphysical certitude, that there is sufficient reason to exclude entire assurance, in the observation that when asleep we can in the same way imagine ourselves possessed of another body and that we see other stars and another earth, when there is nothing of the kind. For how do we know that the thoughts which occur in dreaming are false, rather than those other which we experience when awake, since the former are often not less vivid and distinct than the latter? And though men of the highest genius study this question as long as they please, I do not believe that they will be able to give any reason which can be sufficient to remove this doubt, unless they presuppose the existence of God. For, in the first place, even the principle which I have already taken as a rule, viz., that all the things which we clearly and distinctly conceive are true, is certain only because God is or exists, and because he is a Perfect Being, and because all that we possess is derived from him: whence it follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent of their clearness and distinctness are real, and proceed from God, must to that extent be true. Accordingly, whereas we not infrequently have ideas or notions in which some falsity is contained, this can only be the case with such as are to some extent confused and obscure, and in this proceed from nothing (participate of negation) that is, exist in us thus confused because we are not wholly perfect. And it is evident that it is not less repugnant that falsity or imperfection, in so far as it is imperfection, should proceed from God, than that truth

or perfection should proceed from nothing. But if we did not know that all which we possess of real and true proceeds from a Perfect and Infinite Being, however clear and distinct our ideas might be, we should have no ground on that account for the assurance that they possessed the perfection of being true.

But after the knowledge of God and of the soul has rendered us certain of this rule, we can easily understand that the truth of the thoughts we experience when awake, ought not in the slightest degree to be called in question on account of the illusions of our dreams. For if it happened that an individual, even when asleep, had some very distinct idea, as, for example, if a geometer should discover some new demonstration, the circumstance of his being asleep would not militate against its truth; and as for the most ordinary error of our dreams, which consists in their representing to us various objects in the same way as our external senses, this is not prejudicial, since it leads us very properly to suspect the truth of the ideas of sense; for we are not unfrequently deceived in the same manner when awake; as when persons in a jaundice see all objects yellow, or when the stars or bodies at a great distance appear to us much smaller than they are. For, in fine, whether awake or asleep, we ought never to allow ourselves to be persuaded of the truth of anything unless on the evidence of our *Reason*. And it must be noted that I say of our *Reason*, and not of our imagination or of our senses: thus, for example, although we very clearly see the sun, we ought not therefore to determine that it is only of the

size which our sense of sight presents; and we may very distinctly imagine the head of a lion joined to the body of a goat, without being therefore shut up to the conclusion that a chimera exists; for it is not a dictate of Reason that what we thus see or imagine is in reality existent; but it plainly tells us that all our ideas or notions contain in them some truth; for otherwise it could not be that God, who is wholly perfect and veracious, should have placed them in us. And because our reasonings are never so clear or so complete during sleep as when we are awake, although sometimes the acts of our imagination are then as lively and distinct, if not more so, than in our waking moments, Reason further dictates that, since all our thoughts cannot be true because of our partial imperfection, those possessing truth must infallibly be found in the experience of our waking moments rather than in that of our dreams.

Pages 32-40.

From the "Principles of Philosophy"

THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

51. But with regard to what we consider as things or the modes of things, it is worth while to examine each of them by itself. By substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence. And, in truth, there can be conceived but one substance which is absolutely independent, and that is God. We perceive that all other

things can exist only by help of the concurrence of God. And, accordingly, the term substance does not apply to God and the creatures *univocally*, to adopt a term familiar in the schools; that is, no signification of this word can be distinctly understood which is common to God and them.

52. Created substances, however, whether corporeal or thinking, may be conceived under this common concept; for these are things which, in order to their existence, stand in need of nothing but the concurrence of God. But yet substance cannot be first discovered merely from its being a thing which exists independently, for existence by itself is not observed by us. We easily, however, discover substance itself from any attribute of it, by this common notion, that of nothing there are no attributes, properties, or qualities: for, from perceiving that some attribute is present, we infer that some existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed is also of necessity present.

53. But, although any attribute is sufficient to lead us to the knowledge of substance, there is, however, one principal property of every substance, which constitutes its nature or essence, and upon which all the others depend. Thus, extension in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought the nature of thinking substance. For every other thing that can be attributed to body, presupposes extension, and is only some mode of an extended thing; as all the properties we discover in the mind are only diverse modes of thinking. Thus,

for example, we cannot conceive figure unless in something extended, nor motion unless in extended space, nor imagination, sensation, or will, unless in a thinking thing. But, on the other hand, we can conceive extension without figure or motion, and thought without imagination or sensation, and so of the others; as is clear to anyone who attends to these matters.

54. And thus we may easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas, the one of created substance, which thinks, the other of corporeal substance, provided we carefully distinguish all the attributes of thought from those of extension. We may also have a clear and distinct idea of an uncreated and independent thinking substance, that is, of God, provided we do not suppose that this idea adequately represents to us all that is in God, and do not mix up with it anything fictitious, but attend simply to the characters that are comprised in the notion we have of him, and which we clearly know to belong to the nature of an absolutely perfect Being. For no one can deny that there is in us such an idea of God, without groundlessly supposing that there is no knowledge of God at all in the human mind.

55. We will also have most distinct conceptions of duration, order, and number, if, in place of mixing up with our notions of them that which properly belongs to the concept of substance, we merely think that the duration of a thing is a mode under which we conceive this thing, in so far as it continues to exist; and in like manner, that order and number are not in reality different from things disposed in order

and numbered, but only modes under which we diversely consider these things.

56. And, indeed, we here understand by modes the same with what we elsewhere designate attributes or qualities. But when we consider substance as affected or varied by them, we use the term modes; when from this variation it may be denominated of such a kind, we adopt the term qualities to designate the different modes which cause it to be so named; and, finally, when we simply regard these modes as in the substance, we call them attributes. Accordingly, since God must be conceived as superior to change, it is not proper to say that there are modes or qualities in him, but simply attributes; and even in created things that which is found in them always in the same mode, as existence and duration in the thing which exists and endures, ought to be called attribute and not mode or quality.

57. Of these attributes or modes there are some which exist in the things themselves, and others that have only an existence in our thought; thus, for example, time, which we distinguish from duration taken in its generality, and call the measure of motion, is only a certain mode under which we think duration itself, for we do not indeed conceive the duration of things that are moved to be different from the duration of things that are not moved: as is evident from this, that if two bodies are in motion for an hour, the one moving quickly and the other slowly, we do not reckon more time in the one than in the other, although there may be much more motion in the one of the bod-

ies than in the other. But that we may comprehend the duration of all things under a common measure, we compare their duration with that of the greatest and most regular motions that give rise to years and days, and which we call time; hence what is so designated is nothing superadded to duration, taken in its generality, but a mode of thinking.

58. In the same way number, when it is not considered as in created things, but merely in the abstract or in general, is only a mode of thinking; and the same is true of all those general ideas we call universals.

59. Universals arise merely from our making use of one and the same idea in thinking of all individual objects between which there subsists a certain likeness; and when we comprehend all the objects represented by this idea under one name, this term likewise becomes universal. For example, when we see two stones, and do not regard their nature further than to remark that there are two of them, we form the idea of a certain number, which we call the binary; and when we afterwards see two birds or two trees; and merely take notice of them so far as to observe that there are two of them, we again take up the same idea as before, which is, accordingly, universal; and we likewise give to this number the same universal appellation of binary. In the same way, when we consider a figure of three sides, we form a certain idea, which we call the idea of a triangle, and we afterwards make use of it as the universal to represent to our mind all other figures of three sides. But when we remark more particularly that of figures of three

sides, some have a right angle and others not, we form the universal idea of a right-angled triangle, which being related to the preceding as more general, may be called species; and the right angle the universal difference by which right-angled triangles are distinguished from all others; and further, because the square of the side which sustains the right angle is equal to the squares of the other two sides, and because this property belongs only to this species of triangles, we may call it the universal property of the species. Finally, if we suppose that of these triangles some are moved and others not, this will be their universal accident; and accordingly, we commonly reckon five universals, viz., genus, species, difference, property, accident.

Pages 215-219.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MATERIAL THINGS

I. Although we are all sufficiently persuaded of the existence of material things, yet, since this was before called in question by us, and since we reckoned the persuasion of their existence as among the prejudices of our childhood, it is now necessary for us to investigate the grounds on which this truth may be known with certainty. In the first place, then, it cannot be doubted that every perception we have comes to us from some object different from our mind; for it is not in our power to cause ourselves to experience one perception rather than another, the perception being entirely dependent on the object which affects our senses. It may, indeed, be matter of inquiry

whether that object be God, or something different from God; but because we perceive, or rather, stimulated by sense, clearly and distinctly apprehend, certain matter extended in length, breadth, and thickness, the various parts of which have different figures and motions, and give rise to the sensations we have of colors, smells, pain, etc., God would, without question, deserve to be regarded as a deceiver, if he directly and of himself presented to our mind the idea of this extended matter, or merely caused it to be presented to us by some object which possessed neither extension, figure, nor motion. For we clearly conceive this matter as entirely distinct from God, and from ourselves, or our mind; and appear even clearly to discern that the idea of it is formed in us on occasion of objects existing out of our minds, to which it is in every respect similar. But since God cannot deceive us, for this is repugnant to his nature, as has been already remarked, we must unhesitatingly conclude that there exists a certain object extended in length, breadth, and thickness, and possessing all those properties which we clearly apprehend to belong to what is extended. And this extended substance is what we call body or matter.

2. We ought also to conclude that a certain body is more closely united to our mind than any other, because we clearly observe that pain and other sensations affect us without our foreseeing them; and these, the mind is conscious, do not arise from itself alone, nor pertain to it, in so far as it is a thing which thinks, but only in so far as it is united to another thing ex-

tended and movable, which is called the human body. But this is not the place to treat in detail of this matter.

3. It will be sufficient to remark that the preceptions of the senses are merely to be referred to this intimate union of the human body and mind, and that they usually make us aware of what, in external objects, may be useful or adverse to this union, but do not present to us these objects as they are in themselves, unless occasionally and by accident. For, after this observation, we will without difficulty lay aside the prejudices of the senses, and will have recourse to our understanding alone on this question, by reflecting carefully on the ideas implanted in it by nature.

4. In this way we will discern that the nature of matter or body, considered in general, does not consist in its being hard, or ponderous, or colored, or that which affects our senses in any other way, but simply in its being a substance extended in length, breadth, and depth. For, with respect to hardness, we know nothing of it by sense farther than that the parts of hard bodies resist the motion of our hands on coming into contact with them; but if every time our hands moved towards any part, all the bodies in that place receded as quickly as our hands approached, we should never feel hardness; and yet we have no reason to believe that bodies which might thus recede would on this account lose that which makes them bodies. The nature of body does not, therefore, consist in hardness. In the same way, it may be shown that weight, color, and all the other qualities of this sort, which

are perceived in corporeal matter, may be taken from it, itself meanwhile remaining entire: it thus follows that the nature of body depends on none of these.—

Pages 232-234.

From the "Passions of the Soul"

HOW THE SOUL AND THE BODY ACT ONE UPON THE OTHER.

Let us conceive, then, that the soul has its principal seat in this little gland in the middle of the brain, whence it radiates to all the rest of the body by means of the spirits, the nerves, and even of the blood, which, participating in the impressions of the mind, can carry them by means of the arteries, into all the members; and bearing in mind what has been said above concerning the machine of our body, to wit, that the minute filaments of our nerves are so distributed throughout all its parts, that on occasion of the different motions which are excited there by means of sensible objects, they open in diverse manners the pores of the brain, which causes the animal spirits contained in these cavities to enter in various ways into the muscles by means of which they can move the limbs in all the different ways of which they are capable, and, also, that all the other causes, which in other ways can set the spirits in motion have the effect to turn them upon various muscles. Keeping all this in mind, let us add here that the little gland which is the principal seat of the soul is so suspended between the cavities which contain the spirits that it can be affected by

them in all the different ways that there are sensible differences in objects; but that it can also be variously affected by the soul, which is of such a nature that it receives as many different impressions — that is to say, that it has as many different perceptions as there occur different motions in this gland; as also, reciprocally, the machine of the body is so composed that from the simple fact that this gland is variously affected by the soul, or by whatever other cause, it impels the spirits which surround it toward the pores of the brain, which discharge them by means of the nerves upon the muscles, whereby it causes them to move the limbs.

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THOMAS HOBBES

CHAPTER II

THOMAS HOBBS

1588-1679

The philosophy of Hobbes is materialistic in all its main principles, and is one of the four great systems of the early period of modern philosophy, all of which are based upon the notions of substance.

It was the accidental discovery of Euclid's Geometry, then but little known in England, that first suggested to Hobbes his deductive method, and a conversation in regard to the nature of sensuous perception led to his fundamental thought and principle,—that everything is, or is produced by, motion.

It is interesting to study closely the manner in which Hobbes has treated the problem of consciousness. Many times he seems on the point of seeing the need of using a subjective method, and many times he suggests in a tentative way the primary and irreducible nature of perception; and although he even maintains that our knowledge of substance is *inferred*, he remains a materialist to the last, and never abandons his effort to interpret everything,—including consciousness and the social life,—in terms of the principles of motion.

Hobbes, at the beginning of the modern period of English philosophy, and Spencer, the last of the system makers, have many traits in common. Both make motion a fundamental concept, and both seek to interpret consciousness in terms of physical concepts. Both use a synthetic method, deriving principles from abstract and general truths, and at the same time proceeding from observed facts. But there is this im-

portant difference: Hobbes seeks to explain the *nature* of objects in terms of their constituent motions; Spencer is seeking universal laws of motion in which to express the *whole course of development of the world*. Nothing could illustrate better the progress made in science and philosophy during the modern period.

From "Elements of Philosophy" ¹

PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation: And again, of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects.

For the better understanding of which definition, we must consider, first, that although Sense and Memory of things, which are common to man and all living creatures, be knowledge, yet because they are given us immediately by nature, and not gotten by ratiocination they are not philosophy.

Secondly, seeing Experience is nothing but memory; and Prudence, or prospect into the future time, nothing but expectation of such things as we have already had experience of, Prudence also is not to be esteemed philosophy.

By *Ratiocination*, I mean *computation*. Now to compute, is either to collect the sum of many things

¹ *The Metaphysical System of Hobbes*, as Contained in Twelve Chapters from his *Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body*, etc., selected by Mary Whiton Calkins, 1905. The Open Court Publishing Co.

that are added together, or to know what remains when one thing is taken out of another. *Ratiocination*, therefore, is the same with *addition* and *subtraction*; and if any man add *multiplication* and *division*, I will not be against it, seeing multiplication is nothing but addition of equals one to another, and division nothing but a subtraction of equals one from another, as often as is possible. So that all ratiocination is comprehended in these two operations of the mind, addition and subtraction.

The *subject* of Philosophy, or the matter it treats of, is every body of which we can conceive any generation, and which we may, by any consideration thereof, compare with other bodies, or which is capable of composition and resolution; that is to say, every body of whose generation or properties we can have any knowledge. And this may be deduced from the definition of philosophy, whose profession it is to search out the properties of bodies from their generation, or their generation from their properties; and, therefore, where there is no generation or property, there is no philosophy. Therefore it excludes *Theology*, I mean the doctrine of God, eternal, ingenerable, incomprehensible, and in whom there is nothing neither to divide nor compound, nor any generation to be conceived.

It excludes the doctrine of *angels*, and all such things as are thought to be neither bodies nor properties of bodies; there being in them no place neither for com-

position nor division, nor any capacity of more and less, that is to say, no place for ratiocination.

It excludes *history*, as well *natural* as *political*, though most useful (nay necessary) to philosophy; because such knowledge is but experience, or authority, and not ratiocination.

It excludes all such knowledge as is acquired by Divine inspiration, or revelation, as not derived to us by reason, but by Divine grace in an instant, and, as it were, by some sense supernatural.

It excludes not only all doctrines which are false, but such also as are not well-grounded; for whatsoever we know by right ratiocination, can neither be false nor doubtful; and, therefore, *astrology*, as it is now held forth, and all such divinations rather than sciences, are excluded.

Lastly, the doctrine of *God's worship* is excluded from philosophy, as being not to be known by natural reason, but by the authority of the Church; and as being the object of faith, and not of knowledge.

The principal parts of philosophy are two. For two chief kinds of bodies, and very different from one another, offer themselves to such as search after their generation and properties; one whereof being the work of nature, is called a *natural body*, the other is called a *commonwealth*, and is made by the wills and agreement of men. And from these spring the two parts of philosophy, called *natural* and *civil*. But seeing that, for the knowledge of the properties of a commonwealth, it is necessary first to know the dispositions, affections, and manners of men, civil philosophy is

again commonly divided into two parts, whereof one, which treats of men's dispositions and manners, is called *ethics*; and the other, which takes cognizance of their civil duties, is called politics, or simply *civil philosophy*. In the first place, therefore (after I have set down such premises as appertain to the nature of philosophy in general), I will discourse of bodies *natural*; in the second, of the *dispositions and manners of men*; and in the third, of the *civil duties of subjects*.

To conclude: seeing there may be many who will not like this my definition of philosophy, and will say, that, from the liberty which a man may take of so defining as seems best to himself, he may conclude anything from any thing (though I think it no hard matter to demonstrate that this definition of mine agrees with the sense of all men); yet, lest in this point there should be any cause of dispute betwixt me and them, I here undertake no more than to deliver the elements of that science by which the effects of anything may be found out from the known generation of the same, or contrarily, the generation from the effects; to the end that they who search after other philosophy, may be admonished to seek it from other principles.

In the study of philosophy, men search after science either simply or indefinitely; that is, to know as much as they can, without propounding to themselves any limited question; or they inquire into the cause of some determined appearance, or endeavor to find out the certainty of something in question, as what is the cause of *light*, of *heat*, of *gravity*, of a *figure* pro-

pounded, and the like; or in what *subject* any propounded accident is inherent; or what may conduce most to the *generation* of some propounded *effect* from many *accidents*; or in what manner particular causes ought to be compounded for the production of some certain effect. Now, according to this variety of things in question, sometimes the *analytical method* is to be used, sometimes the *synthetical*.

But to those that search after science indefinitely, which consists in the knowledge of the causes of all things, as far forth as it may be attained, (and the causes of singular things are compounded of the causes of universal or simple things) it is necessary that they know the causes of universal things, or of such accidents as are common to all bodies, that is, to all matter, before they can know the causes of singular things, that is, of those accidents by which one thing is distinguished from another. And, again, they must know what those universal things are, before they can know their causes. Moreover, seeing universal things are contained in the nature of singular things, the knowledge of them is to be acquired by reason, that is, by resolution. For example, if there be propounded a conception or *idea* of some singular thing, as of a *square*, this square is to be resolved into a *plane*, *terminated with a certain number of equal and straight lines and right angles*. For by this resolution we have these things universal or agreeable to all matter, namely, *line*, *plane*, (which contains *superficies*) *terminated*, *angle*, *straightness*, *rectitude*, and *equality*; and if we can find out the causes of these, we may

compound them altogether into the cause of a square. Again, if any man propound to himself the conception of *gold*, he may, be resolving, come to the ideas of *solid, visible, heavy*, (that is, tending to the center of the earth or downwards) and many other more universal than gold itself; and these he may resolve again, till he come to such things as are the most universal of all. And in this manner, by resolving continually, we may come to know what those things are, whose causes being first known severally, and afterwards compounded, bring us to the knowledge of singular things. I conclude, therefore, that the method of attaining to the universal knowledge of things, is purely *analytical*.

But the causes of universal things (of those, at least, that have any cause) are manifest of themselves, or (as they say commonly) known to nature; so that they need no method at all; for they have all but one universal cause, which is motion. For the variety of all figures arises out of the variety of those motions by which they are made; and motion cannot be understood to have any other cause besides motion; nor has the variety of those things we perceive by sense, as of *colors, sounds, savors*, etc., any other cause than motion, residing partly in the objects that work upon our senses, and partly in ourselves, in such manner, as that it is manifestly some kind of motion, though we cannot, without ratiocination, come to know what kind. For though many cannot understand till it be in some sort demonstrated to them, that all mutation consists in motion; yet this happens not from any obscurity in the thing itself, (for it is not intelligible

that anything can depart either from rest, or from the motion it has, except by motion), but either by having their natural discourse corrupted with former opinions received from their masters, or else for this, that they do not at all bend their mind to the inquiring out of truth.

By the knowledge therefore of universals, and of their causes (which are the first principles by which we know the [wherefore] of things) we have in the first place their definitions, (which are nothing but the explication of our simple conceptions). For example, he that has a true conception of *place*, cannot be ignorant of this definition, *place is that space which is possessed or filled adequately by some body; and so*, he that conceives *motion* aright, cannot but know that *motion is the privation of one place, and the acquisition of another*. In the next place, we have their generations or descriptions; as (for example,) that *a line is made by the motion of a point, superficies by the motion of a line, and one motion by another motion*, etc. It remains, that we inquire what motion begets such and such effects; as what motion makes a straight line, and what a circular; what motion thrusts, what draws, and by what way; what makes a thing which is seen or heard, to be seen or heard sometimes in one manner, sometimes in another. Now the method of this kind of inquiry, is *compositive*. For first, we are to observe what effect a body moved produceth, when we consider nothing in it besides its motion; and we see presently that this makes a line, or length; next, what the motion of a long body produces, which we

find to be superficies ; and so forwards, till we see what the effects of simple motion are ; and then, in like manner, we are to observe what proceeds from the addition, multiplication, subtraction, and division, of these motions, and what effects, what figures, and what properties, they produce ; from which kind of contemplation sprung that part of philosophy which is called *geometry*.

But when we seek after the cause of any propounded effect, we must in the first place get into our mind an exact notion or idea of that which we call cause, namely, that *a cause is the sum or aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agents and the patient, as concur to the producing of the effect propounded ; all of which existing together, it cannot be understood but that the effect existeth with them ; or that it can possibly exist if any one of them be absent*. This being known, in the next place we must examine singly every accident that accompanies or precedes the effect, as far forth as it seems to conduce in any manner to the production of the same, and see whether the propounded effect may be conceived to exist, without the existence of any of those accidents ; and by this means separate such accidents, as do not concur, from such as concur to produce the said effect ; which being done, we are to put together the concurring accidents, and consider whether we can possibly conceive, that when these are all present, the effect propounded will not follow ; and if it be evident that the effect will follow, then that aggregate of accidents is the entire cause, otherwise not : but we must still search out and put together

other accidents. For example, if the cause of light be propounded to be sought out; first, we examine things without us, and find that whensoever light appears, there is some principal object, as it were the fountain of light, without which we cannot have any perception of light; and, therefore, the concurrence of that object is necessary to the generation of light. Next, we consider the medium and find that unless it be disposed in a certain manner, namely, that it be transparent, though the object remain the same, yet the effect will not follow; and, therefore, the concurrence of transparency is also necessary to the generation of light. Thirdly, we observe our own body, and find that by the indisposition of the eyes, the brain, the nerves, and the heart, that is, by obstructions, stupidity, and debility we are deprived of light so that a fitting disposition of the organs to receive impressions from without is likewise a necessary part of the cause of light. Again, of all the accidents inherent in the object, there is none that can conduce to the effecting of light, but only action (or a certain motion), which cannot be conceived to be wanting, whensoever the effect is present; for, that anything may shine, it is not requisite that it be of such or such magnitude or figure, or that the whole body of it be moved out of the place it is in (unless it may perhaps be said, that in the sun or other body, that which causes light is the light it hath in itself; which yet is but a trifling exception, seeing nothing is meant thereby but the cause of light; as if any man should say that the cause of light is that in the sun which produceth it); it remains, therefore,

that the action by which light is generated, is motion only in the parts of the object. Which being understood, we may easily conceive what it is the medium contributes, namely, the continuation of that motion to the eye; and, lastly, what the eye and the rest of the organs of the sentient contribute, namely, the continuation of the same motion to the last organ of sense, the heart. And in this manner the cause of light may be made up of motion continued from the original of the same motion, to the original of vital motion, light being nothing but the alteration of vital motion, made by the impression upon it of motion continued from the object. But I give this only for an example, for I shall speak more at large of light, and the generation of it, in its proper place. In the mean time it is manifest, that in the searching out of causes, there is need partly of the analytical, and partly of the synthetical method; of the analytical, to conceive how circumstances conduce severally to the production of effects; and of the synthetical, for the adding together and compounding of what they can effect singly by themselves. And thus much may serve for the method of invention. It remains that I speak of the method of teaching, that is, of demonstration, and of the means by which we demonstrate.

OF PLACE AND TIME

In the teaching of natural philosophy, I cannot begin better (as I have already shown) than from *privation*; that is, from feigning the world to be annihilated, But, if such annihilation of all things be supposed, it

may perhaps be asked, what would remain for any man (whom only I except from this universal annihilation of things) to consider as the subject of philosophy, or at all to reason upon; or what to give names unto for ratiocination's sake.

I say, therefore, there would remain to that man ideas of the world, and of all such bodies as he had, before their annihilation, seen with his eyes, or perceived by any other sense; that is to say, the memory and imagination of magnitudes, motions, sounds, colors, etc., as also of their order and parts. All which things, though they be nothing but ideas and phantasms happening internally to him that imagineth; yet they will appear as if they were external, and not at all depending upon any power of the mind. And these are the things to which he would give names, and subtract from them, and compound them with one another. For seeing, that after the destruction of all other things, I suppose man still remaining, and namely that he thinks, imagines, and remembers, there can be nothing for him to think of but what is past; nay, if we do but observe diligently what it is we do when we consider and reason, we shall find that though all things be still remaining in the world, yet we compute nothing but our own phantasms. For when we calculate the magnitude and motions of heaven or earth, we do not ascend into heaven that we may divide it into parts, or measure the motions thereof, but we do it sitting still in our closets or in the dark. Now things may be considered, that is, be brought into account, either as internal accidents of our mind, in which

manner we consider them when the question is about some faculty of the mind; or as species of external things, not as really existing, but appearing only to exist or to have a being without us. And in this manner we are now to consider them.

If, therefore, we remember, or have a phantasm of any thing that was in the world before the supposed annihilation of the same; and consider, not that the thing was such or such, but only that it had a being without the mind, we have presently a conception of that we call *space*; an imaginary space indeed, because a mere phantasm, yet that very thing which all men call so. For no man calls it space for being already filled, but because it may be filled; nor does any man think bodies carry their places away with them, but that the same space contains sometimes one, sometimes another body; which could not be if space should always accompany the body which is once in it. And this is of itself so manifest, that I should not think it needed any explaining at all, but that I find space to be falsely defined by certain philosophers, who infer from thence, one, that the world is infinite (for taking *space* to be the extension of bodies, and thinking extension may increase continually, he infers that bodies may be infinitely extended); and, another from the same definition, concludes rashly, that it is impossible, even to God himself, to create more worlds than one; for, if another world were to be created, he says, that seeing there is nothing without this world, and therefore (according to his definition) no space, that new world must be placed in nothing; but in nothing

nothing can be placed; which he affirms only, without showing any reason for the same; whereas the contrary is the truth, for more cannot be put into a place already filled, so much is empty space fitter than that, which is full, for the receiving of new bodies. Having therefore spoken thus much for these men's sakes, and for theirs that assent to them, I return to my purpose, and define *space* thus: *Space is the phantasm of a thing existing without the mind simply*; that is to say, that phantasm, in which we consider no other accident, but only that it appears without us.

As a body leaves a phantasm of its magnitude in the mind, so also a moved body leaves a phantasm of its motion, namely, an idea of that body passing out of one space into another by continual succession. And this idea, or phantasm, is that, which, (without receding much from the common opinion, or from Aristotle's definition) I call *Time*. For seeing all men confess a year to be time, and yet do not think a year to be the accident or affection of any body, they must needs confess it to be, not in the things without us, but only in the thought of the mind. So when they speak of the times of their predecessors, they do not think after their predecessors are gone, that their times can be anywhere else than in the memory of those that remember them. And as for those that say, days, years, and months are the motions of the sun and moon, seeing it is all one to say, motion *past* and motion *destroyed*, and that *future* motion is the same with motion which is *not yet begun*, they say that, which they do not mean, that there neither is, nor has been, nor shall

be any time; for of whatsoever it may be said, it *has been* or it *shall be*, of the same also it might have been said heretofore, or may be said hereafter, *it is*. What then can days, months, and years be, but the names of such computations made in our mind? *Time* therefore is a phantasm, but a phantasm of motion, for if we would know by what moments time passes away, we make use of some motion or other, as of the sun, of a clock, of the sand in an hour glass, or we mark some line upon which we imagine something to be moved, there being no other means, by which we can take notice of any time at all. And yet, when I say *time* is a phantasm of motion, I do not say this is sufficient to define it by; for this word *time* comprehends the notion of *former* and *latter*, or of *succession* in the motion of a body, in as much as it is first *here* then *there*. Wherefore a complete definition of *time* is such as this: *Time is the phantasm of before and after in motion*; which agrees with this definition of Aristotle, *time is the number of motion according to former and latter*; for that numbering is an act of the mind; and therefore it is all one to say, *time is the number of motion according to former and latter*; and *time is a phantasm of motion numbered*. But that other definition, *time is the measure of motion*, is not so exact, for we measure time by motion and not motion by time.

OF BODY AND ACCIDENT

Having understood what imaginary space is, in which we supposed nothing remaining without us, but all those things to be destroyed, that, by existing here-

tofore, left images of themselves in our minds; let us now suppose some one of these things to be placed again in the world, or created anew. It is necessary, therefore, that this new-created or replaced thing do not only fill some part of the space above mentioned, or be coincident and coextended with it, but also that it have no dependence upon our thought. And this is that which, for the extension of it, we commonly call *body*; and because it depends not upon our thought, we say is *a thing subsisting of itself*; as also *existing*, because without us; and, lastly, it is called the *subject*, because it is so placed in and *subjected* to imaginary space, that it may be understood by reason, as well as perceived by sense. The definition, therefore, of *body* may be this, *a body is that, which having no dependence upon our thought, is coincident or coextended with some part of space.*

But what an *accident* is cannot so easily be explained by any definition, as by examples. Let us imagine, therefore, that a body fills any space, or is coextended with it; that coextension is not the coextended body: and, in like manner, let us imagine that the same body is removed out of its place; that removing is not the removed body: or let us think the same not removed; that not removing or rest is not the resting body. What, then, are these things? They are *accidents* of that body. But the thing in question is, *what is an accident?* which is an inquiry after that which we know already, and not that which we should inquire after. For who does not always and in the same manner, understand him that says anything is extended, or

moved, or not moved? But most men will have it be said that an *accident* is *something*, namely, some part of a natural thing, when, indeed, it is no part of the same. To satisfy these men, as well as may be, they answer best that define an *accident* to be the *manner by which any body is conceived*; which is all one as if they should say, *an accident is that faculty of any body, by which it works in us a conception of itself*. Which definition, though it be not an answer to the question propounded, yet it is an answer to that question which should have been propounded, namely, *whence does it happen that one part of any body appears here, another there?* For this is well answered thus: *it happens from the extension of that body*. Or, *how comes it to pass that the whole body, by succession, is seen now here, now there*, and the answer will be, *by reason of its motion*. Or, lastly, *whence is it that any body possesseth the same space for some time, and the answer will be, because it is not moved*. For if concerning the name of a body, that is, concerning a concrete name, it be asked, *what is it?* the answer must be made by definition; for the question is concerning the signification of the name. But if it be asked concerning an abstract name, *what is it?* the cause is demanded why a thing appears so or so. As if it be asked *what is hard?* the answer will be, *hard* is that, whereof no part gives place, but when the whole gives place. But if it be demanded, *what is hardness?* a cause must be shown why a part does not give place, except the whole give place. Wherefore I define an *accident* to be the *manner of our conception of body*.

When an *accident* is said *to be in a body*, it is not so to be understood, as if anything were contained in that body; as if, for example, redness were in blood, in the same manner, as blood is in a bloody cloth, that is, as a part in the whole; for so, an accident would be a body also. But, as magnitude, or rest, or motion is in that which is great, or which resteth, or which is moved, (which, how it is to be understood every man understands) so also it is to be understood, that every other accident *is in its subject*. And this, also, is explicated by Aristotle no otherwise than negatively, namely, that *an accident is in its subject, not as any part thereof, but so as that it may be away, the subject still remaining*; which is right, saving that there are certain accidents, which can never perish except the body perish also; for no body can be conceived to be without extension, or without figure. All other accidents, which are not common to all bodies, but peculiar to some only, *as to be at rest, to be moved, color, hardness*, and the like, do perish continually, and are succeeded by others; yet so, as that the body never perisheth. And as for the opinion that some may have, that all other accidents are not in their bodies in the same manner that extension, motion, rest, or figure are in the same; for example, that color, heat, odor, virtue, vice and the like are otherwise in them, and, as they say, *inherent*; I desire they would suspend their judgment for the present, and expect a little, till it be found out by ratiocination whether these very actions are not also certain motions either of the mind of the perceiver, or of the bodies themselves which are

perceived; for in the search of this, a great part of natural philosophy consists.

OF SENSE AND ANIMAL MOTION

I have, in the first chapter, defined philosophy to be *knowledge of effects acquired by true ratiocination, from knowledge first had of their causes and generation; and of such causes or generations as may be, from former knowledge of their effects or appearances.* There are, therefore, two methods of philosophy; one, from the generation of things to their possible effects; and the other, from their effects or appearances to some possible generation of the same. In the former of these the truth of the first principles of our ratiocination, namely definitions, is made and constituted by ourselves, whilst we consent and agree about the appellations of things. And this part I have finished in the foregoing chapters; in which if I am not deceived, I have affirmed nothing, saving the definitions themselves, which hath not good coherence with the definitions I have given; that is to say, which is not sufficiently demonstrated to all those, that agree with me in the use of words and appellations: for whose sake only I have written the same. I now enter upon the other part; which is the finding out by the appearances or effects of nature, which we know by sense, some ways and means by which they may be, I do not say they are, generated. The principles, therefore, upon which the following discourse depends, are not such as we ourselves make and pronounce in general terms, as definitions; but such, as being placed in the

things themselves by the Author of Nature, are by us observed in them; and we make use of them in single and particular, not universal propositions. Nor do they impose upon us any necessity of constituting theorems; their use being only, though not without such general propositions as have been already demonstrated, to show us the possibility of some production or generation. Seeing, therefore, the science, which is here taught, hath its principles in the appearances of nature, and endeth in the attaining of some knowledge of natural causes, I have given to this part the title of *physics*, or the *phenomena of nature*. Now such things as appear, or are shown to us by nature, we call phenomena, or appearances.

Of all the phenomena or appearances which are near us, the most admirable is apparition itself, namely, that some natural bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all things, and others of none at all. So that if the appearances be the principles by which we know all other things, we must needs acknowledge sense to be the principle by which we know those principles, and that all the knowledge we have is derived from it. And as for the cause of sense, we cannot begin our search of them from any other phenomenon than that of sense itself. But you will say, by what sense shall we take notice of sense? I answer, by sense itself, namely, by the memory which for some time remains in us of things sensible, though they themselves pass away. For he that perceives that he hath perceived, remembers.

In the first place, therefore, the causes of our per-

ception, that is, the causes of those ideas and phantasms which are perpetually generated within us whilst we make use of our senses, are to be inquired into; and in what manner their generation proceeds. To help which inquisition, we may observe first of all, that our phantasms or ideas are not always the same; but that new ones appear to us, and old ones vanish, according as we apply our organs of sense, now to one object, now to another. Wherefore they are generated, and perish. And from hence it is manifest, that they are some change or mutation in the sentient.

Now that all mutation or alteration is motion or endeavor (and endeavor also is motion) in the internal parts of the thing that is altered, hath been proved from this, that whilst even the least parts of any body remain in the same situation in respect of one another, it cannot be said that any alteration, unless perhaps that the whole body, together hath been moved, hath happened to it; but that it both appeareth and is the same it appeared and was before. Since, therefore, in the sentient, can be nothing else but motion in some of the internal parts of the sentient; and the parts so moved are parts of the organs of sense. For the parts of our body, by which we perceive anything, are those we commonly call the organs of sense. And so we find what is the subject of our sense, namely, that in which are the phantasms; and partly also we have discovered the nature of sense, namely, that it is some internal motion in the sentient.

I have shown besides that no motion is generated but by a body contiguous and moved; from whence it is

manifest, that the immediate cause of sense or perception consists in this, that the first organ of sense is touched and pressed. For when the uttermost part of the organ is pressed, it no sooner yields, but the part next within it is pressed also; and, in this manner, the pressure or motion is propagated through all the parts of the organ to the innermost. And thus also the pressure of the uttermost part proceeds from the pressure of some more remote body, and so continually, till we come to that from which, as from its fountain, we derive the phantasm or idea that is made in us by our sense. And this, whatsoever it be, is that we commonly call *the object*. Sense, therefore, is some internal motion in the sentient, generated by some internal motion of the parts of the object, and propagated through all the media to the innermost part of the organ. By which words I have almost defined what sense is.

Moreover, I have shown that all resistance is endeavor opposite to another endeavor, that is to say, reaction. Seeing, therefore, there is in the whole organ, by reason of its own internal natural motion, some resistance or reaction against the motion which is propagated from the object to the innermost part of the organ, there is also in the same organ an endeavor opposite to the endeavor which proceeds from the object; so that when that endeavor inwards is the last action in the act of sense, then from the reaction, how little soever the duration of it may be, a phantasm or idea hath its being; which, by reason that the endeavor is now outwards, doth always appear as something

situate within the organ. So that now I shall give you the whole definition of sense, as it is drawn from the explication of the causes thereof and the order of its generation, thus: *sense is a phantasm, made by the reaction and endeavor outwards in the organ of sense, caused by an endeavor inwards from the object, remaining for some time more or less.*

From Leviathan ¹

ERRORS IN PHILOSOPHY

But the philosophy-schools, through all the universities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say, for the cause of *vision*, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a *visible species*, in English, a *visible show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen*; the receiving whereof into the eye, is *seeing*. And for the cause of *hearing*, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an *audible species*, that is an *audible aspect, or audible being seen*; which entering at the ear, maketh hearing. Nay, for the cause of *understanding* also, they say the thing understood, sendeth forth an *intelligible species*, that is, an *intelligible being seen*; which, coming into the understanding, makes us understand. I say not this, as disproving the use of universities; but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what

¹ *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, edited by Sir Wm. Molesworth. Vol. 3. 1839.

things would be amended in them ; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one.

Page 3.

From these metaphysics, which are mingled with the Scripture to make school divinity, we are told, there be in the world certain essences separated from bodies, which they call *abstract essences*, and *substantial forms*. For the interpreting of which jargon there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. . . .

Page 672.

Being once fallen into this error of *separated essences*, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these forms to be real, they are obliged to assign them *some place*. But because they hold them incorporeal, without all dimension of quantity, and all men know that place is dimension, and not to be filled, but by that which is corporeal ; they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed anywhere *circumscriptivè*, but *definitive* ; which terms being mere words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass only in Latin, that the vanity of them may be concealed. For the circumscription of a thing is nothing else but the determination, or defining of its place ; and so both the terms of the distinction are the same. And in particular, of the essence of a man, which, they say, is his soul, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part, how small soever, of his body ; and yet no more soul in the whole body, than in any one of those parts. Can any man

think that God is served with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe, to those that will believe the existence of an incorporeal soul, separated from the body.

Again, whereas motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances are not capable of place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a soul can go hence, without the body, to heaven, hell, or purgatory; and how the ghosts of men, and I may add of their clothes which they appear in, can walk by night in churches, churchyards, and other places of sepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unless they will say, they walk *definitivè*, not *circumscriptivè*, or *spiritually*, not *temporally*; for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to any difficulty whatsoever.

For the meaning of *eternity*, they will not have it to be an endless succession of time; for then they should not be able to render a reason how God's will, and pre-ordaining of things to come, should not be before his prescience of the same, as the efficient cause before the effect, or agent before the action; nor of many other their bold opinions concerning the incomprehensible nature of God. But they will teach us, that eternity is the standing still of the present time, a *nunc-stans*, as the Schools call it; which neither they, nor any else understand, no more than they would a *hic-stans* for an infinite greatness of place.

Pages 675-677.

I. The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of method; in that they begin not their

ratiocination from definitions; that is from settled significations of their words; as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numeral words, *one, two, and three*.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, which I have mentioned in the preceding chapter; these considerations being diversely named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion and unfit connection of their names into assertions. And therefore,

II. The second class of absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of *bodies* to *accidents*; or of *accidents* to *bodies*; as they do, that say, *faith is infused, or inspired*: when nothing can be *poured* or *breathed* into anything, but body; and that, *extension is body*; that *phantasms* are *spirits*, etc.

III. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the *accidents* of *bodies without us*, to the *accidents* of our *own bodies*; as they do that say, *the color is in the body; the sound is in the air*, etc.

IV. The fourth, to the giving of the names of *bodies* to *names* or *speeches*; as they do that say, *that there be things universal*; that a *living creature is genus*, or a *general thing*, etc.

V. The fifth, to the giving of the names of *accidents* to *names* and *speeches*; as they do that say, *the nature of a thing is its definition*; a *man's command is his will*; and the like.

VI. The sixth to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say, for example, in com-

mon speech, *the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither; the proverb says this or that*, whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak; yet in reckoning and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

VII. The seventh, to names that signify nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the schools, as *hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-now*, and the like canting of schoolmen.

By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us; nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is; but attained by industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names to assertions made by connection of one of them to another; and so to syllogisms, which are the connections of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call *Science*. And whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and irrevocable. Science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like another time; because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects.

OUR NOTION OF THE INFINITE

Whatsoever we imagine is *finite*. Therefore there is no idea, or conception of anything we call *infinite*. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signify only, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the things named; having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible; and his greatness and power are unconceivable; but that we may honor him. Also because, whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing anything, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that anything is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once; for none of these things ever have, nor can be incident to sense; but are absurd speeches taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving schoolmen.

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OBJECTS OF RELIGION

And for the matter, or substance of the invisible

agents, so fancied; they could not by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit but that it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a looking-glass, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think to be real and external substances; and therefore call them ghosts; as the Latins called them *imagines*, and *umbræ*; and thought them spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible agents, which they feared, to be like them; save that they appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as *spirit*, and *incorporeal*; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them; and therefore, men that by their own meditation arrive to the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, chose rather to confess he is incomprehensible, and above their understanding, than to define his nature by *spirit incorporeal*, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible; or if they give him such a title it is not *dogmatically*, with intention to make the divine nature understood; but *piously*, to honor him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies visible.

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BARUCH DE SPINOZA

CHAPTER III

BARUCH DE SPINOZA

1632-1677

Spinoza's system is both an advance and a retrogression from the philosophy of Descartes: an advance, since he made progress toward a monistic conception of reality, which has been the main trend of later philosophy,—a retrogression, since his methods were scholastic, and his spirit dogmatic.

Unlike Descartes, Spinoza appears to have been in search of true happiness, rather than of knowledge for its own sake. Riches, fame, and the pleasures of sense he observed to be nearly certain of attainment, if one gave undivided attention to the pursuit of them; while the issues of a quest for happiness in any other direction seemed uncertain. But on further reflection he saw that riches, fame, and the pleasures of sense *never brought true happiness at all*; so that to abandon the pursuit of them, and to seek happiness elsewhere, was a gain, for one thereby exchanged the certainty of defeat for a possibility of success.

Having arrived at this truth, the next step was to discover what the highest good was, in the pursuit of which life ought to be spent. This Spinoza found to be *the attainment of a perfect character*. To attain a perfect character, to show others the truth and to lead them to the desired goal was, therefore, the main purpose of life. But to know what the highest character was, demanded the greatest possible knowledge of nature and of man; to practice virtue wisely required an understanding of many sciences, even the practical sciences that aid in improving the understanding and in perfecting health. In fact, nothing less than the most certain

and complete knowledge of the whole universe would be an adequate ground for the study and practice of the perfect life. Harmony among all one's ideas, the clearness and distinctness that come from perfect consistency,—these would be always the supreme tests of truth.

Such were the considerations that led Spinoza to construct his science of substance as the highest truth.

From "The Ethics" ¹

CONCERNING GOD

Definitions

I. By that which is *self-caused*, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.

II. A thing is called *finite after its kind*, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

III. By *substance*, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

IV. By *attribute*, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

V. By *mode*, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

VI. By *God*, I mean a being absolutely infinite,—

¹ From *The Ethics*, contained in *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, by R. H. M. Elwes.

that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation.—I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.

VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

VIII. By *eternity*, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

Explanation.—Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.

Axioms

I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.

III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of a cause.

V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.

Propositions

Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Proof. This is clear from Def. iii and v.

Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.

Proof. Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself: in other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

Prop. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

Proof. If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v) and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other. (Ax. iv.)

Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i), that is, (by Def. iii and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

Proof. If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications — as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.), — it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly (Def. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another — that is, (by Prop. iv.) there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Proof. It is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute, *i. e.* which have anything common to them both (Prop.

ii.), and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one cannot be the cause of another, neither can one be produced by the other. *Q. E. D.*

Corollary. Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as appear from Ax. i. and Def. iii. and v.). Now (by the last proposition) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. *Q. E. D.* This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause. (Ax. iv.) and (by Def. iii) it would itself not be substance.

Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

Proof. Substance cannot be produced by anything external (Corollary, Prop. vi.); it must, therefore, be its own cause — that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature.

Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof. There can be only one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two substances with an

identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. *Q. E. D.*

Note I. As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite.

Note II. No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop. vii.; for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes make complete confusion — think that trees might talk just as well as men — that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition would be an universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself — that is, something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas modifications exist in something external to them-

selves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist. Therefore we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications; for, although they may have no *actual* existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas, the only truth substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct — that is, a true — idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true — in short, the height of absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning — that there is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must premise:

1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this it follows that —

2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. For in-

stance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does not imply any fixed number of triangles.

3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist.

4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart from such definition.

It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less; for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition; and from its definition alone

existence must be deducible. But from its definition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.) we cannot infer the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has the greater the number of its attributes. (Def. iv.)

Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

Proof. An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.) and, therefore, must be conceived through itself. (Def. iii.). *Q. E. D.*

Note. It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as distinct — that is, one without the help of the other — yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as

consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.

If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought for in vain.

Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

Proof. If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

Another proof. Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence — *e. g.* if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a

circle does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence.

If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him—that is, drawn from another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.

As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect, is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. *Q. E. D.*

Another proof. The potentiality of non-existence

is a negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see Axiom i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely infinite — in other words, God (Def. vi.) — necessarily exists. *Q. E. D.*

Note. In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's existence *à posteriori*, so that the proof might be more easily followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence does not follow *à priori*. For, as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that those which quickly come to pass — that is, quickly come into existence — quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment — that is, not so easily brought into existence — those things which they conceive as more complicated.

However, to do away with this misconception, I

need not here show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise. I need only remark, that I am not here speaking of things, which come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause, and therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from their own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect,—that is, of God. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive reader.

Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Corollary II. It follows that extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (*affectiones*) of the attributes of God.

Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

Proof. Besides God, no substance is granted or can be conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance; wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only through it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing can be, or be conceived. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways — that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Proof. This proposition will be clear to everyone, who remembers that from the given definition of anything the intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite at-

tributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. *Q. E. D.*

Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone.

Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Note. Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature viewed as active (*natura naturans*), and nature viewed as passive (*natura naturata*). I say to explain, or rather to call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop. xiv., Corollary i., and Prop. xvii., Corollary ii.) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause.

[Prop. XIV. i. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.)

Prop. XVII, Corollary ii. That God is the sole free cause, etc.]

By nature viewed as passive I understand all that

which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

THOUGHT AND EXTENSION AS ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

Proof. Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God. [Prop. XXV. *Corollary*. Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.] God therefore possesses the attribute (Part. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Part. i., Def. vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. *Q. E. D.*

Note. This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things, in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the

consideration of thought alone we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (Part i., Def. iv. and vi.) one of the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.

Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.

Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last.

Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Proof. This proposition is evident from Part. i., Ax. iv. For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.

Corollary. Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action — that is, whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of extension (*formaliter*), follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).

Note. Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above — namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance; consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. . . . Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of

extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes — that is, the same things following in either case.

Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.

Proof. If indeed the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God [Part II, ix, Corollary. “Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he has the idea of the object.”] in virtue of his constituting our mind, but in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that is, [II, xi, Corollary “that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God”] the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind: now [by II, Ax. iv. “we perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways”] we do possess the ideas of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists [II, xi. “the first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.”] Further, if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I. xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other

object (II, xi.) ; but (II, Ax. v. " we feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes of thought ") there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. *Q. E. D.*

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GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ

CHAPTER IV

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ

1646-1716

The philosophy of Leibniz passed through several phases, and his relations to the thought that preceded him, and to that which has followed, are many-sided. To some extent he reverted to older methods and problems, and yet the main principles of his system are founded upon the concepts of the physical and mathematical sciences. His monads are substances, and have physical properties, but they are also self-contained and independent, and their activities are wholly internal. He points the way therefore toward idealism, though deviously and uncertainly. He may also be regarded as the founder of modern pluralism; as the forerunner of Herbart and of such current systems as those of Wundt and of Nichols, a too little known American philosopher.

The life of Leibniz was as many-sided as his thought. He had no such singleness and simplicity of purpose in approaching philosophy, as did Descartes and Spinoza. He was a courtier, a man of affairs, a diplomat, possessing great versatility of mind,—a profound mathematician, the discoverer of the method of the calculus, learned in theology and scholastic philosophy. But, for all that, he never seems quite free from a fixed and conscious purpose of defending the dogmas of the Church, and especially many of his views have been built around that doctrine which asserts the perfection of God and of his created world.

From the Monadology ¹

1. The Monad, of which we will speak here, is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes to make up composites; by simple, we mean without parts.

2. There must be simple substances because there are composites; for a composite is nothing else than a collection or *aggregatum* of simple substances.

3. Now, where there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. These Monads are the true Atoms of nature, and, in fact, the Elements of things.

4. Their dissolution, therefore, is not to be feared, and there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance can perish through natural means.

5. For the same reason there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance might, through natural means, come into existence, since it cannot be formed by composition.

6. We may say, then, that the existence of Monads can begin or end only all at once, that is to say, the Monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation. Composites, however, begin or end gradually.

7. There is also no way of explaining how a Monad can be altered or changed in its inner being by any other created thing, since there is no possibility

¹ The passages from Leibniz are contained in *Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics*, etc., by G. R. Montgomery. Open Court Publishing Co., 1902.

of transposition within it, nor can we conceive of any internal movement which can be produced, directed, increased or diminished there within the substance, such as can take place in the case of composites, where a change can occur among the parts. The Monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out. The Attributes are not liable to detach themselves and make an excursion outside the substance, as could *sensible species* of the Schoolmen. In the same way neither substance nor attribute can enter from without into a Monad.

8. Still Monads must needs have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be existences. And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no means of perceiving any change in things. Whatever is in a composite can come into it only through its simple elements, and the Monads, if they were without qualities, since they do not differ at all in quantity, would be indistinguishable one from another. For instance, if we imagine a *plenum* or completely filled space, where each part receives only the equivalent of its own previous motion, one state of things would not be distinguishable from another.

9. Each Monad, indeed, must be different from every other. For there are never in nature two beings which are exactly alike, and in which it is not possible to find a difference either internal or based on an intrinsic property.

10. I assume it as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created Monad, is subject

to change, and indeed that this change is continuous in each.

11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the Monad come from an internal principle, because an external cause can have no influence upon its inner being.

12. Now, besides this principle of change, there must also be in the Monad a manifoldness which changes. This manifoldness constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances.

13. This manifoldness must involve a multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple. For, since every natural change takes place by degrees, there must be something which changes, and something which remains unchanged and consequently there must be in the simple substance a plurality of conditions and relations, even though it has no parts.

14. The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called Perception. This should be carefully distinguished from Apperception, or Consciousness, as will appear in what follows. In this matter the Cartesians have fallen into a serious error, in that they treat as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this also which has led them to believe that spirits alone are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals or other Entelechies, and it has led them to make the common confusion between a protracted period of unconsciousness and actual death.

They have thus adopted the scholastic error that souls can exist entirely separated from bodies, and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal.

15. The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or the passing from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It is true that the desire is not always able to attain to the whole of the perception which it strives for, but it always attains a portion of it and reaches new perceptions.

16. We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious involves a variety in the object. Therefore all those who acknowledge that the soul is a simple substance ought to grant this multiplicity in the Monad, and Monsieur Bayle should have found no difficulty in it, as he has done in his *Dictionary*, article "Rorarius."

17. It must be confessed, however, that Perception, and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain Perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the composite nor in a machine that the

Perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substance can consist.

18. All simple substances or created Monads may be called Entelechies, because they have in themselves a certain perfection. There is in them a sufficiency which makes them the source of their internal activities, and renders them, so to speak, incorporeal Automaton.

19. If we wish to designate as soul everything which has perceptions and desires in the general sense that I have just explained, all simple substances or created Monads could be called souls. But since feeling is something more than a mere perception, I think that the general name of Monad or Entelechy should suffice for simple substances which have only perception, while we may reserve the term Soul for those whose perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory.

20. We experience in ourselves a state where we remember nothing and where we have no distinct perception, as in periods of fainting, or when we are overcome by a profound, dreamless sleep. In such a state the soul does not sensibly differ at all from a simple Monad. As this state, however, is not permanent and the soul can recover from it, the soul is something more.

21. Nevertheless, it does not follow at all that the simple substance is in such a state without perception.

This is so because of the reasons given above; for it cannot perish, nor, on the other hand, would it exist without some affection, and the affection is nothing else than its perception. When, however, there are a great number of weak perceptions where nothing stands out distinctively, we are stunned; as when one turns around and around in the same direction, a dizziness comes on, which makes him swoon and makes him able to distinguish nothing. Among animals, death can occasion this state for quite a period.

22. Every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future.

23. Therefore, since on awakening after a period of unconsciousness we become conscious of our perceptions, we must, without having been conscious of them, have had perceptions immediately before; for one perception can come in a natural way only from another perception, just as a motion can come in a natural way only from a motion.

24. It is evident from this that if we were to have nothing distinctive, or, so to speak, prominent, and of a higher flavor in our perceptions, we should be in a continual state of stupor. This is the condition of Monads which are wholly bare.

25. We see that nature has given to animals heightened perceptions, having provided them with organs which collect numerous rays of light or numerous waves of air and thus make them more effective in their combination. Something similar to this takes

place in the case of smell, in that of taste and of touch, and perhaps in many other senses which are unknown to us. I shall have occasion very soon to explain how that which occurs in the soul represents that which goes on in the sense-organs.

26. The memory furnishes a sort of consecutiveness which imitates reason, but is to be distinguished from it. We see that animals, when they have the perception of something which they notice and of which they have had a similar previous perception, are led by the representation of their memory to expect that which was associated in the preceding perception, and they come to have feelings like those which they had before. For instance, if a stick be shown to a dog, he remembers the pain which it has caused him, and he whines or runs away.

27. The vividness of a picture, which comes to him or moves him, is derived either from the magnitude or from the number of the previous perceptions. For, oftentimes, a strong impression brings about, all at once, the same effect as a long-continued habit, or as a great many reiterated moderate perceptions.

28. Men act in like manner as animals, in so far as the sequence of their perceptions is determined only by the law of memory, resembling the *empirical physicians* who practice simply, without any theory, and we are empiricists in three-fourths of our actions. For instance, when we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow, we do so empirically, because it has always happened so up to the present time. It is

only the astronomer who uses his reason in making such an affirmation.

29. But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals and gives us reason and the sciences, thus raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of God. This is what is called in us the Rational Soul or the Mind.

30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through abstractions from them that we come to perform Reflective Acts, which cause us to think of what is called the I, and to decide that this or that is within us. It is thus, that in thinking upon ourselves we think of *being*, of *substance*, of the *simple* and *composite*, of a *material* thing and of *God* himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits. These Reflective Acts furnish the principal objects of our reasonings.

31. Our reasoning is based upon two great principles: first, that of Contradiction, by means of which we decide that to be false which involves contradiction and that to be true which contradicts or is opposed to the false.

32. And second, the principle of Sufficient Reason, in virtue of which we believe that no fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise. Most frequently, however, these reasons cannot be known by us.

33. There are also two kinds of Truths: those of Reasoning and those of Fact. The truths of Reason-

ing are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Those of fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, the reason can be found by analysis in resolving it into simpler ideas and into simpler truths until we reach those which are primary.

34. It is thus that with mathematicians the Speculative Theorems and the practical Canons are reduced by analysis to Definitions, Axioms, and Postulates.

35. There are, finally, simple ideas of which no definition can be given. There are also the Axioms and Postulates or, in a word, the primary principles which cannot be proved, and, indeed, have no need of proof. These are identical propositions whose opposites involve express contradictions.

36. But there must be also a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact; that is to say, for the sequence of the things which extend throughout the universe of created beings, where the analysis into more particular reasons can be continued into greater detail without limit, because of the immense variety of the things in nature and because of the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of figures and of movements, present and past, which enter into the efficient cause of my present writing, and in its final cause there are an infinity of slight tendencies and dispositions of my soul, present and past.

37. And as all this detail again involves other and more detailed contingencies, each of which again has need of a similar analysis, in order to find its explana-

tion, no real advance has been made. Therefore, the sufficient or ultimate reason must needs be outside of the sequence or series of these details of contingencies, however infinite they may be.

38. It is thus that the ultimate reason for things must be a necessary substance, in which the detail of the changes shall be present merely potentially, as in the fountain-head, and this substance we call God.

39. Now, since this substance is a sufficient reason for all the above-mentioned details, which are linked together throughout, *there is but one God, and this God is sufficient.*

47. God alone is the ultimate unity or the original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are the products, and arise, so to speak, through the continual outflashings of the divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the creature to whom limitation is an essential.

57. And as the same city, regarded from different sides, appears entirely different, and is, as it were, multiplied perspectively, so, because of the infinite number of simple substances, there are a similar infinite number of universes which are, nevertheless, only the aspects of a single one, as seen from the special point of view of each Monad.

61. All space is filled up; therefore, all matter is connected; and in a plenum or filled space every movement has an effect upon bodies in proportion to their distance, so that not only is every body affected by those which are in contact with it, and responds in some way to whatever happens to them, but also by

means of them the body responds to those bodies adjoining them, and their intercommunication can be continued to any distance at will. Consequently every body responds to all that happens in the universe, so that he who saw all, could read in each one what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and what will happen.

62. Thus, although each created Monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it, and of which it constitutes the entelechy. And as the body expresses all the universe through the interconnection of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a particular way.

66. Whence we see that there is a world of created things, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the minutest particle of matter.

77. The soul (the mirror of an indestructible universe) is indestructible.

79. Souls act in accordance with the laws of final causes through their desires, purposes, and means. Bodies act in accordance with the laws of efficient causes or of motion. The two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony each with the other.

81. According to this system [Preëstablished Harmony] bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls at all, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and yet both body and soul act as if the one were influencing the other.

From "Discourse on Metaphysics"

THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS

26. In order to see clearly what an idea is, we must guard ourselves against a misunderstanding. Many regard the idea as the form or the differentiation of our thinking, and according to this opinion we have the idea in our mind in so far as we are thinking of it, and each separate time we think of it anew we have another idea, although similar to the preceding one. Some, however, take the idea as the immediate object of thought, or as a permanent form which remains even when we are no longer contemplating it. As a matter of fact our soul has the power of representing to itself any form or nature whenever the occasion comes for thinking about it, and I think this activity of our soul is, so far as it expresses some nature, form or essence, properly the idea of the thing. This is in us, and is always in us, whether we are thinking of it or no. (Our soul expresses God and the universe and all essences as well as all existences.) This position is in accord with my principles that naturally nothing enters into our minds from outside.

It is a bad habit we have of thinking as though our minds receive certain messengers, as it were, or as if they had doors or windows. We have in our minds all those forms for all periods of time because the mind at every moment expresses all its future thoughts and already thinks confusedly of all that of which it will ever think distinctly. Nothing can be

taught to us of which we have not already in our minds the idea. This idea is, as it were, the material out of which the thought will form itself. This is what Plato has excellently brought out in his doctrine of reminiscence, a doctrine which contains a great deal of truth, provided that it is properly understood and purged of the error of preëxistence, and provided that one does not conceive of the soul as having already known and thought at some other time what it learns and thinks now. Plato has also confirmed his position by a beautiful experiment. He introduces a small boy, whom he leads, by short steps, to extremely difficult truths of geometry bearing on incommensurables, all this without teaching the boy anything, merely drawing out replies by a well arranged series of questions. This shows that the soul virtually knows these things, and needs only to be reminded (*animadverted*) to recognize the truths. Consequently it possesses at least the idea upon which those truths depend. We may say even that it already possesses those truths, if we consider them as the relations of the ideas.

27. Aristotle preferred to compare our souls to blank tablets prepared for writing, and he maintained that nothing is in the understanding which does not come through the senses. This position is in accord with the popular conceptions, as Aristotle's positions usually are. Plato thinks more profoundly. Such tenets or practicologies are nevertheless allowable in ordinary use somewhat in the same way as those who accept the Copernican theory still continue to speak

of the rising and setting of the sun. I find, indeed, that these usages can be given a real meaning containing no error, quite in the same way as I have already pointed out that we may truly say particular substances act upon one another. In this same sense we may say that knowledge is received from without, through the medium of the senses, because certain exterior things contain or express more particularly the causes which determine us to certain thoughts. Because in the ordinary uses of life we attribute to the soul only that which belongs to it most manifestly and particularly, and there is no advantage in going further. When, however, we are dealing with the exactness of metaphysical truths, it is important to recognize the powers and independence of the soul, which extend infinitely further than is commonly supposed. In order, therefore, to avoid misunderstandings, it would be well to choose separate terms for the two. These expressions which are in the soul whether one is conceiving of them or not may be called ideas, while those which one conceives of or constructs may be called conceptions, *conceptus*. But whatever terms are used, it is always false to say that all our conceptions come from the so-called external senses, because those conceptions which I have of myself and of my thoughts, and consequently of being, of substance, of action, of identity, and of many others come from an inner experience.

28. In the strictly metaphysical sense no external cause acts upon us excepting God alone, and he is in immediate relation with us only by virtue of our con-

tinual dependence upon him. Whence it follows that there is absolutely no other external object which comes into contact with our souls and directly excites perceptions in us. We have in our souls ideas of everything, only because of the continual action of God upon us, that is to say, because every effect expresses its cause and therefore the essences of our souls are certain expressions, imitations, or images of the divine essence, divine thought and divine will, including all the ideas which are there contained. We may say, therefore, that God is for us the only immediate external object, and that we see things through him. For example, when we see the sun or the stars, it is God who gives to us and preserves in us the ideas and whenever our senses are affected according to his own laws in a certain manner, it is he who, by his continual concurrence, determines our thinking. God is the sun and the light of souls, although this is not the current conception. I think I have already remarked that during the scholastic period many believed God to be the light of the soul, *intellectus agens animae rationalis*, following in this the Holy Scriptures and the fathers who were always more Platonic than Aristotelian in their mode of thinking. The Averroists misused this conception, but others, among whom were several mystic theologians, and William of St. Amour, also I think, understood this conception in a manner which assured the dignity of God and was able to raise the soul to a knowledge of its welfare.

29.. Nevertheless I cannot approve of the position

of certain able philosophers who seem to hold that our ideas themselves are in God and not at all in us. I think that in taking this position they have neither sufficiently considered the nature of substance, which we have just explained, nor the entire extension and independence of the soul which includes all that happens to it, and expresses God, and with him all possible and actual beings in the same way that an effect expresses its cause. It is indeed inconceivable that the soul should think using the ideas of something else. The soul when it thinks of anything must be affected effectively in a certain manner, and it must needs have in itself in advance not only the passive capacity of being thus affected, a capacity already wholly determined, but it must have besides an active power by virtue of which it has always had in its nature the marks of the future production of this thought, and the disposition to produce it at its proper time. All of this shows that the soul already includes the idea which is comprised in any particular thought.

30. Regarding the action of God upon the human will there are many quite different considerations, which it would take too long to investigate here. Nevertheless, the following is what can be said in general. God in coöperating with ordinary actions only follows the laws which he has established, that is to say, he continually preserves and produces our being so that the ideas come to us spontaneously or with freedom in that order which the concept of our individual substance carries with itself. In this concept they can be foreseen for all eternity. Further-

more, by virtue of the decree which God has made that the will shall always seek the apparent good in certain particular respects (in regard to which this apparent good always has in it something of reality expressing or imitating God's will), he, without at all necessitating our choice, determines it by that which appears most desirable. For, absolutely speaking, our will, as contrasted with necessity, is in a state of indifference, being able to act otherwise, or wholly to suspend its action, either alternative being and remaining possible. It therefore devolves upon the soul to be on guard against appearances, by means of a firm will, to reflect and to refuse to act or decide in certain circumstances, except after mature deliberation. It is, however, true and has been assured from all eternity that certain souls will not employ their power upon certain occasions.

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JOHN LOCKE

CHAPTER V

JOHN LOCKE

1632-1704

Locke's interest centered, not in the problem of reality, but in a few special problems that arose in his mind, as he himself tells us, from a discussion with a few friends about a topic somewhat remote from the subject of the human understanding. This discussion marked the beginning of the critical philosophy, the problem of which is the nature and validity of knowledge.

Locke represents, therefore, a transition in modern thought. Like all transitional thinkers he has characteristics both of that which preceded and that which has followed. He is not wholly consistent or uniformly clear in his thought. In matters of metaphysics and religion he often seems quite naïve and uncritical, but in his own special problems he made a great advance upon all preceding philosophy.

Locke leads forward in two directions: as the forerunner of Berkeley, he is the founder of the idealistic thought, which, joining the deeper German current, has become the prevailing philosophy of our own day; and as the central figure of the early English empiricism he is the ancestor of our current psychological philosophies,—and he is therefore indirectly the sponsor and supporter of the pragmatic methods that are based upon the search for truth and reality within the experience of the individual.

From "An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding" ¹

INNATE IDEAS

1. It is an established opinion among some men that there are in the understanding certain *innate principles*; some primary notions, characters, as it were, stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine anyone will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colors innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common

¹ Fraser's edition, 1894. Clarendon Press.

road, I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.

2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain *principles* both *speculative* and *practical*, (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind; which, therefore, they argue, must needs be the constant impressions which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

3. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.

4. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all mankind gives an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, "Whatever is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be"; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of

maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if anyone should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

Pages 37-40.

OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGIN

1. Every man being conscious to himself, that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about while thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, — such as are those expressed by the words *whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness*, and others: it is in the first place, then, to be inquired, *How he comes by them?* I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and I suppose what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has; and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind; — for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience.

2. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; — how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy

of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the *materials* of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

3. First our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of *yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet*, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call *Sensation*.

4. Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is,—the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; —which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from

things without. And such are *perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this Reflection, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of sensation, and the operations of our minds within, as the objects of reflection, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term *operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

5. The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External objects* furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities,

which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the *mind* furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes [combinations, and relations,] we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding; and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection. And how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted,—though perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

Pages 121-124.

OUR SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSATION

7. To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are *ideas or perceptions in our minds*; and as they are *modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us*; that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the like-

ness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.

8. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call *quality* of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round,—the power to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas; which ideas, if I speak of sometimes as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us.

9. [Qualities thus considered in bodies are, *First*, such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be;] and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived; and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses: v. g. take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, until the parts become insensible; they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any

other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. [These I call *original* or *primary* qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.

10. *Secondly*, such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i. e., by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colors, sounds, tastes, etc. These I call *secondary qualities*. To these might be added a *third* sort, which are allowed to be barely powers; though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, call qualities, but for distinction, *secondary* qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new color, or consistency, in wax or clay,—by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in *me* a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before,—by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.]

11. [The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in.]

12. If, then, external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas therein; and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brains or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.

13. After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of *secondary* qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. For, it being manifest that there are bodies and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion,—as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and others extremely smaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air or water, as the particles of air or water are smaller than peas or hail stones;—let us suppose at present that the different motions and figures, bulk and number, of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colors

and smells of bodies; v. g. that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue color, and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds. It being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.

14. What I have said concerning colors and smells, may be understood also of tastes and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts [as I have said.]

15. From whence I think it is easy to draw this observation,—that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us; and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

23. The qualities, then, that are in bodies, rightly considered, are of three sorts:—

First, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of their solid parts. Those are in them, whether we perceive them or not; and when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself; as is plain in artificial things. These I call *primary qualities*.

Secondly, The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in *us* the different ideas of several colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. These are usually called *sensible qualities*.

Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of *another body*, as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. [These are usually called *powers*.]

The first of these, as has been said, I think may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities; because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or not; and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things; which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.

24. But, though the two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers, relating to

several other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities, yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For the second sort, viz. the powers to produce several ideas in us, by our senses, are looked upon as real qualities in the things thus affecting us; but the *third* sort are called and esteemed barely powers. V. g. The idea of heat or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch, from the sun are commonly thought real qualities existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But when we consider the sun in reference to wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced by powers in it. Whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the sun. They are all of them equally *powers in the sun, depending on its primary qualities*; whereby it is able, in the one case, so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat; and in the other, it is able so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of the insensible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid.

25. The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, seems to be, because the ideas we have of distinct

colors, sounds, etc., containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of these primary qualities; which appear not, to our senses, to operate in their production, and with which they have not any apparent congruity or conceivable connection. Hence it is that we are so forward to imagine, that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves; since sensation discovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts in their production; nor can reason show how bodies, *by their bulk, figure, and motion*, should produce in the mind the ideas of blue or yellow, etc. But, in the other case, in the operations of bodies changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with anything in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power.

For, through receiving the idea of heat or light from the sun, we are apt to think *it* is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun; yet when we see wax, or a fair face, receive change of color from the sun, we cannot imagine *that* to be the reception or resemblance of anything in the sun, because we find not those different colors in the sun itself. For, our senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of bare power, and not the communication of any quality which was really in the efficient, when

we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it. But our senses, not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it, we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities, with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.

Pages 168-181.

OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCE

29. To conclude. Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other. But beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire further into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any further, one is as easy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how *a substance we know not* should, by thought, set body into motion, than how *a substance we know not* should, by impulse, set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than those belonging to

spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas.

30. So that, in short, the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea we have of body, stands thus: the substance of spirits is unknown to us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities or properties of body, viz. solid coherent parts and impulse, we have distinct clear ideas of: so likewise we know, and have distinct clear ideas, of two primary qualities or properties of spirit, viz. thinking, and a power of action; i. e. a power of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions. We have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear distinct ideas of them; which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts, and their motion. We have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking, viz. believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the several modes of thinking. We have also the ideas of willing, and moving the body consequent to it, and with the body itself too; for, as has been shown, spirit is capable of motion.

31. Lastly, if this notion of immaterial spirit may have, perhaps, some difficulties in it not easily to be explained, we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits, than we have

to deny or doubt the existence of body; because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced anything in our notion of spirit more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the divisibility *in infinitum* of any finite extension involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent; consequences that carry greater difficulty and more apparent absurdity, than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance.

32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but some few superficial ideas of things, discovered to us only by the senses from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal constitution, and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies; we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity, than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent

from thinking, they being both but simple ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking, as of solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity, i. e. immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, i. e. matter, to exist; especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection, and dive further into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness and difficulties, and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection: and so is it of all our other ideas of substances, even of God himself.

Pages 414-418.

THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE

3. It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a *conformity* between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? This, though it seems not to want

difficulty, yet, I think, there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things.

4. *First*, The first are simple ideas, which since the mind, as has been showed, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind, in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended; or which our state requires: for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea of whiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can or ought to have, with things without us. And this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things is sufficient for real knowledge.

5. *Secondly*, All our complex ideas, *except those of substances*, being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of anything, nor referred to the existence of anything, as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For that which is not designed to repre-

sent anything but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of anything, by its dislikeness to it; and such, excepting those of substances, are all our complex ideas, which, as I have showed in another place, are combinations of ideas, which the mind, by its free choice, puts together, without considering any connection they have in nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the ideas themselves are considered as the archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real, and reaches things themselves. Because in all our thoughts, reasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no further than as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality.

6. I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the knowledge we have of mathematical truths is not only certain, but real knowledge; and not the bare empty vision of vain, insignificant chimeras of the brain: and yet, if we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own ideas. The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, i. e. precisely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things exist-

ing: because real things are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the *idea* of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a triangle, wherever it *really exists*. Whatever other figure exists, that it is not exactly answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all concerned in that proposition. And therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge: because, intending things no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning those figures, when they have *barely an ideal existence* in his mind, will hold true of them also when they have *a real existence* in matter: his consideration being barely of those figures, which are the same wherever or however they exist.

7. And hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideas or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas; all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.

OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE

1. Hitherto we have only considered the essences of things; which being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understanding,) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence: and further, that all particular affirmations or negations that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning existence; they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have no known necessary union or repugnancy.

2. But, leaving the nature of propositions, and different ways of predication to be considered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the *existence of things*, and how we come by it. I say, then, that we have the knowledge of *our own* existence by intuition, of the existence of *God* by demonstration; and of *other things* by sensation.

Vol. 2, pages 303-304.

OF FAITH, REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES

It has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where

we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon.

From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down *the measures and boundaries between faith and reason*: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavor to convince one another in matters of religion.

2. I find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly; and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has anything to do.

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to *faith*, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz, by sensation or reflection.

Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truth to men, we call *revelation*.

Vol. 2, pages 415-416.

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GEORGE BERKELEY

CHAPTER VI

GEORGE BERKELEY

1685-1753

Berkeley was the first to proclaim a radically idealistic conception of the world, and he arrived at this view by following out Locke's doctrine of the subjective nature of the secondary qualities of objects to its logical conclusion. Berkeley thus accomplished, by a simple, direct method, what Leibniz had unclearly groped for by his objective method; that is, an interpretation of the outer world in terms of subjective reality.

In the *Commonplace Book*, written by Berkeley at about the age of twenty, this new theory of the world was audaciously proposed, and to the old belief in the existence of matter he earnestly charged many evils, both of the practical life and of philosophy.

Berkeley never attempted to elaborate his views into a system of philosophy, but his writings, like those of Leibniz, consist mainly of a series of brilliant essays, in which his fundamental principles are stated from different points of view. For those who seek an explanation of philosophical views in the personal characteristics of their authors, Berkeley provides excellent evidence. To his unusual powers of visualization are attributed his theory of vision, and the whole idealistic philosophy that depends upon it. While his theory of abstract ideas is said to be founded upon his own habit of thinking in concrete terms.

Of the Principles of Human Knowledge ¹

1. It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the *objects* of human knowledge that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination — either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colors, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odors; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain color, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name *apple*; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things — which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or

¹ *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, by George Berkeley. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1903.

objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call *mind*, *spirit*, *soul*, or *myself*. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived — for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.—I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by anyone that shall attend to what is meant by the term *exists*, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed — meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it

possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?

5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of *abstract ideas*. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and figures — in a word, the things we see and feel — what are they, but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? And is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a

human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract — if that may properly be called *abstraction* which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. [In truth, the object and the sensation are the same thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other.]

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their *being is to be perceived or known*; that consequently, so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit — it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his

own thoughts, the *being* of a sensible thing from its *being perceived*."

7. From what has been said, it follows there is not any other Substance than *Spirit*, or *that which perceives*.

9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt *primary* and *secondary* qualities: By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colors, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to understand *an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure and motion do actually subsist*. But it is evident, from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called *Matter* or *corporeal substance* involves a contradiction in it.

25. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive — there is nothing of Power or Agency included in them. So that one

idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another.— To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived; but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or of reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from section 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion and size of corpuscles must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual *succession* of ideas; some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is, therefore, some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality, or idea, or combination, of ideas is clear from the preceding section. It must, therefore, be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains, therefore, that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal, active substance or Spirit.

27. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being — as it *perceives* ideas it is called the *Understanding*, and as it *produces* or otherwise *operates* about them it is called the *Will*. Hence there can be no *idea* formed of a soul or spirit; for, all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vid. sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall be *like* that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of *Spirit*, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any Power or Active Being, and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names *Will* and *Understanding*, distinct from each other, as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers — which is signified by the name *Soul* or *Spirit*. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words *will*, *soul*, *spirit* do not stand for different ideas or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an Agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. [Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some *notion* of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind: such as willing, lov-

ing, hating—inasmuch as we know or *understand* the meaning of these words.]

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called *real things*; and those excited in the Imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed *ideas*, or *images of things*, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful Spirit; yet still they are *ideas*, and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

86. From the Principles we have laid down it follows Human Knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads—that of *Ideas* and that of *Spirits*. Of each of these I shall treat in order.

89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of Skepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by *thing*, *reality*, *existence*; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the “real existence.”

of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. *Thing* or *Being* is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, viz., *spirits* and *ideas*. The former are active, indivisible (incorruptible) substances; the latter are inert, fleeting, or dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection; and that of other Spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or *notion* of our own minds, of spirits and active beings whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and have a *notion* of relations between things or ideas — which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that *ideas*, *spirits*, and *relations* are all, in their respective kinds, the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term *idea* would be improperly extended to signify *everything* we know or have any notion of.

116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an Absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related to bodies; which that *it* cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And, perhaps, if we in-

quire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of Pure Space exclusive of all body. This, I must confess, seems impossible, as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is *Space*; but if I find resistance, then I say there is *Body*; and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less *pure*. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion — though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains *Pure Space*, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance; but if that, too, were annihilated, then there could be no motion and consequently no space. Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of Pure Space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shown, that the ideas of Space and Distance are not obtained by that sense.

137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation, have arisen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much skepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some

whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. That an *idea* which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original.

138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit, we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident that there can be no idea of a spirit.

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no *idea* signified by the terms "soul," "spirit," and "substance," they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term "I," is the same with what is

meant by *soul* or *spiritual substance*. But if I should say that *I* was nothing, or that *I* was an idea or notion, nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these propositions. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a word, and that, since the *immediate* significations of other names are by common consent called *ideas*, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name *spirit* or *soul* may not partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between *Spirit* and *Idea*.

146. But, though there be some things which convince us *human* agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident to everyone that those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them, since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, and,

above all, the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who works all in all, and by whom all things consist."

147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which enlightens everyone, is itself invisible.

Theory of Vision ¹

46. From what we have shown, it is a manifest consequence that the ideas of Space, Outness, and things placed at a distance are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight; they are not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear. Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street; I look through the casement and see it; I walk out and enter into it. Thus, common speech would incline one to think I heard, saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless certain the ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different and distinct from each other; but, having been observed constantly to go together, they are spoken of as one and the same thing. By the variation of the noise, I perceive the different distances of the coach, and know that it approaches before I look out. Thus, by the ear I perceive distance just after the same manner as I do by the eye.

47. I do not, nevertheless, say I hear distance, in like manner as I say that I see it—the ideas perceived by hearing not being so apt to be confounded with the ideas of touch as those of sight are. So likewise a man is easily convinced that bodies and external things are not properly the object of hearing, but only sounds by the mediation whereof the idea of this or that body, or distance, is suggested to his thoughts. But then one is with more difficulty

¹ *The Works of George Berkeley*, edited by A. C. Fraser. Clarendon Press.

brought to discern the difference there is betwixt the ideas of sight and touch: though it be certain, a man no more sees and feels the same thing, than he hears and feels the same thing.

48. One reason of which seems to be this. It is thought a great absurdity to imagine that one and the same thing should have any more than one extension and one figure. But, the extension and figure of a body being let into the mind in two ways, and that indifferently, either by sight or touch, it seems to follow that we see the same extension and the same figure which we feel.

49. But, if we take a close and accurate view of the matter, it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same object. That which is seen is one thing, and that which is felt is another. If the visible figure and extension be not the same with the tangible figure and extension, we are not to infer that one and the same thing has divers extensions. The true consequence is that the objects of sight and touch are two distinct things. It may perhaps require some thought rightly to conceive this distinction. And the difficulty seems not a little increased, because the combination of visible ideas hath constantly the same name as the combination of tangible ideas wherewith it is connected — which doth of necessity arise from the use and end of language.

80. For the better explaining the nature of vision, and stating the manner wherein we perceive magnitudes in a due light, I shall proceed to make some observations concerning matters relating thereto,

whereof the want of reflection, and duly separating between tangible and visible ideas, is apt to create in us the mistaken and confused notions.

And, first, I shall observe, that the *minimum visible* is exactly equal in all beings whatsoever that are endowed with the visive faculty. No exquisite formation of the eye, no peculiar sharpness of sight, can make it less in one creature than in another; for, it not being distinguishable into parts, nor in anything consisting of them, it must necessarily be the same to all. For, suppose it otherwise, and that the *minimum visible* of a mite, for instance, be less than the *minimum visible* of a man; the latter therefore may, by detraction of some part, be made equal to the former. It doth therefore consist of parts, which is inconsistent with the notion of a *minimum visible* or point.

81. It will, perhaps, be objected, that the *minimum visible* of a man doth really and in itself contain parts whereby it surpasseth that of a mite, though they are not perceivable by the man. To which I answer, the *minimum visible* having (in like manner as all other the proper and immediate objects of sight) been shown not to have any existence without the mind of him who sees it, it follows there cannot be any part of it that is not actually perceived and therefore visible. Now, for any object to contain several distinct visible parts, and at the same time to be a *minimum visible*, is a manifest contradiction.

82. Of these visible points we see at all times an equal number. It is every whit as great when our view is contracted and bounded by near objects as

when it is extended to larger and more remote ones. For, it being impossible that one *minimum visible* should obscure or keep out of sight more than one other, it is a plain consequence that, when my view is on all sides bounded by the walls of my study, I see just as many visible points as I could in case that, by the removal of the study-walls and all other obstructions, I had a full prospect of the circumjacent fields, mountains, sea, and open firmament. For, so long as I am shut up within the walls, by their interposition every point of the external objects is covered from my view. But, each point that is seen being able to cover or exclude from sight one only other corresponding point, it follows that, whilst my sight is confined to those narrow walls, I see as many points or *minima visibilia* as I should were those walls away, by looking on all the external objects whose prospect is intercepted by them. Whenever, therefore, we are said to have a greater prospect at one time than another, this must be understood with relation, not to the proper and immediate, but the secondary and mediate objects of vision; which, as hath been shown, do properly belong to the touch.

127. It having been shown that there are no abstract ideas of figure, and that it is impossible for us, by any precision of thought, to frame an idea of extension separate from all other visible and tangible qualities, which shall be common both to sight and touch, the question now remaining is, whether the particular extensions, figures, and motions perceived by sight, be of the same kind with the particular exten-

sions, figures and motions perceived by touch? In answer to which I shall venture to lay down the following propositions:— *The extension, figure, and motions perceived by sight are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch, called by the same names; nor is there any such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses.*

Pages 149-190.

43. To explain how the mind or soul of man simply sees is one thing, and belongs to Philosophy. To consider particles as moving in certain lines, rays of light as refracted or reflected, or crossing, or including angles, is quite another thing and appertaineth to Geometry. To account for the sense of vision by the mechanism of the eye is a third thing, which appertaineth to Anatomy and experiments. These two latter speculations are of use, in practice, to assist the defects and remedy the distempers of sight, agreeably to the natural laws contained in this mundane system. But the former Theory is that which makes us understand the true nature of Vision *considered as a faculty of the soul*. Which theory, as I have already observed, may be reduced to this simple question, to wit, How comes it to pass that a set of ideas, altogether different from tangible ideas, should nevertheless suggest them to us—there being no necessary connection between them? To which the proper answer is—That this is done in virtue of an arbitrary connection, instituted by the Author of Nature.

Pages 399-400.

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DAVID HUME

CHAPTER VII

DAVID HUME

1711-1776

Hume examined in the greatest detail the two great foundation stones of the older philosophies, the belief in Cause and Substance, and thought he was able to demonstrate that these notions were wholly due to certain sequences of ideas within experience. But in centering his attention entirely upon individual experience, and seeking to reduce experience to its elements, and to show the laws of the relations of these elements to one another, it was natural that he should over-emphasize the validity of the psychological point of view, and extend its methods beyond their proper field. Although the validity of his analyses must be admitted so far as they are *psychological*, when these results are carried over to *metaphysics*, they become open to serious objection, and are almost self-evidently fallacious. Hume showed clearly that thought is made up solely of ideas and external impressions, and that these elements are joined according to the laws of association; but when he asserted that because experience is thus analyzable, and is thus self-contained it cannot pass beyond itself to a knowledge of anything outside itself, and that therefore we can assert that outside objects and substances do not exist, he went too far, and indeed we can say that the whole problem is thus wrongly stated. The secret of the error lies in the fact that Hume treated ideas in an objective way as entities, abstracting them from the concrete and immediately whole meanings in which alone they are real, and that he failed on that account to perceive

the nature and significance of the relations between ideas, the ultimate and irreducible unity in which they stand. It remained for Kant to take advantage of this oversight, or this perversity of point of view, and to turn philosophy again toward constructive results.

Hume's peculiar fate in philosophy has been that, by carrying a point of view to its extreme limits, he has initiated a movement which in all its main results is the direct opposite of his own, although a logical outcome of it. The extreme of skepticism was quickly followed, in the more profound German thought, by the most audaciously positive of philosophies.

From "Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding"

ON THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION

THERE are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of *power*, *force*, *energy*, or *necessary connection*, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavor, in this section to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.

It seems a proposition which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently *felt*, either by our external or internal senses. I have endeavored to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes, that, by a

proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of our inquiry.

To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connection, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived.

When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or

necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the *outward* senses. The mind feels no sentiment or *inward* impression from this succession of objects: consequently there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.

From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning.

In reality there is no part of matter that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine that it could produce anything or be followed by any other object, which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion; these qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. We know that, in fact, heat

is a constant attendant of flame; but what is the connection between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover any power, which can be the original of this idea.

Since, therefore, external objects, as they appear to the senses, give us no idea of power or necessary connection, by their operation in particular instances, let us see whether this idea be derived from reflexion on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impression. It may be said that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflexion, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and the faculties of the soul.

We shall proceed to examine this pretension; and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influence, we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience, and can never be foreseen

from any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must forever escape our most diligent inquiry.

We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope, without any temerity, though with assurance, that our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs, to their proper use and office. That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience, like other natural events. But the power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable.

Shall we then assert, that we are conscious of a power or energy in our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up a new idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all sides, and at last dismiss it for some other idea, when we think that we have surveyed it with sufficient accuracy? I believe the same arguments will prove that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy.

First, it must be allowed that, when we know a power, we know that very circumstance in the cause,

by which it is enabled to produce the effect; for these are supposed to be synonymous. We must, therefore, know both the cause and effect, and the relation between them. But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation; a production of something out of nothing. which implies a power so great, that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the reach of any being less than infinite. At least it must be owned that such a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind. We only feel the event, namely, *the existence of an idea, consequent to a command of the will*; but the manner in which this operation is performed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our comprehension.

Secondly, The command of the mind over itself is limited, as well as its command over the body; and these limits are not known by reason, or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect; but only by experience and observation, as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects. Our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries. Will anyone pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries, or show why the power is deficient in one case, not in another?

Thirdly, This self-command is very different at different times. A man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness. We are more

master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening: fasting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience? Where, then, is the power, of which we pretend to be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or material substance, or both, some secret mechanism or structure of parts, upon which the effect depends, and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible?

Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find anything in it like this creative power, by which it raises from nothing a new idea, and with a kind of *Fiat* imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, who called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this energy in the will, it requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed, to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of volition.

The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature—such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food. But suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is forever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of

mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it. It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phenomena, such as earthquakes, pestilences, and prodigies of any kind, that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men, in such difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them; and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philosophers who carry their scrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent *Conjunction* of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like *Connexion* between them. Here, then, many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse, on all occasions, to the same principle, which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural. They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be, not only the ultimate and original cause of all things, but the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in nature. They pretend that those objects which are commonly denominated *causes*, are in reality nothing but *occasions*; and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Su-

preme Being, who wills that such particular objects should forever be conjoined with each other. Instead of saying that one billiard-ball moves another by a force which it has derived from the author of nature, it is the Deity himself, they say, who, by a particular volition, moves the second ball, being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball, in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe. But philosophers advancing still in their inquiries, discover that, as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body, or of body on mind; nor are we able, either from our senses or consciousness, to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other. The same ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being agitated by external objects, produce sensations in the mind; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such a sensation, in consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members: it is God himself, who is pleased to second our will, in itself impotent, and to command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind it-

self, in its internal operations. Our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea; it is the universal Creator, who discovers it to the mind, and renders it present to us.

Thus, according to these philosophers, everything is full of God. Not content with the principle, that nothing exists but by his will, that nothing possesses any power but by his concession, they rob nature, and all created things, of every power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate. They consider not that, by this theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so much to celebrate. It argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures, than to produce everything by his own immediate volition. It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight, that, of itself, and by its proper operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine.

But, if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory, perhaps the two following reflections may suffice.

First, it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is

too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and experience. We are got into fairyland, long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory: and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of verisimilitude and experience, we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience. But on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards.

Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which this theory is founded. We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate on each other; their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible, but are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind, even the Supreme mind, operates either on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Be-

ing but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting anything, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases.

But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which is already drawn out to too great a length: we have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connection in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived. It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover anything but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connection between it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body; where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former, but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces its effect. The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible; so that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connection which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we can

never observe any tie between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*. And as we can have no idea of anything which never appeared to our outward sense or inner sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connection or power at all, that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings, or common life.

But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion, and one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, *Cause*; the other, *Effect*. We suppose that there is some connection between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the

other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connection among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur, of the constant conjunction of these events: nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connection, therefore, which we *feel* in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connection and a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was *connected*, but only that it was *conjoined*, with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be *connected*. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of *connection*? Nothing but he now *feels* these

events to be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connection in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, or skeptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to skepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity.

And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? For surely, if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us how to control and regulate future events by their causes. Our thoughts and inquiries are, therefore, every moment, employed about this relation: yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just definition

of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an *object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second*. Or, in other words, *where, if the first object had not been, the second had never existed*. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause, and call it *an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other*. But though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy this inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out that circumstance in the cause, which gives it a connection with its effect. We have no idea of this connection; nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to know, when we endeavor at a conception of it. We say, for instance, that the vibration of this string is a cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We either mean, *that this vibration is followed by this sound; and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds*; or, *that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that on the appearance of one, the mind anticipates the senses and forms imme-*

diately an idea of the other. We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights; but beyond these, we have no idea of it.

To recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings of this section: Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single cases of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connection. But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection. We then *feel* a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connection in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not from any single instance, it must arise from that circumstance, in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance. But this customary connection or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ. In every other particular they are alike. The first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar to any instance that may, at present, occur to us; except only, that we could not, at first, *infer* one event from the other; which we are enabled to do at present, after so long a course of uni-

form experience. I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning. I am afraid that, should I multiply words about it, or throw it into a greater variety of lights, it would only become more obscure and intricate. In all abstract reasonings there is one point of view which, if we can happily hit, we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence in the world. This point of view we should endeavor to reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them.

From "A Treatise of Human Nature"¹

OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *self*; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on *self* either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt a further proof of this were to weaken its evidence; since no proof can be derived from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious; nor is there anything, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.

¹ From an old edition and compared with the edition of T. H. Green and F. H. Grose, 1909.

Unluckily, all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of *self*, after the manner it is here explained. For, from what impression could this idea be derived? This question it is impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet it is a question, which must necessarily be answered, if we would have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible. It must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations, succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea.

But further, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately considered, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some par-

ticular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may perhaps perceive something simple and continued, which he calls *himself*; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight, and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions success-

ively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theater must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.

What, then, gives us so great propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. The first is our present subject; and to explain it perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or person.

We have a distinct idea of an object that remains invariable and uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time; and this idea we call that of *identity* or *sameness*. We have also a distinct idea of several different objects existing in succession, and connected together by a close relation; and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a notion of *diversity*, as if there was no manner of relation among the objects.

But though these two ideas of identity, and a succession of related objects be in themselves perfectly distinct, and even contrary, yet it is certain that, in our common way of thinking, they are generally confounded with each other. That action of the imagination by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on the succession of related objects, are almost the same to the feeling, nor is there much more effort of thought required in the latter case than in the former. The relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continued object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects. However at one instant we may consider the related succession as variable or interrupted, we are sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity, and regard it as invariable and uninterrupted. Our propensity to this mistake is so great from the resemblance above mentioned, that we fall into it before we are aware; and though we incessantly correct ourselves by reflection, and return to a more accurate method of thinking, yet we cannot long sustain our philosophy, or take off this bias from the imagination. Our last resource is to yield to it, and boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable. In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their

interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a *soul*, and *self*, and *substance*, to disguise the variation. But, we may further observe, that where we do not give rise to such a fiction, our propensity to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, besides their relation; and this I take to be the case with regard to the identity we ascribe to plants and vegetables. And even when this does not take place, we still feel a propensity to confound these ideas, though we are not able fully to satisfy ourselves in that particular, nor find anything invariable and uninterrupted to justify our notion of identity.

Pages 533-536.

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IMMANUEL KANT

CHAPTER VIII

IMMANUEL KANT

1714-1804.

Kant perceived both the strength and the weakness of Hume's philosophy. Although accepting the proof that reason cannot go beyond experience, by revealing the unity and *activity* in every act of consciousness, he restored to philosophy the problems of reality which Hume had too hastily solved, and the reality of the active consciousness itself, and of the substance of the external world was again asserted, while the nature of these realities again became problematic.

In order to understand Kant one must study him not only in his own achievements, but in his effects. Undoubtedly himself always a realist, but like all transitional and revolutionary thinkers, inconsistent, yet by the single assertion that objects must conform to our knowledge rather than our knowledge to objects, he inspired the complete idealism that followed him.

But besides producing that idealism which denies the existence of a world independent of a thinking subject, Kant marks another turning point of the most profound significance. He first described the inner element in reason and then he found the *moral law* in the inner life of man. He asserted that the moral principle is the most significant and real fact of the world, and that therefore the most direct approach to a knowledge of reality is by way of the *practical will* and of the values embodied in its activities. He thus introduced into philosophy a new series of problems, centering about the nature of the will, which had hitherto been

wholly subsidiary to the problem of reason,—and hence all the problems of values and of the relations of values to existence that still perplex us.

The importance to philosophy and to all practical life of this change, is very great. The nature of the world, closed to abstract reason, is shown to be open to a more direct approach. The practical life is elevated to the dignity of a philosophical problem, and from this time the world's concrete meaning and purposes, as revealed in the inner life of man, and in the facts of history, become important matters of philosophy.

That the practical life and the world of our idea still remain more or less asunder in philosophy only testifies to the depth and complexity of the problems aroused by Kant's "Copernican revolution."

From "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic"

I OPENLY confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction. I was far from following him in the conclusions at which he arrived by regarding, not the whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us no information.

If we start from a well-founded, but undeveloped, thought, which another has bequeathed to us, we may well hope by continued reflection to advance farther than the acute man, to whom we owe the first spark of light. I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the under-

standing thinks the connection of things *a priori*, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connections. I sought to ascertain their number, and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure understanding. This deduction (which seemed impossible to my acute predecessor, which had never even occurred to anyone else, though no one had hesitated to use the concepts without investigating the basis of their objective validity), was the most difficult task ever undertaken in the service of metaphysics; and the worst was that metaphysics, such as it then existed, could not assist me in the least, because this deduction alone can render metaphysics possible. But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem not merely in a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely, and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its contents. This was required for metaphysics in order to construct its system according to a reliable method.¹

¹ *Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, edited by Paul Carus.

From the "Critique of Pure Reason" ¹

INTRODUCTION

In metaphysical speculations it has always been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects; but every attempt from this point of view to extend our knowledge of objects *a priori* by means of conceptions has ended in failure. The time has now come to ask, whether better progress may not be made by supposing that objects must conform to our knowledge. Plainly this would better agree with the avowed aim of metaphysic, to determine the nature of objects *a priori*, or before they are actually presented. Our suggestion is similar to that of Copernicus in astronomy, who, finding it impossible to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they turned round the spectator, tried whether he might not succeed better by supposing the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. Let us make a similar experiment in metaphysic with *perception*. If it were really necessary for our perception to conform to the nature of objects, I do not see how we could know anything of it *a priori*; but if the sensible object must conform to the constitution of our faculty of perception, I see no difficulty in the matter. Perception, however, can become knowledge only if it is related in some way to the object which it determines. Now here again I

¹ From *The Philosophy of Kant as Contained in Extracts from his own Writings*, by John Watson.

may suppose, either that the *conceptions* through which I effect that determination conform to objects, or that objects, in other words, the experience in which alone objects are known, conform to conceptions. In the former case, I fall into the same perplexity as before, and fail to explain how such conceptions can be known *a priori*. In the latter case, the outlook is more hopeful. For experience itself is a mode of knowledge which implies intelligence, and intelligence has a rule of its own, which must be an *a priori* condition of all knowledge of objects presented to it. To this rule, as expressed in *a priori* conceptions, all objects of experience must necessarily conform, and with it they must agree.

1. *Distinction of Pure and Empirical Knowledge.*

There can be no doubt whatever that all our knowledge begins with experience. By what means should the faculty of knowledge be aroused to activity but by objects, which, acting upon our senses, partly of themselves produce ideas in us, and partly set our understanding at work to compare these ideas with one another, and, by combining or separating them, to convert the raw material of our sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is called experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge prior to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.

But, although all our knowledge begins *with* experience, it by no means follows that it all originates *from* experience. For it may well be that experience

is itself made up of two elements, one received through impressions of sense, and the other supplied from itself by our faculty of knowledge on occasion of those impressions. If that be so, it may take long practice before our attention is drawn to the element added by the mind, and we learn to distinguish and separate it from the material to which it is applied.

It is, therefore, a question which cannot be lightly put aside, but can be answered only after careful investigation, whether there is any knowledge that is independent of experience, and even of all impressions of sense. Such knowledge is said to be *a priori*, to distinguish it from empirical knowledge, which has its sources *a posteriori*, or in experience.

The term *a priori* must, however, be defined more precisely, in order that the full meaning of our question may be understood. We say of a man who undermines the foundation of his house, that he might have known *a priori* that it would fall; by which we mean, that he might have known it would fall, without waiting for the event to take place in his experience. But he could not know it completely *a priori*; for it is only from experience that he could learn that bodies are heavy, and must fall by their own weight when there is nothing to support them.

By *a priori* knowledge we shall, therefore, in what follows, understand, not such knowledge as is independent of this or that experience, but such as is *absolutely* independent of all experience. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge, or that which is possi-

ble only *a posteriori*, that is, by experience. *A priori* knowledge is *pure*, when it is unmixed with anything empirical. The proposition, for instance, that every change has its cause is *a priori*, but it is not pure, because change is an idea that can be derived only from experience.

Necessity and strict universality are, therefore, sure criteria of *a priori* knowledge, and are also inseparably connected with each other.

If an example from the sciences is desired, we have but to think of any proposition in mathematics; if an instance from common sense is preferred, it is enough to cite the proposition, that every change must have a cause.

3. *A science is needed to determine a priori the possibility, the principles, and the extent of all knowledge.*

4. *The distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments.*

There are two ways in which the predicate of an affirmative judgment may be related to the subject. Either the predicate B is already tacitly contained in the subject A, or B lies entirely outside of A, although it is in some way connected with it. In the one case I call the judgment *analytic*, in the other case *synthetic*. Analytic judgments are those in which the predicate is related to the subject in the way of identity, while in synthetic judgments the predicate is not thought as identical with the subject.

Judgments of experience are all by their very nature synthetic. To say that I must have recourse to experience for an analytic judgment is absurd, because I can frame the judgment without going beyond the conception I already possess. I have, for instance, the conception of body, and by mere analysis, I become aware of the attributes extension, impenetrability, figure, etc., which the thought of it involves. To enlarge my conception, I turn again to experience, from which the conception was originally derived, and finding weight to be invariably connected with those attributes, I attach it to them by synthesis as a new attribute. The possibility of this synthesis of the attribute weight with the conception body therefore rests upon experience. The two ideas are quite distinct, but they yet are parts of the same experience, and experience is itself a whole in which a number of perceptions are synthetically though only contingently combined.

In *a priori* synthetic judgments, on the other hand, I can get no aid whatever from experience. But, if it is here vain to look to experience for aid, on what other support am I to rely, when I seek to go beyond a certain conception A, and to connect B synthetically with it? Take the proposition, that every event must have its cause. No doubt I cannot have the conception of an event without thinking of something as having a moment of time before it, and from this certain analytic judgments may be derived. But the conception of a cause lies entirely outside the conception of an event, and introduces an idea not contained in it.

By what right, then, do I pass from the conception of an event to the totally different conception of a cause? How do I know that there is a necessary connection between the two conceptions, when I can perfectly well think the one without the other? What is here the unknown x , which gives support to the understanding, when it seems to have discovered an entirely new predicate B to belong necessarily to the subject A? Experience it cannot be, because the principle has a degree of universality that experience can never supply, as it is supposed to connect the new conception with the old in the way of necessity, and must do so entirely *a priori*, and on the basis of mere conceptions. And yet our speculative *a priori* knowledge must rest upon such synthetic or ampliative propositions.

5. *The principles of all theoretical sciences of reason are a priori synthetic judgments.*

1. All *mathematical* judgments, without exception, are synthetic. No doubt the mathematician, in his demonstrations, proceeds on the principle of contradiction, but it is a mistake to suppose that the propositions on which his demonstrations rest can be known to be true by that principle. The mistake arises from not observing that, while a synthetic proposition may certainly be seen to be true by the principle of contradiction, its truth is in that case evident, not from itself, but only because it is seen to follow from another proposition that has been previously obtained by the synthesis.

The first thing to notice is, that no truly mathemati-

cal judgments are empirical, but always are *a priori*. They carry necessity on their very face, and therefore cannot be derived from experience. Should anyone demur to this, I am willing to limit my assertion to the propositions of *pure mathematics*, which, as everybody will admit, are not empirical judgments, but perfectly pure *a priori* knowledge.

6. *The problem of pure reason.*

It is of very great advantage to others, as well as to oneself, to be able to bring together various topics of investigation in a single problem. Now, the true problem of pure reason may be put in this way — *How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?*

7. *Idea and division of the Critique of Pure Reason.*

From all that has been said we get the idea of a unique science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason. It is not a *doctrine*, but a *criticism* of pure reason, and its speculative value is entirely negative, because it does not enlarge our knowledge, but only casts light upon the nature of our reason and enables us to keep it free from error. By *transcendental* knowledge I mean all knowledge that is occupied, not with objects, but with the way in which a knowledge of objects may be gained, so far as that is possible *a priori*. What we propose is not a doctrine of pure reason, but a transcendental criticism, the purpose of which is not to extend knowledge, but to rectify it, and to supply a touchstone of the value of all *a priori* knowledge.

This transcendental criticism will afford a complete

architectonic plan of transcendental philosophy, as exhibited in its principles, and will therefore give a perfect guarantee of the completeness and stability of the edifice in all its parts.

The Critique of Pure Reason therefore contains all that is essential to the idea of transcendental philosophy, and if we distinguish it from that philosophy, the reason is that it does not carry its analysis beyond what is required in a complete estimate of *a priori* synthetic knowledge.

The main thing to be kept in view in the division of such a science is that no ideas be allowed to enter that are in any way of empirical origin, or, in other words, that it consist only of perfectly pure *a priori* knowledge. Hence, although the principles and fundamental conceptions of morality are *a priori*, they form no part of a transcendental philosophy, because they are necessarily relative to the conceptions of pleasure and pain, desire, and inclination, etc., which in their origin are empirical.

In a systematic division of this science we must have, firstly, a doctrine of the *elements*, secondly, a doctrine of the *method* of pure reason. As to the subdivisions, it seems enough to say at present that there are two stems of human knowledge,—Sensibility and Understanding, which may perhaps spring from a common root, unknown to us, and that by the one objects are given, by the other they are thought. Now, if Sensibility is found to contain an *a priori* element, without which objects could not be given to us, an investigation into the nature of that element will

be one of the tasks of transcendental philosophy. The doctrine of this transcendental element of sensible perception will form the first part of the science of elements, because we must consider the conditions under which objects of human knowledge are given, before we go on to inquire into the conditions under which they are thought.

TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC

Sensation is the actual affection of our sensibility, or capacity of receiving impressions, by an object. The perception which refers itself to an object through sensation, is *empirical perception*. The undetermined object of such a perception is a *phenomenon*.

That element in the phenomenon which corresponds to sensation I call the *matter*, while that element which makes it possible that the various determinations of the phenomenon should be arranged in certain ways relatively to one another, is its *form*. Now, sensations cannot possibly give order or form to themselves. The matter of a phenomenon is given to us entirely *a posteriori*, but its form must lie *a priori* in the mind, ready to be applied to all sensations as they arise, and hence it must be capable of being considered by itself apart from sensation.

This pure form of sensibility is also called *pure perception*. Thus, if from the consciousness of a body, I separate all that the understanding has thought into it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and all that is due to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc.; what is left over are extension and figure.

These, therefore, belong to pure perception, which exists in the mind *a priori*, as a mere form of sensibility, even when no sensation or object of sense is actually present.

The science of all the *a priori* principles of sensibility I call *Transcendental Æsthetic*, in contradistinction from the science of the principles of pure thought, which I call *Transcendental Logic*.

In *Transcendental Æsthetic* we shall first of all isolate sensibility, abstracting from all that the understanding contributes through its conceptions, so that we may have nothing before us but empirical perception. In the next place, we shall separate from empirical perception all that belongs to sensation; when there will remain only pure perception or the mere form of phenomena, the sole element that sensibility can yield *a priori*. If this is done, it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible perception, which constitute principles of *a priori* knowledge, namely, Space and Time. With these it will now be our business to deal.

2. *Metaphysical Exposition of Space.*

In external sense we are conscious of objects as outside of ourselves, and as all without exception in space. In space their shape, size, and relative position are marked out, or are capable of being marked out. Inner sense, in which we are conscious of ourselves, or rather of our own state, gives us, it is true, no direct perception of the soul itself as an object; but it nevertheless is the one single form in which our own

state comes before us as a definite object of perception; and hence all inner determinations appear to us as related to one another in time. We cannot be conscious of time as external, any more than we can be conscious of space as something within us. What, then, are space and time? Are they in themselves real things? Are they only determinations, or perhaps merely relations of things, which yet would belong to things in themselves even if those things were not perceived by us? Or, finally, have space and time no meaning except as forms of perception, belonging to the subjective constitution of our own mind, apart from which they cannot be predicated of anything whatever? To answer these questions I shall begin with a metaphysical exposition of space. An *exposition* I call it, because it gives a distinct, though not a detailed, statement of what is implied in the idea of space; and the exposition is *metaphysical*, because it brings forward the reasons we have for regarding space as given *a priori*.

1. Space is not an empirical conception, which has been derived from external experiences. For I could not be conscious that certain of my sensations are relative to something outside of me, that is, to something in a different part of space from that in which I myself am; nor could I be conscious of them as outside of and beside one another, were I not at the same time conscious that they not only are different in content, but are in different places. The consciousness of space is, therefore, necessarily presupposed in external perception. No experience of the external relations

of sensible things could yield the idea of space, because without the consciousness of space there would be no external experience whatever.

2. Space is a necessary *a priori* idea, which is presupposed in all external perceptions. By no effort can we think space to be away, although we can quite readily think of space as empty of objects. Space we therefore regard as a condition of the possibility of phenomena, and not as a determination dependent on phenomena. It is thus *a priori*, and is necessarily presupposed in external phenomena.

3. Space is not a discursive or general conception of the relations of things, but a pure perception. For we can be conscious only of a single space. It is true that we speak as if there were many spaces, but we really mean only parts of one and the same identical space. Nor can we say that these parts exist *before* the one all-embracing space, and are put together to form a whole; but we can think of them only as *in* it. Space is essentially single; by the plurality of spaces, we merely mean that because space can be limited in many ways, the general conception of spaces presupposes such limitations as its foundation. From this it follows, that an *a priori* perception, and not an empirical perception, underlies all conceptions of pure space. Accordingly, no geometrical proposition, as, for instance, that any two sides of a triangle are greater than the third side, can ever be derived from the general conceptions of line and triangle, but only from perception. From the perception, however, it can be derived *a priori*, and with demonstrative certainty.

4. Space is *presented* before our consciousness as an infinite magnitude. Now, in every conception we certainly think of a certain attribute as common to an infinite number of possible objects, which are subsumed *under* the conception; but, from its very nature, no conception can possibly be supposed to contain an infinite number of determinations *within* it. But it is just in this way that space is thought of, all its parts being conceived to co-exist *ad infinitum*. Hence the original consciousness of space is an *a priori* perception, not a conception.

3. *Transcendental Exposition of Space.*

A transcendental exposition seeks to show how, from a certain principle, the possibility of other *a priori* synthetic knowledge may be explained. To be successful, it must prove (1) that there really are synthetic propositions which can be derived from the principle in question, (2) that they can be so derived only if a certain explanation of that principle is adopted.

Now, geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet *a priori*. What, then, must be the nature of space, in order that such knowledge of it may be possible? Our original consciousness of it must be perception, for no new truth, such as we have in the propositions of geometry, can be obtained from the mere analysis of a given conception. And this perception must be *a priori*, or, in other words, must be found in us before we actually observe an object, and hence it must be pure, not empirical, perception. For all geometrical proposi-

tions, as, for instance, that space has but three dimensions, are of demonstrative certainty, or present themselves in consciousness as necessary; and such propositions cannot be empirical, nor can they be derived from judgments of experience.

How, then, can there be in the mind an external perception, which is antecedent to objects themselves, and in which the conception of those objects may be determined *a priori*? Manifestly, only if that perception has its seat in the subject, that is, if it belongs to the formal constitution of the subject, in virtue of which it is so affected by objects as to have a direct consciousness or perception of them; therefore, only if perception is the universal *form* of outer sense.

Our explanation is, therefore, the only one that makes the possibility of geometry intelligible, as a mode of *a priori* synthetic knowledge. All other explanations fail to do so, and, although they may have an external resemblance to ours, may readily be distinguished from it by this criterion.

4. *Metaphysical Exposition of Time.*

1. Time is not an empirical conception, which has been derived from any experience. For we should not observe things to co-exist or to follow one another, did we not possess the idea of time *a priori*. It is, therefore, only under the presupposition of time, that we can be conscious of certain things as existing at the same time (simultaneously), or at different times (successively).

2. Time is a necessary idea, which is presupposed

in all perceptions. We cannot be conscious of phenomena if time is taken away, although we can quite readily suppose phenomena to be absent from time. Time is, therefore, given *a priori*. No phenomenon can exist at all that is not in time. While, therefore, phenomena may be supposed to vanish completely out of time, time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be supposed away.

3. Time is not a discursive, or general conception, but a pure form of sensible perception. Different times are but parts of the very same time. Now, the consciousness of that which is presented as one single object, is perception. Moreover, the proposition, that no two moments of time can co-exist, cannot be derived from a general conception. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot originate in mere conceptions. It therefore rests upon the direct perception and idea of time.

4. The infinity of time simply means, that every definite quantity of time is possible only as a limitation of one single time. There must, therefore, be originally a consciousness of time as unlimited. Now, if an object presents itself as a whole, so that its parts and every quantity of it can be represented only by limiting that whole, such an object cannot be given in conception, for conceptions contain only partial determinations of a thing. A direct perception must therefore be the foundation of the idea of time.

5. *Transcendental Exposition of Time.*

Apodictic principles which determine relations in

time, or axioms of time in general, are possible only because time is the necessary *a priori* condition of all phenomena. Time has but one dimension; different times do not co-exist but follow one another, just as different spaces do not follow one another but co-exist. Such propositions cannot be derived from experience, which never yields strict universality or demonstrative certainty. If they were based upon experience, we could say only, that it has ordinarily been observed to be so, not that it must be so. Principles like these have the force of rules, that lay down the conditions without which no experience whatever is possible: they are not learned from experience, but anticipate what experience must be.

Let me add here that change, including motion or change of place, is conceivable only in and through the idea of time. Were time not an inner *a priori* perception, we could not form the least idea how there should be any such thing as change. Take away time, and change combines in itself absolutely contradictory predicates. Motion, or change of place, for instance, must then be thought of as at once the existence and the non-existence of one and the same thing in the same place. The contradiction disappears, only when it is seen that the thing has those opposite determinations one after the other. Our conception of time as an *a priori* form of perception, therefore, explains the possibility of the whole body of *a priori* synthetic propositions in regard to motion that are contained in the pure part of physics, and hence it is not a little fruitful in results.

Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic.

We have, then, in the Transcendental Æsthetic, one of the elements required in the solution of the general problem of transcendental philosophy: *How are a priori synthetic propositions possible?* Such propositions rest upon space and time, which are pure *a priori* perceptions. To enable us to go beyond a given conception, in an *a priori* judgment, we have found that something is needed, which is not contained in the conception, but in the perception corresponding to it, something therefore that may be connected with that conception synthetically. But such judgments, as based upon perception, can never extend beyond objects of sense, and therefore hold true only for objects of possible experience.

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

I. *General Logic.*

There are two ultimate sources from which knowledge comes to us: either we receive ideas in the form of impressions, or, by our spontaneous faculty of conception, we know an object by means of those ideas. In the former case, the object is *given* to us; in the latter case it is *thought* in relation to the impressions that arise in our consciousness. Perception and conception, therefore, are the two elements that enter into all our knowledge. To every conception some form of perception corresponds, and no perception yields knowledge without conception. Both may be either pure or empirical; *empirical* if sensation, which occurs only in the actual presence of an object is implied;

pure, if there is no intermixture of sensation. We may call sensation the matter of sensuous knowledge. Hence pure perception contains only the form under which a definite object is perceived, and pure conception the form in which an object in general is thought. Pure perceptions or pure conceptions alone are possible *a priori*, while empirical perceptions or empirical conceptions are possible only *a posteriori*.

[Transcendental Logic is divided into transcendental analytic which deals with the pure element in the understanding, and transcendental dialectic, a criticism of the understanding and reason in their hyper-physical use. The first part of the Transcendental Analytic deals with conceptions, the second with judgments of the pure understanding.]

9. *The Logical Function of Understanding in Judgment.*

If we abstract from all the content of a judgment, and only pay heed to the mere form of understanding, we find that the functions of thought in judgment may be brought under four heads, each of which contains three subdivisions. Thus we get the following table:

1. *Quantity of Judgments.*

Universal
Particular
Singular

2. *Quality.*

Affirmative
Negative
Infinite

3. *Relation.*

Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive

4. *Modality.*

Problematic

Assertoric

Apodictic

The Categories.

The same function which gives unity to various ideas in a *judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various ideas in a *perception*; and this synthesis, in its most general expression, is the pure conception of understanding. Understanding at once gives analytic unity to conceptions, and sythetic unity to the complex content of perception; and indeed the logical form of judgment presupposes and rests upon the very same acts of thought as those by which a transcendental content is given to the various determinations of our consciousness. Hence it is that the pure conceptions of understanding, as they are fitly called, apply to objects *a priori*, and therefore do not fall within the view of general logic.

In this way there arises exactly the same number of pure conceptions of understanding, applying *a priori* to all objects of perception, as there are logical functions of judgments in the preceding table; for those functions completely specify understanding, and give a perfect measure of its powers. We shall call the pure conceptions *categories*, after Aristotle, because our object is the same as his, although our method and results are widely different.

*Table of Categories.*1. *Quantity.*

Unity

Plurality

Totality

2. *Quality.*

Reality

Negation

Limitation

3. *Relation.*

Inherence and Subsistence

Causality and Dependence

Community

4. *Modality.*

Possibility

Existence

Necessity

Impossibility

Non-existence

Contingency

This, then, is a list of all the primary pure conceptions of synthesis that understanding contains within itself *a priori*. Because it contains these pure conceptions, it is called pure understanding, and only by them can it understand anything in the complex content of perception, that is, think an object. The table has not been left to the uncertain suggestions of empirical induction, but has been drawn up systematically, on the basis of a single principle, namely, the faculty of judgment, or, what is the same thing, the faculty of thought.

The table of categories suggests some nice points, which, perhaps, might be found to have an important bearing on the scientific form of all knowledge of reason. (1) The four classes of categories naturally fall into two groups; those in the first group being

concerned with objects of perception, pure as well as empirical, while those in the second group are concerned with the existence of those objects, as related either to one another or to understanding. The first may be called the *mathematical*, the second the *dynamical* categories. The former, as is obvious, have no correlates, the latter have correlates. This distinction must have some ground in the nature of understanding. (2) It is also suggestive that the number of categories in each class is three, because usually all *a priori* division must be by dichotomy. To this it must be added that the third category in each class arises from the union of the second category with the first. Thus *totality* or *allness* is just *plurality* regarded as *unity*, *limitation* is *reality* combined with *negation*, *community* is *causality* in which two *substances* mutually determine one another, and lastly, *necessity* is just *existence* given by mere *possibility*.

16. *The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception.*

The "*I think*" must be capable of accompanying all my ideas; for, otherwise I should be conscious of something that could not be thought; which is the same as saying, that I should not be conscious at all, or at least should be conscious only of that which for me was nothing. Now, that form of consciousness which is prior to all thought, is *perception*. Hence, all the manifold determinations of perception have a necessary relation to the "*I think*" in the subject that is conscious of them. The "*I think*," however, is an act of *spontaneity*, which cannot possibly be due to

sense. I call it *pure apperception*, to distinguish it from *empirical apperception*. I call it also the *original apperception*, because it is the self-consciousness which produces the "*I think*." Now the "*I think*" must be capable of accompanying all other ideas, and it is one and the same in all consciousness; but there is no other idea beyond the "*I think*," to which self-consciousness is bound in a similar way. The unity of apperception I call also the *transcendental unity* of self-consciousness, to indicate that upon it depends the possibility of *a priori* knowledge. For, the various determinations given in a certain perception would not all be in my consciousness, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. True, I may not be aware of this, but yet as they are determinations of my consciousness, they must necessarily conform to the condition, without which they are not *capable* of standing together in one universal self-consciousness. In no other way would they all without exception be mine. From this original combination important consequences follow.

The absolute identity of apperception in relation to all the determinations given in perception, involves a synthesis of those determinations, and is possible only through consciousness of the synthesis. For, the empirical consciousness, which accompanies each determination as it arises, is in itself broken up into units, and is unrelated to the one identical subject. Relation to a single subject does not take place when I accompany each determination with consciousness, but only when I add one determination to the other,

and am conscious of this act of synthesis. It is only because I am capable of combining *in one consciousness* the various determinations presented to me, that I can become aware that in every one of them the consciousness is the same. The *analytic* unity of apperception is, therefore, possible only under presupposition of a certain *synthetic* unity. The thought, that the determinations given in a perception all belong to me, is the same as the thought, that I unite them, or at least that I am capable of uniting them in one self-consciousness. This does not of itself involve a *consciousness of the synthesis* of determinations, but it presupposes the possibility of that consciousness. It is only because I am capable of grasping the various determinations in one consciousness, that I can call them all mine; were it not so, I should have a self as many-colored and various as the separate determinations of which I am conscious. Synthetic unity of the various determinations of perception as given *a priori*, is therefore the ground of that identity of apperception itself, which precedes *a priori* every definite act of thought. Now, objects cannot combine themselves, nor can understanding learn that they are combined by observing their combination. All combination is the work of understanding, and in fact understanding is itself nothing but the faculty of combining *a priori*, and bringing under the unity of apperception, the various determinations given in perception. The unity of apperception is, therefore, the supreme principle of all our knowledge.

This principle of the necessary unity of apperception

is no doubt in itself an identical and therefore an analytic proposition; but it also reveals the necessity for a synthesis of the various determinations given in perception, because without such synthesis the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness is inconceivable. In the simple consciousness of self, no variety of determination is given; such variety of determination can be given only in the perception which is distinguished from the consciousness of self, and can be thought only by being combined in one consciousness. An understanding in which the consciousness of self should at the same time be a consciousness of all the complex determination of objects, would be *perceptive*; but our understanding can only think, and must go to sense for perception. I am conscious of myself as identical in the various determinations presented to me in a perception, because all determinations that constitute one perception I call mine. But this is the same as saying that I am conscious of a necessary synthesis of them *a priori*, or that they rest upon the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all the determinations given to me must stand, but under which they can be brought only by means of a synthesis.

17. *The synthetic unity of apperception is the supreme principle of understanding.*

In the Transcendental Æsthetic, we have seen that the supreme principle, without which perception in its relation to sensibility is impossible, is, that all the determinations of perception should stand under the formal conditions of space and time. Now, the

the supreme principle, without which perception in its relation to understanding is impossible, is, that all determinations of perception should stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Under the former stand all determinations of perception, in so far as they are *given* to us; under the latter, in so far as they must be capable of being *combined* in one consciousness. Apart from the synthetic unity of apperception nothing can be thought or known, because the determinations given in perception, not having the act of apperception, "*I think*," in common, would not be comprehended in one-self-consciousness.

Speaking quite generally, understanding is the faculty of *knowledge*. Knowledge consists in the consciousness of certain given determinations as related to an object. An *object*, again, is that, in the conception of which the various determinations of a given perception are *united*. Now, all unification of determinations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the determinations. Hence, the unity of consciousness is absolutely necessary, to constitute the relation of determinations to an object, give them objective validity, and make them objects of knowledge; and on that unity therefore rests the very possibility of understanding.

The principle of the original *synthetic* unity of apperception, as being completely independent of all conditions of sensuous perception, is the supreme condition of the pure use of understanding, and upon this pure use rests the whole of its empirical use. Space, as the mere form of external sensuous perception,

does not of itself yield any knowledge: it but supplies the various elements of *a priori* perception that are capable of becoming knowledge. To know anything spacial, as, for instance a line, I must draw it, and so produce by synthesis a definite combination of the given elements. Thus, the unity of the act of combination is at the same time the unity of the consciousness in which the line is thought, and only in this unity of consciousness is a determinate space known as an object. The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition which I must observe in knowing an object, but it is a condition under which every perception must stand, before *it can become an object for me at all*. Without this synthesis, the various determinations would *not* be united in one consciousness.

Although it is thus proved, that the synthetic unity of consciousness is the condition of all thought, the unity of consciousness, as has been already said, is in itself an analytic proposition. For, it says only, that all the determinations of which *I* am conscious in a given perception must stand under the condition, which enables me to regard them as *mine*, or as related to my identical self, and so to comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception, through the "*I think*" expressed in all alike.

But this is not the principle of every possible understanding, but only of an understanding, through the pure apperception of which, in the consciousness "*I am*," no determinations are given. If we had an

understanding, which, by its mere self-consciousness, presented to itself the manifold determinations of perception; an understanding, which, by its very consciousness of objects, should give rise to the existence of these objects; such an understanding would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of manifold determinations. But this act of synthesis is essential to human understanding, which thinks, but does not perceive. It is, indeed, the supreme principle of human understanding. Nor can we form the least conception of any other possible understanding, whether of one that itself perceives, or of one that is dependent upon sensibility for its perception, but not upon a sensibility that stands under the conditions of space and time.

General Remark on the Principle of Judgment

It is very remarkable that there is nothing in a category taken by itself, that enables us to say whether a real thing corresponding to it is possible, and that a pure conception of understanding can be shown to have objective reality only if a perception is brought forward to which it can apply.

But what is still more remarkable is that the categories cannot be shown to be conditions of the possibility of things, and therefore to have *objective reality*, without the aid not only of perceptions, but even of *external perceptions*. Take, for instance, the pure conceptions of relation. Here we find (1) that, in order to show that there is something permanent, which corresponds to the conception of substance, and

thus to prove the objective reality of the conception, we must have the perception of that which is in *space*, in other words, the perception of matter; for only space has in it anything permanent, whereas time, and therefore all that exists in the inner sense, is in perpetual flux. (2) The perception which corresponds to the conception of *causality* is *change*. Now, to have a real consciousness of change, we must have the perception of motion, or change of place, and indeed it is only by reference to motion that we can realize what change means. No pure understanding can comprehend how change is possible, for in itself change combines determinations that contradict one another when they are predicated of the same thing. How, in the very same thing, there should follow from a given state another state that is its opposite, is not only beyond the power or reason to comprehend without a special instance, but without perception, it cannot be made intelligible to it at all. The only perception which fulfills this requirement is that of the motion of a point in space, for, by its presence in different places, the point presents us with a series of reciprocally exclusive determinations, and thus enables us to realize the meaning of change. Even in the case of inner changes we have to figure time, the form of inner sense, as a line, and the inner changes themselves as the generation of that line, that is, as motion. Thus it is by means of external perception that we make intelligible to ourselves the various successive states in which we ourselves exist. The true explanation of this is that no change can possibly be an object

of experience apart from the consciousness of something that is permanent, and that in inner sense, nothing that is permanent can be found. (3) Nor can the possibility of the category of *community* be conceived by reason alone, and hence its objective reality can be seen to be possible only by reference to perception, and indeed only by reference to external perception in space. How can we think it to be possible, that there should be anything in the existence of one substance to affect reciprocally the existence of other substances, and that, therefore, because there is something in the former, there must be something also in the latter which could not be understood from the existence of the latter when it is considered merely by itself? This is what community demands, and yet it is inconceivable, if things subsist by themselves, or are completely isolated from one another. The answer is that we can make the possibility of the community of substances, that is, of objects of experience, intelligible to ourselves only by representing them in space, and therefore in internal perception. For space by its very nature contains in itself *a priori* formal external relations, and these are conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and reaction, and therefore of community. Similarly it might readily be shown that the possibility of things as *quanta*, and therefore the objective reality of the category of quantity, requires external perception, and that only by means of external perception can we have experience even of anything in inner sense as a quantum.

The net result of this whole section is this:— All

principles of pure understanding are nothing but *a priori* principles of the possibility of experience; and all *a priori* synthetic propositions relate only to experience, and indeed from that relation they derive their possibility.

Distinction of Phenomena and Noumena

We have seen that whatever the understanding produces from itself, it holds in trust solely in the interest of experience. The principles of pure understanding, whether as mathematical they are *a priori* constitutive principles, or as dynamical merely regulative principles, contain nothing but what may be called the pure schema for a possible experience. For experience derives its unity entirely from the synthetic unity which understanding imparts, originally and spontaneously, to the synthesis of imagination in relation to apperception; and phenomena, as the data for a possible knowledge, must therefore stand *a priori* in relation to that synthetic unity and in harmony with it.

Now the proposition that understanding can never make a transcendental use, but only an empirical use, of any of its *a priori* principles is seen to have very important consequences, so soon as it is thoroughly understood. A conception is employed transcendently when it occurs in a proposition regarding things *as such* or *in themselves*; it is employed empirically when the proposition relates merely to *phenomena*, or objects of a possible experience. Only the empirical use is admissible. Every conception requires, firstly, the logical form of conception or thought, and sec-

only, the possibility of an object being empirically given to which it may be applied. Where no such object can be given, the conception is empty and meaningless, containing nothing but the logical function which is necessary in order to form a conception out of any data that may be given. Now, the only way in which an object can be presented is in perception. And this perception must be empirical; for, although pure perception is possible *a priori* before the presentation of an object, yet, as it is a mere form, it can by itself have no object to which it may apply, and therefore it can have no objective value ascribed to it. Hence all conceptions, and with them all principles, even when they are possible *a priori*, are none the less relative to empirical perceptions as the data for a possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity, but are a mere play of imagination or of understanding.

That this limitation applies to all the categories, and to all the principles derived from them, is evident, if only from this, that we cannot give a *real* definition of even a single one of them, or in other words, make the possibility of their object intelligible, without directly referring to the conditions of sensibility, and therefore to the form of phenomena. The categories are thus necessarily limited to phenomena as their sole object, and, if this limitation is taken away, all meaning or objective relation vanishes from them, and no possible instance of an object can be adduced to make the conception comprehensible.

There is therefore no way of avoiding the conclu-

sion that the pure conceptions of understanding can never be employed transcendently, but only empirically, and that the principles of pure understanding can apply only to objects of sense, as conforming to the universal conditions of a possible experience, and never to things as such, or apart from the manner in which we are capable of perceiving them.

The Transcendental Analytic has brought us to this important conclusion, that understanding can never do more than supply by anticipation the form for a possible experience; and, as nothing but a phenomenon can be an object of experience, it has taught us that understanding cannot possibly transcend the limits of sensibility, beyond which no objects are presented to us. The principles of pure understanding are merely exponents of phenomena, and for the proud name of Ontology, as a science that claims to supply in a systematic doctrine *a priori* synthetic knowledge of things as such, must be substituted the modest claims of an Analytic of Pure Understanding.

A conception which cannot be known in any way to have objective reality may be called problematic, if it is not self-contradictory, and if it is bound up with the knowledge gained through certain conceptions, the range of which it serves to limit. Now the conception of a *noumenon*, that is, of a thing that cannot be an object of sense, but is thought, by pure understanding alone, as a thing in itself, is certainly not self-contradictory; for we cannot know with certainty that sensibility is the only possible mode of

perception. Moreover, the conception of a noumenon is necessary to prevent sensuous perception from claiming to extend to things in themselves, and to set a limit to the objective validity of sensuous knowledge. In the end, however, we are unable to understand how such noumena are possible at all, and the realm beyond the sphere of phenomena is for us empty. We have indeed an understanding that *problematically* stretches beyond the sphere of phenomena, but we have no perception in which objects beyond the field of sensibility can be presented, nor can we conceive how such a perception is even possible. Hence understanding cannot be employed assertorically beyond the world of phenomena. The conception of a noumenon is, therefore, merely the conception of a *limit*, a conception which is only of negative use, and but serves to check the presumption of sensibility. But although it is unable to establish anything beyond the sphere of phenomena, the idea of a noumenon is not a mere arbitrary fiction, but is connected in the closest way with the limitation of the sensibility to phenomena.

Dialectical Conclusions of Pure Reason

There are three kinds of dialectical inference. In the first, I reason from the transcendental conception of the subject, which is perfectly simple, to the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I have no conception at all. This dialectical illusion I shall call the transcendental *paralogism*. The second kind of dialectical inference is to the transcendental conception of an absolute totality in the series of con-

ditions to any given phenomenon. Here I reason, that, as my conception of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series is always self-contradictory, the opposite unity, which is equally inconceivable, must be regarded as true. The attitude of reason in this form of dialectical inference I shall call the *antinomy* of reason. In the third and last kind of sophistical inference of reason, I conclude from the totality of conditions demanded by the thought of objects as a whole, in so far as these can be given, to the absolute synthetic unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; in other words, I reason from things that I cannot know through the mere transcendental conception of them to a Being of all beings that I know still less, since the transcendental conception throws no light upon its existence or its unconditioned necessity. This sort of dialectical inference I shall call the *ideal* of pure reason.

The Paralogism of Rational Psychology

The analysis, then, of my consciousness of self as the subject that thinks, does not enable me to take a single step towards the knowledge of myself as an object. To suppose so is simply to confuse the logical analysis of thinking in general with the metaphysical determination of an object.

The truth is, that it would be a great stumbling block, and, indeed, the only thing that our Critique could have reason to fear, if it could be shown *a priori*, that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances; that, as a necessary consequence, personality

is inseparable from them; and that they are conscious of their own existence as separate and distinct from all matter. Were it possible in this way to take a step beyond the world of sense, and to enter the world of *noumena*, who should then deny us the right to go forward in this new region, to settle in it, and, if we were under a lucky star, to take complete possession of it? For, the proposition that every thinking being is by its very nature a simple substance, is an *a priori* synthetic proposition; firstly, because it goes beyond the conception with which it starts, and adds to the act of thinking in general the *mode of existence*; and, secondarily, because it adds to that conception the new predicate of simplicity, which cannot be given in any experience. Hence *a priori* synthetic propositions would be possible and admissible, not simply, as we have contended, in relation to objects of a possible experience, and indeed as principles of the possibility of experience, but even as determinations of things in general and of things in themselves. This would make an end of our whole Critique, and bring us back to the old dogmatism. The danger, however, is not so great as it seems, as may be seen when we look at the matter more closely.

The whole procedure of rational psychology is vitiated by a paralogism which may be exhibited in the following syllogism:—

That which can be thought only as subject, must exist as subject, and is therefore substance.

A thinking being from its very nature can be thought only as subject.

Therefore, a thinking being can exist only as subject, that is, as substance.

Now, in the major premise of this syllogism, by "that which can be thought" is meant a being in every relation in which it can be thought, and therefore in relation to possible perception. But, in the minor premise, the only being spoken of is "a thinking being," or one that is conscious of itself as subject, simply from its relation to thought and to the unity of consciousness, but not at all from its relation to a perception by which it is presented to thought as an object. The conclusion is, therefore, reached *per sophisma figuræ dictionis*.

That we are perfectly right in resolving this famous argument into a paralogism will be at once evident, if we call to mind what has already been pointed out. The conception of a thing that can exist by itself as a subject, but cannot exist as a mere predicate, does not carry with it objective reality. We cannot possibly know that there is an object corresponding to the conception, because we cannot understand how an object of that sort could exist at all. If by the term "substance" is meant an object that can be presented to us, we must say that the indispensable condition of the objective reality of our conception is, that it should be presented to us in a permanent perception. Now, in inner perception, there is nothing permanent, for the *I* is merely the consciousness of my thinking. So long, therefore, as we limit ourselves to mere thinking, we are without the necessary condition for the application of the conception of substance to the self

as a thinking being; we are unable, in other words, to say that the self is an independent subject. And along with the objective reality of the conception of substance completely disappears the simplicity of substance, leaving only the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thinking in general, a unity which exists whether the subject is composite or simple.

Rational psychology is, therefore, not a *doctrine* which enables us to add anything to our knowledge of self; it is merely a *discipline*, which sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this field, and prevents us, on the one hand, from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism, and on the other hand, from giving ourselves up to a mystic spiritualism that has lost its hold of actual life. The refusal of reason to answer our curious questions as to a life beyond the present, we ought to interpret as a hint to apply our self-knowledge to fruitful practical ends, and to turn away from fruitless and transcendent speculations.

Concluding Remark on the Whole Antinomy of Pure Reason

So long as reason in its conceptions is seeking simply the totality of conditions in the world of sense, and trying to find satisfaction in that direction, our ideas are *cosmological*, though at the same time transcendental. But the moment the unconditioned, in which we are mainly interested, is conceived as lying entirely outside of the world of sense, and therefore beyond all possible experience, our ideas become trans-

cendent. For then they are not merely ideas which reason employs in seeking to complete experience — an end which must always be pursued, though it can never be fully attained; rather they are ideas that entirely separate themselves from experience, and create for themselves objects, for which experience supplies no material, and which cannot rest their claim to objective reality upon the completion of the empirical series, but only upon pure *a priori* conceptions. Nevertheless, the cosmological idea which gave rise to the fourth antinomy urges us to take this step. Finding that phenomena are always conditioned modes of existence, and have no support in themselves, we are driven to look about for something different from all phenomena, and therefore for an intelligible object which is entirely free from contingency. Thus the very first step which we take beyond the world of sense compels us to enter upon an inquiry into the nature of the absolutely necessary being, and to derive from our conceptions of it, our conceptions of all things in their purely intelligible nature.

The Ideal of the Supreme Being

The ideal of the Supreme Being is therefore nothing but a *regulative principle* of reason, telling us to view all connection in the world as if it proceeded from an all-sufficient necessary cause. We can base upon it a rule for the systematic unity which is necessary in the explanation of the world according to universal laws, but it does not entitle us to assert that there is an existence necessary in itself. At the same time it

is impossible to avoid the transcendental subreption by which this formal principle is imagined to be constitutive, and the unity of the world hypostatized. It is the same here as with space. Space is merely a principle of sensibility, but as it originally makes possible all the figures which are merely different limitations of itself, it is held to be something absolutely necessary and self-subsistent, and to be an object given in itself *a priori*. Similarly, the systematic unity of nature cannot be shown to be a principle of the empirical use of our reason, except in so far as we presuppose the idea of an absolutely real being as the supreme cause. Accordingly, this idea is supposed to be an actual object, and this object, because it is the supreme condition of existence is regarded as necessary. Thus a *regulative* principle is changed into a *constitutive* principle. That such a substitution has actually been made is evident from this, that if I consider that Supreme Being, which relatively to the world is absolutely or unconditionally necessary, as a thing existing by itself, I cannot conceive what such necessity means. The conception of necessity, therefore, is one which lies in my reason merely as a formal condition of thought, not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence.

Criticism of All Speculative Theology

Reason in its purely speculative use is quite incapable of proving the existence of a Supreme Being. At the same time it is of very great value in this way, that it is able to *correct* our knowledge of that Being,

should it be possible to obtain a knowledge of it in any other way; to bring it into harmony with itself and with all the aims of our intelligence, and to purify it of all that is inconsistent with the conception of an Original Being, and of all admixture of empirical limitations.

The Supreme Being is for purely speculative reason a mere ideal, but still a *perfectly faultless* ideal, which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. And if it should turn out that there is a moral theology, which is able to supply what is deficient in speculative theology, we should then find that transcendental theology is no longer merely problematic, but is indispensable in the determination of the conception of a Supreme Being, and in the continual criticism of reason, which is so often deluded by sense, and is not always in harmony even with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence apart from the world (not as a soul of the world), eternity as free from conditions of time, omnipresence as unaffected by conditions of space, etc., are purely transcendental predicates, the purified conception of which, essential as it is to every theology, can be derived only from a transcendental theology.

From "Metaphysic of Morals" ¹

THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MORAL LAW.

Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in

¹From *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, translated by T. K. Abbott. 1898.

the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects,—agreeableness of one's own condition, and even the promotion of the happiness of others,—could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. The preëminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the *conception of law* in itself, *which certainly is only possible in a rational being*, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result.

But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i. e., I am never to act otherwise than so *that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law*. Here now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delu-

sion, and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this, and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example, May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have: whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise. The former may undoubtedly often be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and as, with all my supposed *cunning*, the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it would not be more *prudent* to act herein according to a universal maxim, and to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear of consequences. Now, it is a wholly different thing to be truthful from duty, and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the action already implies a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt

wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? and should I be able to say to myself, "Everyone may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself?" Then I presently became aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or, if they over-hastily did so, would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.

I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle

into a possible universal legislation, and reason exerts from me immediate respect for such legislation. I do not, indeed, as yet *discern* on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from *pure* respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good *in itself*, and the worth of such a will is above everything.

Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason we have arrived at its principle.

Pages 17-20.

From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason, and that, moreover, in the commonest reason, just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent, knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from their genuine influence, and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not only of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical importance, to

derive these notions and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the compass of this practical or pure rational knowledge, *i. e.* to determine the whole faculty of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must not make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at times be necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature, we must derive them from the general concept of a rational being. In this way, although for its *application* to man morality has need of anthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it independently as pure philosophy, *i. e.* as metaphysic, complete in itself (a thing which in such distinct branches of science is easily done); knowing well that unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on their genuine principles, even for common practical purposes, especially of moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest possible good in the world.

But in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the natural steps from the common moral judgment (in this case very worthy of respect) to the philosophical, as has been already done, but also from a popular philosophy which goes no further than it can reach by groping with the help of examples, to

metaphysics (which does not allow itself to be checked by anything empirical, and as it must measure the whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge, goes as far as ideal conceptions, where even examples fail us) we must follow and clearly describe the practical faculty of reason, from the general rules of its determination to the point where the notion of duty springs from it.

Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is, according to principles, *i. e.*, have a *will*. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires *reason*, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognized as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, *i. e.*, the will is a faculty to choose *that only* which reason independent on inclination recognizes as practically necessary, *i. e.*, as good. But if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions: in a word, if the will does not *in itself* completely accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is *obligation*, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by

principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.

The conception of an objective principle in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason) and the formula of the command is called an Imperative.

All Imperatives are expressed by the word *ought* [or *shall*], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically *good*, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the *pleasant*, as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for every one.

A perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to objective laws (viz. laws of good), but could not be conceived as *obliged* thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from its subjective constitution it can only be determined by the conception of good. Therefore no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in general for a *holy* will; *ought* is here out

of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law. Therefore imperatives are only formulæ to express the relation of objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, *e. g.* the human will.

Now all *imperatives* command either *hypothetically* or *categorically*. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, *i. e.* as objectively necessary.

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulæ determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to *something else*, then the imperative is *hypothetical*; if it is conceived as good *in itself* and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is *categorical*.

Thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be good, and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good, whether because the subject does not always know that it is good,

or because, even if it know this, yet its maxims might be opposed to the objective principles of practical reason.

Pages 28-31.

Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality, the difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very profound one. It is an *à priori* synthetical practical proposition; and as there is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions of this kind, it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less with the practical.

In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of a categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the formula of it, containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative; for even if we know the tenor of such an absolute command, yet how it is possible will require further special and laborious study, which we postpone to the last section.

When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone

that the imperative properly represents as necessary.

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: *Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.*

Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative, as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided whether what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.

Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called *nature* in the most general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: *Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature.*

Pages 37-39.

Supposing, however, that there were something *whose existence has in itself* an absolute worth, something which, being *an end in itself*, could be a source of definite laws, then in this and this alone would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative, *i. e.* a practical law.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being *exists* as an end in himself, not *merely as a means* to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other

rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is *to be acquired* by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called *things*; rational beings, on the contrary, are called *persons*, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth *for us* as an effect of our action, but *objective ends*, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself: an end, moreover, for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve *merely* as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess *absolute worth*; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.

If then there is a supreme practical principle, or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative,

it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for every one because it is *an end in itself*, constitutes an *objective* principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is; *rational nature exists as an end in itself*. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a *subjective* principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: *So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.*

Pages 46-47.

This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is *an end in itself* (which is the supreme limiting condition of every man's freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, *firstly*, because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything about them: *secondly*, because it does not present humanity as an end to men subjectively, that is, as an object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective ends, let them be

what we will; it must therefore spring from pure reason. In fact the objective principle of all practical legislation lies (according to the first principle) in *the rule* and its form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say, *e. g.*, a law of nature); but the *subjective* principle is in the *end*; now by the second principle the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of its harmony with the universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of *the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will*.

On this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent with the will being universal legislator. Thus the will is not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded *as itself giving the law*, and on this ground only, subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).

Page 49.

Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the principle of morality, we need not wonder why they all failed. It was seen that man was bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed that the laws to which he is subject are *only those of his own giving*, though at the same time they are *universal*, and that he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will; a will, however, which is designed by nature to give universal laws. For when one has conceived man only as subject to a law (no matter what), then this law required some interest either by

way of attraction or restraint, since it did not originate as a law from *his own* will, but this will was according to a law obliged by *something else* to act in a certain manner. Now by this necessary consequence all the labor spent in finding a supreme principle of *duty* was irrevocably lost. For men never elicited duty, but only a necessity of acting from a certain interest. Whether this interest was private or otherwise, in any case the imperative must be conditional, and could not by any means be capable of being a moral command. I will therefore call this the principle of *Autonomy* of the will, in contrast with every other which I accordingly reckon as *Heteronomy*.

The conception of every rational being as one which must consider itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws, so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view — this conception leads to another which depends on it and is very fruitful, namely, that of a *kingdom of ends*.

By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are determined as regards their universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings, and likewise from all the content of their private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole (including both rational beings as ends in themselves, and also the special ends which each may propose to himself), that is to say, we can conceive a kingdom of ends, which on the preceding principles is possible.

For all rational beings come under the *law* that each of them must treat itself and all others *never merely as means*, but in every case *at the same time as ends in themselves*. Hence results a systematic union of rational beings by common objective laws, *i. e.*, a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means. It is certainly only an ideal.

A rational being belongs as a *member* to the kingdom of ends when, although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it *as sovereign* when, while giving laws, he is not subject to the will of any other.

A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends, which is rendered possible by the freedom of will. He cannot, however, maintain the latter position merely by the maxims of his will, but only in case he is a completely independent being without wants, and with unrestricted power adequate to his will.

Morality consists then in the reference of all action to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This legislation must be capable of existing in every rational being, and of emanating from his will, so that the principle of this will is, never to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be also a universal law, and accordingly always so to act *that the will could at the same time regard itself as giving in its maxims universal laws*.

If now the maxims of rational beings are not by their own nature coincident with this objective principle, then the necessity of acting on it is called practical necessitation, *i. e. duty*. Duty does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it does to every member of it and to all in the same degree.

Pages 51-52.

Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself (independently on any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy then is: Always so to choose that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law. We cannot prove that this practical rule is an imperative, *i. e.*, that the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to it as a condition, by a mere analysis of the conceptions which occur in it, since it is a synthetical proposition; we must advance beyond the cognition of the objects to a critical examination of the subject, that is of the pure practical reason, for this synthetic proposition which commands apodictically must be capable of being cognized wholly *a priori*. This matter, however, does not belong to the present section. But that the principle of autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be readily shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality. For by this analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative, and that what this commands is neither more nor less than this very autonomy.

Page 59.

The *will* is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and *freedom* would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently on foreign causes *determining* it; just as *physical necessity* is the property that the causality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes.

The preceding definition of freedom is *negative*, and therefore unfruitful for the discovery of its essence; but it leads to a *positive* conception which is so much the more full and fruitful. Since the conception of causality involves that of laws, according to which, by something that we call cause, something else, namely, the effect, must be produced (laid down); hence, although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law, that something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: The will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and

is the principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.

On the hypothesis then of freedom of the will, morality together with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of the conception. However the latter is still a synthetic proposition; viz, an absolutely good will is that whose maxim can always include itself regarded as a universal law; for this property of its maxim can never be discovered by analyzing the conception of an absolutely good will. Now such synthetic propositions are only possible in this way: that the two cognitions are connected together by their union with a third in which they are both to be found. The *positive* concept of freedom furnishes this third cognition, which cannot, as with physical causes, be the nature of the sensible world (in the concept of which we find conjoined the concept of something in relation as cause to *something else* as effect). We cannot now at once show what this third is to which freedom points us, and of which we have an idea *a priori*, nor can we make intelligible how the concept of freedom is shown to be legitimate from principles of pure practical reason, and with it the possibility of a categorical imperative; but some further preparation is required.

Pages 65-66.

It is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will, from whatever reason, if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same of all rational

beings. For as morality serves as a law for us only because we are *rational beings*, it must also hold for all rational beings; and as it must be deduced simply from the property of freedom, it must be shown that freedom also is a property of all rational beings. It is not enough then to prove it from certain supposed experiences of human nature (which indeed is quite impossible, and it can only be shown *à priori*), but we must show that it belongs to the activity of all rational beings endowed with a will. Now I say every being that cannot act except *under the idea of freedom* is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free, that is to say, all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have the same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in itself by a proof theoretically conclusive. Now I affirm that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that is practical, that is, has causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgment not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles independent on foreign influences. Consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom. This idea

must therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed to every rational being.

Pages 66-67.

Every rational being reckons itself *qua* intelligence as belonging to the world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient cause belonging to that world that he calls his causality a *will*. On the other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the world of sense, in which his actions which are mere appearances (phenomena) of that causality are displayed; we cannot however discern how they are possible from this causality which we do not know; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena, namely, desires and inclinations. If therefore I were only a member of the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will; if I were only a part of the world of sense they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature. (The former would rest on morality as the supreme principle, the latter on happiness.) Since however the *world of understanding contains the foundation of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws also*, and accordingly gives the law to my will, (which belongs wholly to the world of understanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it follows that, although on the one side I must regard myself as a being belong-

ing to the world of sense, yet on the other side I must recognize myself as subject as an intelligence to the law of the world of understanding, *i. e.*, to reason, which contains this law in the idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the will; consequently I must regard the laws of the world of understanding as imperatives for me, and the actions which conform to them as duties.

And thus what makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in consequence of which if I were nothing else all my actions *would* always conform to the autonomy of the will: but as I at the same time intuite myself as a member of the world of sense, they *ought* so to conform, and this *categorical* 'ought' implies a synthetic *a priori* proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as affected by sensible desires there is added further the idea of the same will but as belonging to the world of the understanding, pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according to reason of the former will; precisely as to the intuitions of sense there are added concepts of the understanding which of themselves signify nothing but regular form in general, and in this way synthetic *à priori* propositions become possible, on which all knowledge of physical nature rests. The practical use of common human reason confirms this reasoning.

Pages 73-74.

The question then: How a categorical imperative

is possible can be answered to this extent that we can assign the only hypothesis on which it is possible, namely, the idea of freedom; and we can also discern the necessity of this hypothesis, and this is sufficient for the *practical exercise* of reason, that is, for the conviction of the *validity of this imperative*, and hence of the moral law; but how this hypothesis itself is possible can never be discerned by any human reason. On the hypothesis, however, that the will of an intelligence is free, its *autonomy*, as the essential formal condition of its determination, is a necessary consequence. Moreover, this freedom of will is not merely quite *possible* as a hypothesis (not involving any contradiction to the principle of physical necessity in the connection of the phenomena of the sensible world) as speculative philosophy can show; but further, a rational being who is conscious of a causality through reason, that is to say, of a will (distinct from desires), must *of necessity* make it practically, that is, in idea, the condition of all his voluntary actions. But to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source, *i. e.*, how the mere principle of the *universal validity of all its maxims as laws* (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any matter (object) of the will in which one could antecedently take any interest; and how it can produce an interest which would be called purely *moral*; or in other words, *how pure reason can be practical* — to explain this is beyond the power of

human reason, and all the labor and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost.

It is just the same as though I sought to find out how freedom itself is possible as the causality of a will. For then I quit the ground of philosophical explanation, and I have no other to go upon. I might indeed revel in the world of intelligences which still remains to me, but although I have an *idea* of it, which is well founded, yet I have not the least *knowledge* of it, nor can I ever attain to such knowledge with all the efforts of my natural faculty of reason. It signifies only a something that remains over when I have eliminated everything belonging to the world of sense from the actuating principles of my will, serving merely to keep in bounds the principle of motives taken from the field of sensibility; fixing its limits and showing that it does not contain all in all within itself, but that there is more beyond it; but this something more I know no further. Of pure reason which frames this ideal there remains after the abstraction of all matter, *i. e.* knowledge of objects, nothing but the form, namely, the practical law of the universality of the maxims, and in conformity with this the conception of reason in reference to a pure world of understanding as a possible efficient cause, that is a cause determining the will. There must here be a total absence of springs; unless this idea of an intelligible world is itself the spring, or that in which reason primarily takes an interest; but to make this intelligible is precisely the problem that we cannot solve.

Here now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry, and it is of great importance to determine it even on this account, in order that reason may not on the one hand, to the prejudice of morals, seek about in the world of sense for the supreme motive and an interest comprehensible but empirical; and on the other hand, that it may not impotently flap its wings without being able to move in the (for it) empty space of transcendent concepts which we call the intelligible world, and so lose itself amidst chimeras. For the rest, the idea of a pure world of understanding as a system of all intelligences, and to which we ourselves as rational beings belong, (although we are likewise on the other side members of the sensible world), this remains always a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes of rational belief, although all knowledge stops at its threshold, useful, namely, to produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the noble ideal of a universal kingdom of *ends in themselves* (rational beings), to which we can belong as members then only when we carefully conduct ourselves according to the maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature.

The speculative employment of reason *with respect to nature* leads to the absolute necessity of some supreme cause of *the world*; the practical employment of reason *with a view to freedom* leads also to absolute necessity, but only of *the laws of the actions* of a rational being as such. Now it is an essential *principle* of reason, however employed, to push its knowledge to a consciousness of its *necessity* (with-

out which it would not be rational knowledge). It is however an equally essential *restriction* of the same reason that it can neither discern the *necessity* of what is or what happens, nor of what ought to happen, unless a condition is supposed on which it is or happens or ought to happen. In this way, however, by the constant inquiry for the condition, the satisfaction of reason is only further and further postponed. Hence it unceasingly seeks the unconditionally necessary, and finds itself forced to assume it, although without any means of making it comprehensible to itself, happy enough if only it can discover a conception which agrees with this assumption. It is therefore no fault in our deduction of the supreme principle of morality, but an objection that should be made to human reason in general, that it cannot enable us to conceive the absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law (such as the categorical imperative must be). It cannot be blamed for refusing to explain this necessity by a condition, that is to say, by means of some interest assumed as a basis, since the law would then cease to be a moral law, *i. e.*, a supreme law of freedom. And thus while we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its *incomprehensibility*, and this is all that can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to the very limit of human reason.

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JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE

CHAPTER IX

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE

1762-1814

Besides the more immediate advance toward a complete idealism, made by the followers of Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Schelling and Hegel, a deeper feature of their philosophies is embodied in their treatment of the Will, or the active principle in the universe. Although by all these writers except Schopenhauer, the will is still considered mainly by formal methods and in its rational aspects, this movement marks a great advance upon preceding philosophy, since it was the foundation of a philosophy of *values*, and prepared also for a deeper interpretation of nature than had hitherto been attempted.

Unlike Kant, who began his investigations with experience as content, Fichte starts with the activity of the ego itself, which must precede all content. In the original act by which subject and object are produced in consciousness, Fichte finds the key to an understanding of the structure of the whole world, and the most fundamental principles of knowledge.

In his abstract science of knowledge, which is the foundation of his philosophy, Fichte has plainly confused metaphysics and logic, and his psychology is inadequate; and, in spite of his appearance of scientific precision, his method remains speculative, since he passes from truths of experience to metaphysical assumptions unjustifiably. But Fichte was greater than his method. Through the intricacies of his science of knowledge runs the simplicity of eternal truths. In the analysis of thought he seeks to analyze also the principle of freedom, and the actual world symbolized by his formulas

is the world of our moral struggle. In his more popular writings the spirit of a great teacher, a deep conviction of profound truth, and a noble vision of a spiritual world are revealed.

From the "Science of Knowledge" ¹

First and Absolutely Unconditioned Fundamental Principle.

WE have to search for the absolute, first, and unconditioned fundamental principle of human knowledge. It cannot be proven, nor determined if it is to be absolute first principle.

This principle is to express that *deed-act* which does not occur among the empirical determinations of our consciousness, nor can so occur, since it is rather the basis of all consciousness, and first and alone makes consciousness possible. In representing this deed-act it is not so much to be feared that my readers will *not* think what they ought to think, as that they will think what they ought not to think. This renders necessary a *reflection* on what may perhaps for the present be taken for that deed-act, and an *abstraction* from all that does not really belong to it.

Even by means of this abstracting reflection, that deed-act, which is not empirical *fact* of consciousness, cannot become fact of consciousness: but by means of this abstracting reflection we may recognize so much;

¹ From *The Science of Knowledge*, by J. G. Fichte, translated by A. E. Kroeger, 1889.

that this deed-act must necessarily be *thought* as the basis of all consciousness.

The laws according to which this deed-act must necessarily be thought as basis of human knowledge, or, which is the same, the rules according to which that abstracting reflection proceeds, have not yet been proven as valid, but are for the present tacitly presupposed as well known and agreed upon. As we proceed we shall deduce them from that fundamental principle, the establishment whereof is correct only if they are correct. This is a circle, but an unavoidable circle. And since it is unavoidable and freely admitted, it is also allowable to appeal to all the laws of general logic in establishing this highest fundamental principle.

In undertaking this abstracting reflection, we must start from some proposition which every one will admit without dispute. Doubtless there are many such. We choose the one which seems to us to open the shortest road to our purpose. In admitting this proposition, the deed-act, which we intend to make the basis of our whole science of knowledge, must be admitted; and the reflection must show *that* this deed-act is admitted the moment that proposition is admitted.

Our course of proceeding in this reflection is as follows: Any fact of empirical consciousness, admitted as such valid proposition, is taken hold of, and from it we separate one of its empirical determinations after the other, until only that remains, which can no longer be separated and abstracted from.

As such admitted proposition we take this one: A is A.

Every one admits this proposition, and without the least hesitation. It is recognized by all as completely certain and evident.

If any one should ask a proof of its certainty, no one would enter upon such a proof, but would say: This proposition is *absolutely* (*that is, without any further ground,*) *certain*; and by saying this would ascribe to himself the power of *absolutely positing something*.

In insisting on the in-itself certainty of the above proposition, you posit *not* that A is. The proposition A is A is by no means equivalent to A is. *Being* when posited without predicate is something quite different from being when posited with a predicate. Let us suppose A to signify a space enclosed within two straight lines, then the proposition A is A would still be correct; although the proposition A is would be false, since such a space is impossible.

But you posit by that proposition: *If A is, then A is*. The question *whether* A is at all or not, does not, therefore, occur in it. The *content* of the proposition is not regarded at all: merely its *form*. The question is not whereof you know, but *what* you know of any given subject. The only thing posited, therefore, by that proposition is the *absolutely* necessary connection between the two A's. This connection we shall call X.

In regard to A itself nothing has as yet been posited.

The question, therefore, arises: Under what condition *is* A?

X at least is in the Ego, and posited *through* the Ego, for it is the Ego which asserts the above proposition, and so asserts it by virtue of X as a law, which X or law must, therefore, be given to the Ego; and, since it is asserted absolutely, and without further ground, must be given to the Ego through itself.

Whether and *how* A is posited we do not know; but since X is to designate a connection between an unknown positing of A (of the first A in the proposition A is A) and a positing of the same A, which latter positing is absolute on condition of the first positing, it follows that A, *at least in so far as that connection is posited*, is posited *in* and *through* the Ego, like X. Proof: X is only possible in relation to an A; now X is really posited in the Ego; hence, also, A must be posited in the Ego, in so far as X is related to it.

X is related to that A, in the above proposition, which occupies the logical position of subject, and also to that A which is the predicate, for both are united by X. Both, therefore, are posited in the Ego, in so far as they are posited; and the A of the predicate is posited *absolutely* if the first one is posited. Hence, the above proposition may be also expressed: If A is posited *in the Ego*, then *it is posited*, or then it *is*.

Hence, by means of X, the Ego posits; that A *is* absolutely for the asserting Ego, and *is* simply because it is posited in the Ego: or that there is something in

the Ego which always remains the same, and is thus able to connect or posit: and hence the absolutely posited X may also be expressed, $\text{Ego}=\text{Ego}$, or I am I.

Thus we have already arrived at the proposition I *am*; not as expression of a deed-act, it is true, but, at least, as expression of a *fact*.

For X is absolutely posited; this is a fact of empirical consciousness, as shown by the admitted proposition. Now X signifies the same as I am I; hence, this proposition is also absolutely posited.

But Ego is Ego, or I am I, has quite another significance than A is A. For the latter proposition had content only on a certain condition, namely, *if* A is posited. But the proposition I am I is unconditionally and absolutely valid, since it is the same as X; it is valid not only in form but also in content. In it the Ego is posited not on condition, but absolutely, with the predicate of self-equality; hence, it is posited, and the proposition may also be expressed, I *am*.

This proposition, I *am*, is as yet only founded upon a fact, and has no other validity than that of a fact. If " $A=A$ " (or X) is to be certain, then "I am" must also be certain. Now, it is fact of empirical consciousness that we are compelled to regard X as absolutely certain; hence, also "I am" is certain, since it is the ground of the X. It follows from this, that the *ground of explanation of all facts of empirical consciousness is this: before all positing, the Ego must be posited through itself*.

I say of *all* facts; and to prove this I must show that X is the highest fact of empirical consciousness,

is the basis of all others, and contained in all other facts; which, perhaps, would be admitted by all men, without proof, although the whole science of knowledge busies itself to prove it.

The proposition A is A is *asserted*. But all asserting is an act of the human mind; for it has all the conditions of such as act in empirical consciousness, which must be presupposed as well known and admitted in order to advance our reflection. Now, this act is based on something which has no higher ground, namely X or I am.

Hence, that which is *absolutely posited and in itself grounded* is the ground of a *certain* (we shall see hereafter of *all*) acting of the human mind; hence its pure character; the pure character of activity in itself, altogether abstracting from its particular empirical conditions.

The positing of the Ego through itself is, therefore, the pure activity of the Ego. The Ego *posits* itself; and the Ego is by virtue of this its mere self-positing. Again, *vice versa*: the Ego *is* and *posits* its being, by virtue of its mere being. It is both the acting and the product of the act; the active and the result of the activity; deed and act in one; and hence the *I am* is expressive of a deed-act; and of the *only possible* deed-act, as our science of knowledge must show.

Let us again consider the proposition *I am I*. The Ego is absolutely posited. Let us assume that the first Ego of this proposition (which has the position of formal subject) is the *absolutely posited* Ego, and

that the second Ego (that of the predicate) is the *being* Ego; then the absolutely valid assertion that both are one signifies: the Ego is, *because* it has posited itself.

This is, indeed, the case according to the logical form of the proposition. In $A=A$ the first A is that which is posited in the Ego, (either absolutely, like the Ego itself, or conditionally, like any non-Ego) and in this positing of A the Ego is absolutely subject; and hence the first A is also called the subject. But the second A designates that which the Ego, in now making itself the object of its own reflection discovers thus *as* posited in itself, (since it has just before itself posited the A in itself). The Ego, in asserting that proposition $A=A$, predicates in truth not something of A, but of itself, namely, that it has found an A posited in itself; and hence the second A is called predicate.

The Ego in the former and the Ego in the latter significance are to be absolutely Equal. Hence, the above proposition may be turned around, and then it reads: The Ego posits itself simply *because* it is. It posits itself through its mere being, and *is* through its mere being posited.

This, then, will explain clearly in what significance we here use the word Ego (I), and will lead us to a definite explanation of the Ego as absolute subject. The Ego as absolute subject is *that, the being, essence, whereof consists merely in positing itself as being*. As soon as it posits itself, it is; and as soon as it is, it posits itself; and hence the Ego is for the

Ego absolute and necessary. Whatsoever is not for itself is not an Ego.

The question has been asked, What *was* I before I became self-conscious? The answer is, *I* was not at all, for I was not I. The Ego is only, in so far as it is conscious of itself. The possibility of that question is grounded upon a mixing up of the Ego as *subject*, and the Ego as *object* of the reflection of the absolute subject; and is in itself altogether improper. The Ego represents itself, and in so far takes itself up in the form of representation, and now first becomes a *somewhat*, that is, an object. Consciousness receives in this form of representation a substrate, which *is*, even without the real consciousness, and which, moreover, is thought bodily. Such a condition is thought, and the question asked, *What* was the Ego at that time? that is, what is the substrate of consciousness? But even in this thought you unconsciously *add in thinking* the *absolute subject* as looking at that substrate; and hence you unconsciously add in thought the very thing whereof you wanted to abstract, and thus you contradict yourself. The truth is, you cannot think anything at all without adding in thought your Ego as self-conscious; you cannot abstract from your self-consciousness; and all questions of the above kind are not to be answered, since maturely considered, they cannot be asked.

If the Ego *is* only so far as it posits itself, then it also is only *for* the positing, and posits only for the being Ego. *The Ego is for the Ego*; but if it posits itself absolutely, as it is, then it posits itself neces-

sarily, and is necessary for the Ego. *I am only for me; but for me I am necessarily.* (By saying *for me*, I already posit my being.) *To posit itself and to be* is, applied to the Ego, the same. Hence, the proposition I am because I have posited myself, can also be expressed; *I am absolutely because I am.*

Again, the Ego as positing itself and the Ego as being are one and the same. The Ego is as *what* it posits itself, and posits itself as *what* it is. Hence, *I am absolutely what I am.*

The immediate expression of the thus developed deed-act may be given in the following formula: *I am absolutely because I am, and I am absolutely what I am for myself.*

If this narration of the original deed-act is to be placed at the head of a science of knowledge as its highest fundamental principle, it may perhaps be best expressed thus:

The Ego posits originally its own being.

(In other words, the Ego is necessarily identity of subject and object; is itself subject-object; and it is this without further meditation.)

We started from the proposition $A=A$, not as if the proposition, I am, could be proven by it, but because we had to start from some one certain proposition given in empirical consciousness. And our development, also, has shown that $A=A$ does not contain the ground of "I am," but, on the contrary, that the latter proposition is the ground of the former.

By abstracting from the content of the proposition I am, and looking merely to its form, namely, the form

of drawing a conclusion from the being posited of something to its being, as we must abstract for the sake of logic, we thus obtain as *fundamental principle of logic* the proposition $A=A$, which can only be proven and determined through the science of knowledge. *Proven*: for A is A because the Ego which has posited A is the same as the Ego in which A is posited. *Determined*: for whatever is, is only in so far as it is posited in the Ego, and there is nothing outside of the Ego. No possible A (no *thing*) can be any thing else but an A posited in the Ego.

By abstracting, moreover, from all asserting as a determined acting, and looking merely to the general *manner* of acting of the human mind, which is given through that form, we obtain the *category of reality*. Every thing to which the proposition $A=A$ is applicable has reality, *in so far as that proposition is applicable to it*. That which is posited through the mere positing of any thing (in the Ego) is its reality, its essence.

Second, and in regard to its content, conditioned fundamental Principle.

For the same reason why the first fundamental principle could not be proven or deduced, the second, also, can not be proven. Hence, we here, also, proceed from a fact of empirical consciousness in the same manner.

The proposition, *Not A is not A*, will doubtless be recognized by every one as certain, and it is scarcely to be expected that any one will ask for its proof.

If, however, such a proof were possible, it must in our system be deduced from the proposition $A=A$.

But such a proof is impossible. For let us assume, at the utmost, that the above proposition is the same as $\neg A$ is $\neg A$, (and hence that $\neg A$ is equal to some Y posited in the Ego,) and that for this reason our proposition signifies now; *if* the opposite of A is posited, *then* it is posited; still we should only have the same connection posited (X) which we obtained in our § 1, and our proposition, $\neg A$ is not A , instead of being derived from $A=A$, would, after all, be only the very same proposition. The chief question, is the opposite of A posited, and under what condition *of form of mere acting* is it posited, is altogether ignored. If our second proposition were a derived one, then this condition of the form of acting would have to be derived from the proposition $A=A$. But how can the proposition $A=A$, which involves only the form of positing, also involve the form of opposing? Hence, that form of acting, the opposing, is posited absolutely, and with no attached condition. $\neg A$ is posited *as* such simply *because* it is posited.

Hence, as sure as the proposition $\neg A$ not $=A$ occurs among the facts of empirical consciousness, there occurs among the acts of the Ego an *oppositing*; and this opposing, as far as its *form* is concerned, is absolutely and unconditionally possible, and is an acting which has no higher ground.

Through this absolute act the opposite, *as mere* opposite, is posited. Every opposite, in so far as it is merely opposite, is simply by virtue of an absolute act

of the Ego, and has no other ground. Opposition generally is simply posited through the Ego.

But if any —A is to be posited, an A must be posited. Hence, the act of opposing is also, in another respect, conditioned. Whether the act at all is possible depends upon another act; hence, the act in its *content*, as acting generally, is conditioned; it is an acting in relation to another acting. The *form* of the act, however, (the How? namely, that it is not an act of positing, but of opposing,) is unconditioned.

Opposition is only possible on condition of the unity of consciousness of the positing and the opposing. For if the consciousness of the first act were not connected with that of the second, then the second positing would not be an *op*-positing, but an absolute positing. Opposing it becomes only through its relation to a positing.

As yet we have only spoken of the act, as mere act, of the *manner* of acting. Let us now examine its product, = —A.

In —A we can again distinguish *form* and *content*. Through the form is determined, that it is an *opposite*; the content determines that it is an opposite of a determined something, (of A,) that is is *not* this something.

The *form* of —A is determined simply through the act; it is an opposite because it is product of an opposing; the *content* is determined through A: it is *not* what A is, and its whole essence consists in this, that it is not what A is. I know of —A simply *that*

it is the opposite of A. But *what* that is *whereof* I know this, I can only know by knowing A.

Originally only the Ego is posited, and this alone is absolutely posited. Hence, an absolute opposing can only refer to the Ego. The opposite of the Ego we call the non-Ego.

As sure as the proposition —A is not A is unconditionally admitted as fact of empirical consciousness, a *non-Ego is absolutely opposed to the Ego*. All we have said above in reference to opposing generally, is deduced from this original opposing, and hence is valid for it; it is, therefore, unconditioned in form, but conditioned in content. And thus we have also found the second principle of all human knowledge.

Whatever appertains to the Ego, of that the opposite must appertain to the non-Ego.

(The general opinion is, that the conception of the non-Ego is a discursive conception, obtained by abstracting from all objects of representation. But the foolishness of this explanation can be easily demonstrated. If I am to represent an object, I must posit it in opposition to the representing subject. Now it is true that in the object of representation there can and must be an X, whereby it discovers itself to be not the representing, but a represented; but no object of representation can possibly teach me, that everything wherein this X occurs is represented object, and not representing subject; on the contrary, only by presupposing this law do I attain any object.)

By undertaking the same abstraction with this prop-

osition, which we undertook with the first, we obtain the logical proposition —A is not A, which I should call the proposition of *oppositing*. In the present place, this proposition can not yet be properly determined, or expressed in a formula, the reason whereof will appear in the following section:

By abstracting from the determined act of asserting this proposition, and looking merely to the form of drawing a conclusion from the being opposed of something to its being, we obtain the *category of negation*. This also can not be clearly developed till in the following section.

Third, in its form conditioned fundamental principle.

Every step we take in our science brings us nearer to the point where everything can be proven. In the first principle, nothing could be nor was to be proven; in the second, only the *act of oppositing* was not provable; but, this act once admitted, it was strictly shown that the opposite must be a Non-Ego. The third principle is almost throughout capable of proof, since it is not, like the second, conditioned in content, but only in form, and, moreover, conditioned in form by the *two* foregoing propositions.

It is conditioned in form signifies, the *problem of the act* it establishes is given by the two foregoing propositions, but not the *solution* of the problem. The solution is the result of an unconditioned and absolute act of reason.

We therefore commence with a deduction, and pro-

ceed as far as we can go. When we can go no farther, we shall have to appeal to this absolute act.

1. In so far as the non-Ego is posited, the Ego is not posited; for the non-Ego completely cancels the Ego.

Now, the Non-Ego is posited *in* the Ego, for it is opposed; and all opposing presupposes the identity of the Ego.

Hence, the Ego is not posited in the Ego in so far as the Non-Ego is posited in it.

2. But the Non-Ego can only be posited in so far as an Ego is posited in the Ego, (in the identical consciousness,) as the opposite of which it is posited.

Hence, in so far as the Non-Ego is posited in the Ego, the Ego also must be posited in it.

3. The conclusions of our 1st and 2nd are opposed to each other; yet both are developed from the second fundamental principle; hence, that second principle is opposed to itself and cancels itself.

4. But it cancels itself only in so far as the posited is canceled by the opposed, hence in so far as itself is valid.

Hence, it does not cancel itself. The second fundamental principle cancels itself and does not cancel itself.

5. If this is the case with the second principle, it must also be with the first principle. That first principle cancels itself and does not cancel itself. For,

If Ego is=Ego, then all is posited, which is posited in the Ego.

Now, the second principle is to be posited and not to be posited in the Ego.

Hence, Ego is not $=$ Ego, but Ego is $=$ to the Non-Ego and Non-Ego $=$ Ego.

All these results have been deduced from the established principles according to the laws of reflection presupposed as valid; they must be correct, therefore. But if they are correct, the identity of consciousness, the only absolute foundation of our knowledge, is canceled. This determines our problem. We must find an X, by means of which all these results may be correct, without destroying the identity of consciousness.

1. The opposites, to be united, are in the Ego as consciousness. Hence, X must also be in consciousness.

2. Both the Ego and the non-Ego are products of original acts of the Ego, and consciousness itself is such a product of the first original act of the Ego of the positing of the Ego through itself.

3. But our above results show that the act of which the Non-Ego is the product, that is, the opposing, is not at all possible without X. Hence, X must be a product of an original act of the Ego. There must be, accordingly, an act of the human mind $=$ Y, the product of which is X.

4. The form of this act Y is determined by the above problem. It is to be a uniting of the opposites (the Ego and the Non-Ego) without their mutually canceling each other. The opposites are to be taken up into the identity of consciousness.

5. But the problem does not determine the How, or the manner of this uniting, nor even suggest it at all. We must, therefore, make an experiment, and ask: How can A and $\neg A$, being and not being, reality and negation, be thought together, without their mutually canceling each other?

6. It is not to be expected that anyone will reply otherwise but: They must mutually *limit* each other. If this answer is correct, the act Y is a *limiting* of both opposites through each other, and X would signify the *limits*.

(Let me not be understood as asserting that the conception of limits is an analytical conception, involved in, and to be developed out of, the union of reality and negation. It is true, our fundamental principles have given us the opposite conceptions, and our first principle has given us the requirement to unite them. But the *manner* of uniting them has not been given, and is determined by a *particular* law of our mind, which law our experiment was only to make us conscious of.)

7. The conception of limits, however, involves more than the required X; for it involves also the conceptions of reality and negation, which are to be united. Hence, to get X pure, we must undertake another abstraction.

8. To *limit* something signifies to cancel the reality thereof not *altogether*, but only *in part*. Hence the conception of limits involves, besides the conceptions of reality and negation, that of *divisibility*, (of *quantitability* generally, not of a *determined* quantity).

This conception is the required X, and hence, through the act Y, *the Ego as well as the Non-Ego is posited divisible*.

9. *The Ego as well as the Non-Ego is posited divisible*; for the act Y can not *succeed* the act of opposing, for in itself the act of opposing has shown itself impossible; nor can it *precede* that act, for the act Y occurs merely to make the act of opposing possible; and divisibility is nothing but a divisible. Hence, the act Y and the act of opposing occur in and with each other; both are one and the same, and are only distinguished in reflection. By opposing, therefore, a Non-Ego to the Ego, both the Ego and the Non-Ego are posited divisible.

Let us now see whether the here established act has really solved the problem and united the opposites.

The first result is now determined as follows: The Ego is not posited in the Ego in so far, that is, with those parts of reality wherewith the Non-Ego is posited. That part of reality, which is ascribed to the Non-Ego, is canceled in the Ego.

This proposition at present does not contradict the second result: is so far as the Non-Ego is posited, the Ego also must be posited; for both are posited as divisible in regard to their reality.

And only now can you say of either, it is *something*. For the absolute Ego of the first fundamental principle is not *something*, (has no predicate, and can have none;) it is simply *what* it is. But now *all* reality is in consciousness, and of this reality that part is to be ascribed to the Non-Ego, which is not to be

ascribed to the Ego, and *vice versa*. Both are something. The Non-Ego is what the Ego is *not*, and *vice versa*. Opposed to the absolute Ego, the Non-Ego is *absolutely nothing* (but it can be opposed to the absolute Ego only in so far as it is an object of representation, as we shall see hereafter;) opposed to the divisible Ego, the Non-Ego is a *negative quantity*.

The Ego is to be = Ego, and yet it is also to be opposed to itself. But it is self-equal in regard to consciousness; and in this consciousness the absolute Ego is posited as indivisible, and the Ego, to which the non-Ego is opposed, as divisible. Hence, in the unity of consciousness, all the opposites are united; for in it even the Ego, in so far as a non-Ego is opposed to it, is opposed to the absolute Ego; and this is, as it were, the test that the established conception of divisibility was the correct one.

According to our presupposition, which can be proven only through the completion of the science of knowledge, only one absolute unconditioned, one in its content conditioned, and one in its form conditioned principle is possible. Hence, no further principle can be possible. All that is unconditionally and absolutely certain has been exhausted, and I might express the total in this formula:

The Ego opposes in the Ego a divisible Non-Ego to a divisible Ego.

Beyond this cognition no philosophy can go; but every thorough philosophy ought to go to it, and by doing so will become science of knowledge. Whatsoever is hereafter to occur in the system of the human

mind, must be deducible from what we have here established.

We have united the opposites, Ego and Non-Ego, through the conception of divisibility. By abstracting from the content (the Ego and Non-Ego) and looking at the *mere form of uniting opposites through the conception of divisibility*, we obtain the logical proposition of the *ground*; that is, A is in part $\neg A$, and *vice versa*. Every opposite is related to its opposite in one characteristic $= X$; and all equals are opposed to each other in one characteristic X. Such an X is called, in the first instance, *ground of relation*; in the second instance, *ground of distinction*. This logical proposition our third fundamental principle both *proves* and *determines*.

Proves; for every opposite $= \neg A$ is opposed to an A, and this A is posited. Through the positing of a $\neg A$ you both cancel and do not cancel A. Hence, you only cancel A in part; and instead of the X in A, which is not canceled, you have posited in $\neg A$ not $\neg X$, but X itself; and hence A is $= \neg A$ in X.

Again, every opposite ($= A = B$) is self-equal by virtue of being posited in the Ego: $A = A$, $B = B$.

Now, you posit $B = A$; hence, B is not posited through A, for then it would be $= A$ and not $= B$. (You would have only posited one, and not two.)

But if B is not posited through the positing of A, then it is in so far $= \neg A$; and through the positing of both as equal, neither A nor B, but an X, is posited, which X is $= X$ and $= A$ and $= B$.

Thus it appears how the proposition $A = B$ can be

valid, which in itself contradicts the proposition $A = A$. $X = X$, $A = X$, $B = X$; hence $A = B$ in so far as both is $= X$; but $A = \neg B$ in so far as both is $= \neg X$.

Opposites are related and equals opposed to each other in only *one* part. For, if they were opposed in many parts, that is, if the opposites themselves contained opposite characteristics, one or both would belong to that wherein they are equal, and hence they would not be opposites, and *vice versa*. Every grounded judgment has, therefore, only one ground of relation and one ground of distinction. If it has more, it is not one judgment, but many judgments.

Determines: for only on condition that many things are posited at all as equals or as opposites, are they thus opposed or related in one characteristic. But it is by no means asserted that absolutely everything which may occur in our consciousness, must be equal to another and opposed to a third.

A judgment, therefore, concerning that to which nothing can be related or opposed, does not come at all under the rule of this proposition of the ground, for it is not under the condition of its validity; it is not grounded, since, on the contrary, itself grounds all possible judgments; it has no ground, but furnishes itself the ground of all grounded. The object of all such judgments is the absolute Ego, and all judgments, whereof it is the subject, are valid absolutely and without further ground; whereof more below.

The act whereby, in comparing a twofold, you look up the mark wherein they are *opposites*, is called the

antithetical proceeding generally spoken of as *analytical*, which expression, however, is less proper; partly because it permits the opinion that you can develop something out of a conception which you have not previously put into it by a synthesis, and partly because the expression *antithetical* signifies more clearly that it is the opposite of synthetical. For the *synthetical* proceeding consists in this, that in opposites that characteristic is looked up wherein they are *equal*. In the mere logical form, judgments of the first class are called antithetical or negative, and judgments of the latter class synthetical or affirmative judgments.

Again: since we discovered, in the development of our third principle, that the act of uniting opposites in a third is not possible without the act of oppositing, and *vice versa*, it also follows that in logic antithesis and synthesis are inseparable. No antithesis — no positing of equals as opposites — without synthesis — without the previous positing of the equals as equals. No synthesis — no positing of opposites as equals — without antithesis — without the previous positing of the opposites as opposites. (As far as the content is concerned, mere analytical judgments have, therefore, no existence; and not only do they not carry us far, as Kant remarks, but they do not advance us a single step.)

Kant's celebrated question, which he placed at the head of his Critic of Pure Reason, How are synthetical judgments *a priori* possible? has now been answered in the most universal and satisfactory manner. In our third principle we have established a synthesis

between the opposites, Ego and Non-Ego, by means of the posited divisibility of both, concerning the possibility of which no further question can be asked nor any further ground assigned; it is absolutely possible, and we are justified in establishing it without further ground. All other syntheses, which are to be valid, must be involved in this one; must have been established in and with this one; and as soon as this is proven, the most convincing proof has been shown up that they are equally valid.

Must be involved in this one; and this shows us at the same time in the most determined manner, how we must henceforth proceed in the development of our science. It is syntheses we are to obtain, and hence our whole course of proceeding hereafter will be synthetical; every proposition will contain a synthesis. (At least in the theoretical part of our science, for in the practical part the very reverse is the case, as will appear hereafter.) But no synthesis is possible without a previous analysis; from this analysis, however, in so far as it is an *act*, we abstract, and only look up its product — the opposites. Hence, at every proposition hereafter we shall begin by looking up the opposites involved in it, and which are to be united. Again, all our syntheses are to be involved in the highest synthesis, just shown up, and to be developed out of it. Hence, it will be our task to look up in the Ego and Non-Ego, which that synthesis unites, some opposite characteristics, which have not been united: and to unite these opposites through a new ground of relation; which, again, must be in-

volved in the highest ground of relation; next, it will be our task to look up new opposites in the opposites united by this second synthesis, and to unite them in a third synthesis; and to continue this course, until we arrive at opposites which can no longer be perfectly united, whereby we shall then be forced to enter the practical part of our science.

From the Science of Rights

ABRIDGED

A finite, rational being can not posit itself without ascribing to itself a free causality.

Proof A. If a rational being is to posit itself as such, it must ascribe to itself an activity which shall have its last ground in itself.

B. Its activity in contemplating the world can not be posited by the rational being as such an activity, which has its last ground in itself;

C. But the rational being can opposit such an activity as we are in search of, to the world, as that which limits this activity, and in order to opposit it must generate it. Moreover, if such an activity is the sole condition of the possibility of self-consciousness, and if self-consciousness must be ascribed to a rational being, as indeed that which constitutes it a rational being, then it must opposit and generate such an activity.

Hence such an activity, and the positing thereof, is necessarily assumed when self-consciousness is assumed; and both conceptions are identical.

Through this positing of its power to have free

causality, the rational being posits and determines a sensuous world outside of itself.

The finite rational being can not ascribe to itself a free causality in the sensuous world, without ascribing the same to others, and hence, without likewise assuming other finite rational beings outside of itself.

The finite rational being can not assume other finite rational beings outside of itself, without positing itself as occupying a determined relation toward them, which is called the Legal Relation.

Proof. The subject must distinguish itself through opposition from the rational being, which it has assumed outside of itself.

In this distinction through opposition the conception of the subject as a free being, and the conception of the outside rational being, as also a free being, are mutually determined and conditioned through the subject.

The conclusion has been discovered already. It is this: I must recognize the free being as such in all cases, that is, must restrict my freedom through the conception of the possibility of his freedom. The deduced relation between rational beings — namely, that each individual must restrict his freedom through the conception of the possibility of the freedom of the other — is called the *Relation of Legality*. Legal Relation, and the formula given to it is called the *Fundamental Principle of the Science of Rights*.

This relation has been deduced from the conception of the individual. We have therefore proven what was to be proven. Again: the conception of the indi-

vidual has been proven to be the condition of self-consciousness; hence the conception of the Law (of Rights) is itself condition of self-consciousness; and hence, this conception has been properly deduced *a priori*, that is, from the pure form of Reason, from the Ego.

From "The Vocation of Man" ¹

This, then, is my whole sublime vocation, my true nature. I am a member of two orders:—the one purely spiritual, in which I rule by my will alone; the other sensuous, in which I operate by my deed. The sole end of reason is pure activity, absolutely by itself alone, having no need of any instrument out of itself,—independence of everything which is not reason,—absolute freedom. The will is the living principle of reason,—is itself reason, when purely and simply apprehended; that reason is active by itself alone, means that pure will, merely as such, lives and rules. It is only the Infinite Reason that lives immediately and wholly in this purely spiritual order. The finite reason,—which does not of itself constitute the world of reason, but is only one of its many members,—lives necessarily at the same time in a sensuous order; that is to say, in one which presents to it another object beyond a purely spiritual activity:—a material object, to be promoted by instruments and powers which indeed stand under the immediate dominion of the will, but whose activity is also con-

¹ *The Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte*, translated by Wm. Smith, 1889.

ditioned by their own natural laws. Yet as surely as reason is reason, must the will operate absolutely by itself, and independently of the natural laws by which the material action is determined;—and hence the sensuous life of every finite being points toward a higher, into which the will, by itself alone, may open the way, and of which it may acquire possession,—a possession which indeed we are again constrained to conceive of sensuously as a state, and not as a mere will.

These two orders,—the purely spiritual and the sensuous, the latter consisting possibly of an innumerable series of particular lives,—have existed for me since the first moment of the development of an active reason within me, and still continue parallel to each other. The latter order is only a phenomenon for myself, and for those with whom I am associated in this life; the former alone gives it significance, purpose, and value. I am immortal, imperishable, eternal, as soon as I form the resolution to obey the laws of reason; I do not need to become so. The supersensual world is no future world; it is now present; it can at no point of finite existence be more present than at another; not more present after an existence of myriads of lives than at this moment. My sensuous existence may, in future, assume other forms, but these will be just as little the true life as its present form. By that resolution I lay hold on eternity, and cast off this earthly life and all other forms of sensuous life which may yet lie before me in futurity, and place myself far above them. I become the sole

source of my own being and its phenomena, and, henceforth, unconditioned by anything without me, I have life in myself. My will, directed by no foreign agency in the order of the super-sensual world but by myself alone, is this source of true life, and of eternity.

But it is my will alone which is this source of true life and of eternity: — only by recognizing this will as the true seat of moral goodness, and by actually raising it thereto, do I obtain the assurance and the possession of that super-sensual world.

Without regard to any conceivable or visible object, without inquiry as to whether my will may be followed by any result other than the mere volition,— I must will in accordance with the moral law. My will stands alone, apart from all that is not itself, and is its own world merely by itself and for itself; not only as being itself an absolutely *first*, primary and original power, before which there is no preceding influence by which it may be governed, but also as being followed by no conceivable or comprehensible *second* step in the series, by which its activity may be brought under the dominion of a foreign law. Did there proceed from it any second, and from this again a third result, and so forth, in any conceivable sensuous world distinct from the spiritual world, then would its strength be broken by the resistance of the independent elements which such a world would set in motion; the mode of its activity would no longer exactly correspond to the purpose expressed in the volition; and the will would be no longer free, but be in so far limited by the laws of its heterogeneous sphere of

action. And thus must I actually regard the will in the present sensuous world, the only one known to me. I am indeed compelled to believe, and consequently to act as if I thought, that by my mere volition my tongue, my hand, or my foot, may be set in motion; but how a mere aspiration, an impress of intelligence upon itself, such as will is, can be the principle of motion to a heavy material mass,—this I not only find it impossible to conceive, but the mere assertion is, before the tribunal of the understanding, a palpable absurdity;—here the movement of matter, even in myself, can be explained only by the internal forces of matter itself.

Such a view of my will, as I have taken, can, however, be attained only through an intimate conviction that it is not merely the highest active principle for this world,—which it certainly might be, without having freedom in itself, by the mere energy of the system of the universe, such as we must conceive of the formative power in Nature,—but that it absolutely disregards all earthly objects, and generally all objects lying out of itself, and recognizes itself, for its own sake, as its own ultimate end. But by such a view of my will I am at once directed to a super-sensual order of things, in which the will, by itself alone and without any instrument lying out of itself, becomes an efficient cause in a sphere, which, like itself, is purely spiritual, and is thoroughly accessible to it. That moral volition is demanded of us absolutely for its own sake alone,—a truth which I discover only as a fact in my inward consciousness, and to the knowledge

of which I cannot attain in any other way;—this was the first step of my thought. That this demand is reasonable, and the source and standard of all else that is reasonable; that it is not modelled upon anything whatever, but that all other things must, on the contrary, model themselves upon it, and be dependent upon it,—a conviction which also I cannot arrive at from without, but can attain only by inward experience, by means of the unhesitating and immovable assent which I freely accord to this demand:—this was the second step of my thought. And from these two terms I have attained to faith in a super-sensual Eternal World. If I abandon the former, the latter falls to the ground. If it were true,—as many say it is, assuming it without farther proof as self-evident and extolling it as the highest summit of human wisdom,—that all human virtue must have before it a certain definite external object, and that it must first be assured of the possibility of attaining this object, before it can act and before it can become virtue; that, consequently, reason by no means contains within itself the principle and the standard of its own activity, but must receive this standard from without through contemplation of an external world;—if this were true, then might the ultimate end of our existence be accomplished here below; human nature might be completely developed and exhausted by our earthly vocation, and we should have no rational ground for raising our thoughts above the present life.

My Moral Will, merely as such, in and through itself, shall certainly and invariably produce consequences; every determination of my will in accordance with duty, although no action should follow it, shall operate in another, to me incomprehensible, world, in which nothing but this moral determination of the will shall possess efficient activity. What is it that is assumed in this conception?

Obviously a *Law*; a rule absolutely without exception, according to which a will determined by duty must have consequences; just as in the material world which surrounds me I assume a law according to which this ball, when thrown by my hand with this particular force, in this particular direction, necessarily moves in such a direction with a certain degree of velocity,—perhaps strikes another ball with a certain amount of force, which in its turn moves on with a certain velocity,—and so on. As here, in the mere direction and motion of my hand, I already recognize and apprehend all the consequent directions and movements with the same certainty as if they were already present before me; even so do I embrace by means of my virtuous will a series of necessary and inevitable consequences in the spiritual world as if they were already present before me; only that I cannot define them as I do those in the material world,—that is, I only know *that* they must be, but not *how* they shall be;—and even in doing this I conceive of a *Law* of the spiritual world in which my pure will is one of the moving forces, as my hand is one of the moving forces of the material world. My own firm confidence in

these results, and the conceptions of this *Law* of a spiritual world, are one and the same; — they are not two thoughts one of which arises by means of the other, but they are entirely the same thought; just as the confidence with which I calculate on a certain motion in a material body, and the conception of a mechanical law of nature on which that motion depends, are one and the same. The conception of a *law* expresses nothing more than the firm, immovable confidence of reason in a principle, and the absolute impossibility of admitting its opposite.

I assume such a law of a spiritual world,— not given by my will, nor by the will of any finite being, nor by the will of all finite beings taken together, but to which my will, and the will of all finite beings, is subject. Neither I, nor any finite and therefore sensuous being, can conceive how a mere will can have consequences, nor what may be the true nature of those consequences; for herein consists the essential character of our finite nature,—that we are unable to conceive this,—that having indeed our will, as such, wholly within our power, we are yet compelled by our sensuous nature to regard the consequences of that will as sensuous states:—how then can I, or any other finite being whatever, propose to ourselves as objects, and thereby give reality to, that which we can neither imagine nor conceive? I cannot say that, in the material world, my hand, or any other body which belongs to that world and is subject to the universal law of gravity, brings this law into operation;—these bodies themselves stand under this law, and are able

to set another body in motion only in accordance with this law, and only in so far as that body, by virtue of this law, partakes of the universal moving power of Nature. Just as little can a finite will give a law to the super-sensual world which no finite spirit can embrace; but all finite wills stand under the law of that world, and can produce results therein only inasmuch as that law already exists, and inasmuch as they themselves, in accordance with the form of that law which is applicable to finite wills, bring themselves under its conditions and within the sphere of its activity by moral obedience;—by moral obedience, I say, the only tie which unites them to that higher world, the only nerve that descends from it to them, and the only organ through which they can re-act upon it. As the universal power of attraction embraces all bodies, and holds them together in themselves and with each other, and the movement of each separate body is possible only on the supposition of this power, so does that super-sensual law unite, hold together, and embrace all finite reasonable beings. My will, and the will of all finite beings, may be regarded from a double point of view;—partly as a mere *volition*, an internal act directed upon itself alone, and, in so far, the will is complete in itself, concluded in this act of volition;—partly as something beyond this, a *fact*. It assumes the latter form to me, as soon as I regard it as completed; but it must also become so beyond me;—in the world of sense, as the moving principle, for instance, of my hand, from the movement of which, again, other movements follow;—in the super-sen-

sual world, as the principle of a series of spiritual consequences of which I have no conception. In the former point of view, as a mere act of volition, it stands wholly within my own power; its assumption of the latter character, that of an active first principle, depends not upon me, but on a law to which I myself am subject;—on the law of nature in the world of sense, on a super-sensual law in the word of pure thought.

What, then, is this law of the spiritual world which I conceive? This idea now stands before me in fixed and perfect shape; I cannot and dare not add anything whatever to it; I have only to express and interpret it distinctly. It is obviously not such as I may suppose the principle of my own, or any other possible sensuous world, to be,—a fixed, inert existence, from which by the encounter of a will some internal power may be evolved,—something altogether different from a mere will. For,—and this is the substance of my belief,—my will, absolutely by itself, and without the intervention of any instrument that might weaken its expression, shall act in a perfectly congenial sphere,—reason upon reason, spirit upon spirit,—in a sphere to which, nevertheless, it does not give the law of life, activity, and progress, but which has that law in itself;—therefore upon self-active reason. But self-active reason is will. The law of the super-sensual world must, therefore, be a Will:—A Will which operates purely as will; by itself, and absolutely without any instrument or sensible material of its activity; which is at the same time both act and product; with whom

to will is to do, to command is to execute; in which therefore the instinctive demand of reason for absolute freedom and independence is realized:—A Will, which in itself is law; determined by no fancy or caprice, through no previous reflection, hesitation, or doubt:—but eternal, unchangeable, on which we may securely and infallibly rely, as the physical man relies with certainty on the laws of his world:—A Will in which the moral will of finite beings, and this alone, has sure and unfailing results; since for it all else is unavailing, all else is as if it were not.

Pages 453-457.

Whence, then, our feelings, our sensible intuitions, our discursive laws of thought, on all which is founded the external world which we behold, in which we believe that we exert an influence on each other? With respect to the two last—our sensible intuitions and our laws of thought—to say these are laws of reason in itself, is only to give no satisfactory answer at all. For us, indeed, who are excluded from the pure domain of reason in itself, it may be impossible to think otherwise, or to conceive of reason under any other law. But the true law of reason in itself is the practical law, the law of the super-sensual world, or of that sublime Will. And, leaving this for a moment undecided, whence comes our universal agreement as to feelings, which, nevertheless, are something positive, immediate, inexplicable? On this agreement in feeling, perception, and in the laws of thought, however, it depends that we all behold the same external world.

“ It is a harmonious, although inconceivable limitation of the finite rational beings who compose our race; and only by means of such a harmonious limitation do they become a race: ”— thus answers the philosophy of mere knowledge, and here it must rest as its highest point. But what can set a limit of reason but reason itself?— What can limit all finite reason but the Infinite Reason? This universal agreement concerning a sensible world,— assumed and accepted by us as the foundation of all our other life, and as the sphere of our duty — which, strictly considered, is just as incomprehensible as our unanimity concerning the products of our reciprocal freedom,— this agreement is the result of the One Eternal Infinite Will. Our faith, of which we have spoken as faith in duty, is only faith in Him, in His reason, in His truth. What, then, is the peculiar and essential truth which we accept in the world of sense, and in which we believe? Nothing less than from our free and faithful performance of our duty in this world, there will arise to us throughout eternity a life in which our freedom and morality may still continue their development. If this be true, then indeed is there truth in our world, and the only truth possible for finite beings; and it must be true, for this world is the result of the Eternal Will in us,— and that Will, by the law of His own being, can have no other purpose with respect to finite beings than that which we have set forth.

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FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON
SCHELLING

CHAPTER X

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING

1775-1854

The philosophy of Schelling passed through several phases, and although he was an independent thinker, and must be regarded as one of the founders of German idealism, he was much influenced by his contemporaries, and it is difficult to distinguish in his system that which is essentially his own. His methods were as varied as his results: speculation, analogy, intuition, and the logical methods of his day all found a place in his system.

Schelling's philosophy, however, may be said to be mainly an attempt to create a deductive philosophy of nature, to derive the objective from the subjective. He sought an evolutionary principle, but his method was subjective; his principle of evolution was not a law of the relation of objects to one another, but the formal principle of the activity of an absolute that ever revolves upon itself, and produces the stages of nature by its own separate self-representative acts.

The philosophy of Schelling lacked, just as did Schopenhauer's, the evolutionary principle introduced later by Darwin, which might have shown him the way to a more fruitful science of nature than can be created by a deductive method alone.

From "A System of Transcendental Idealism"¹

THE IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

ALL knowledge rests upon the agreement of an objective with a subjective. For we know nothing but the true; and the truth, as is maintained by all, is the agreement of representations with their objects.

The sum of all that is merely objective in our knowledge we can designate as Nature; the sum of all that is subjective we may term the Ego, or the Intelligence. These two concepts stand opposed to one another. The Intelligence is originally thought of as that which merely represents, and Nature as that which is simply representable; the one as the conscious, the other as the unconscious. But in all knowledge there must be an agreement of these two: between the conscious and the unconscious;—our problem is to explain this agreement.

In knowledge itself, in the fact of my knowing, the objective and the subjective are so joined, that we cannot say which of them has priority. Here there is no first and so second—the two are simultaneous and one. In trying to explain this identity I must indeed have abolished it. To explain it, since I have no other principle of explanation than these two factors, I must necessarily put one before the other—I must set out from the one in order to reach the other. From which of them I shall set out, the problem itself does not determine.

¹ Translated from the German and compared with Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, pp. 535–566.

There are, therefore, but two possible cases:

A. *Either the objective is first made, in which case the question is asked: How is a subjective, agreeing with this, added?*

The notion of the subjective is not contained in the notion of the objective; in fact these two exclude one another. The subjective must therefore be added to the objective. There is nothing in the notion of Nature that demands that there shall be an intelligence to represent it. Nature, it appears, would still exist, if there were nothing to represent it. So the problem may also be expressed in this way: How is the Intelligent added to Nature? Or, how does it happen that Nature is represented?

The problem assumes Nature, or the objective, to be first. Natural science, which does the same, has therefore the same task. That natural science unwittingly approaches a solution of this problem can here be demonstrated only briefly.

If all knowledge has, so to speak, two poles, which presuppose and require one another, then they must, in every science, seek each other. There must, therefore, of necessity, be two fundamental sciences; and it must be impossible to set out from one pole without being driven to the other. The necessary tendency of all natural sciences is, therefore, to pass from Nature to the Intelligent. This, and nothing else, lies at the bottom of the effort to introduce theory into natural phenomena. The consummation of natural science would be the complete intellectualizing of all the laws of Nature into laws of intuition and thought. The

phenomena, that is to say, the material, must entirely vanish, and there must remain only the laws,—the formal. So it happens that the more lawfulness is revealed in Nature, the more does the husk tend to disappear,—the phenomena themselves became intellectualized, and at last entirely vanish. Optical phenomena are nothing but a geometry of which the lines are drawn by the means of light; and of the light itself the materiality is already a matter of doubt.

In the phenomena of magnetism every trace of the material has already disappeared; and of the phenomena of gravitation, which the natural philosophers themselves believed could be conceived only as due to direct spiritual influence, nothing remains but their law, the operation of which upon a vast plan is the mechanism of the celestial motions. The complete theory of Nature would be one by means of which Nature as a whole would be resolved into an intelligence. The dead and unconscious products of Nature are but thwarted efforts of Nature to reflect itself,—the so-called dead Nature is but an immature intelligence; hence, in its phenomena, the intelligent character is revealed, although it is still unconscious. Its goal, the becoming wholly object of itself, Nature attains only in its highest and latest reflection, which is nothing else than man; or, more generally speaking, what we term reason, by means of which Nature first is able to turn fully upon itself. Thereby it becomes clear that Nature is originally identical with that which in us is recognized as intelligent and conscious.

This may be sufficient to show that natural science

tends necessarily to interpret Nature as intelligent; indeed by this tendency it becomes natural philosophy, which is one of the two sciences necessary to philosophy.

B. *Or the objective is made first, and the problem is, how an objective, agreeing with it, is added.*

If all knowledge rests upon the agreement of these two, then is the problem to explain this agreement the highest of all knowledge; and if, as is generally admitted, philosophy is the highest and most exalted of all sciences, it is without doubt the chief problem of philosophy.

But the problem demands only an explanation of the agreement in general, and leaves wholly undetermined where the explanation shall begin, what it shall do first and what second. Since also both contraries are necessary to each other, the outcome must be the same, from whichever point one may begin.

To make the objective first, and to derive the subjective from it, is, as has already been shown, the problem of natural philosophy.

Now if there is a transcendental philosophy, the only possible direction remaining for it is the opposite, that is, to proceed from the subjective, regarding it as the first and the absolute, and to derive the objective from it. Natural and transcendental philosophy have therefore divided between themselves these two possible directions; and if all philosophy must undertake, either to make an intelligence out of Nature, or Nature out of intelligence, then transcendental philosophy, whose

problem is the latter, is the remaining science necessary to philosophy.

THE ORGAN OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The one immediate object of transcendental consideration is the subjective. The sole organ of this method of philosophizing is, therefore, the inner sense, and its object is such that it cannot become the object of external intuition, in which respect it differs from mathematics. The object of mathematics, it is true, is no more outside of knowledge than is that of philosophy. The whole existence of mathematics rests upon the intuition. It exists, therefore, only in intuition; but this intuition itself is an external one. Besides, the mathematician never deals immediately with the intuition — the construction itself — but only with the construct, which can certainly be presented objectively, — while the philosopher gives his attention only to the act of construction itself, which is wholly internal.

Moreover, the objects of the transcendental philosopher do not exist, except in so far as they are freely produced. But to this production one cannot be compelled, any more than one can be compelled to regard a mathematical figure internally, from the external drawing of it. As the existence of a mathematical figure depends upon external sense, so the whole reality of a philosophical concept rests upon inner sense alone. The whole object of this philosophy is nothing but the action of the intelligence according to fixed laws. This action is to be conceived by a pe-

cular immediate inner intuition, and this again is possible only by production. But this is not all. In philosophizing, one is not simply the object, but one is also at the same time the subject of the reflection. For the understanding of philosophy, therefore, there are two necessary conditions. First, one must engage in a continuous inner activity, in a continuous production of those original acts of intelligence; second, one must be engaged in continuous reflection upon this producing;—in a word, one must always, at one and the same time, be both the contemplated and the contemplating.

By this continuous duality of producing and intuiting, that must become an object which otherwise is reflected by nothing. It cannot be shown at this point, but will be proved later, that the becoming-reflected of the absolutely unconscious and non-objective, is possible only by means of an æsthetic act of the imagination. And yet, from what has already been shown, it is certain that all philosophy is productive. So philosophy, no less than art, rests upon the productive faculty, and the two differ simply in the direction of the productive power. For while the production in art is directed outward, in order to reflect the unconscious by means of products, philosophical production directs itself immediately to the inner in order to reflect it in intellectual intuition. So the proper sense by which this kind of philosophy is to be grasped is the æsthetic, and, therefore, the philosophy of art is the true *organon* of philosophy.

From the vulgar reality there are but two ways

of escape: poetry, which carries us into an ideal world; and philosophy, which causes the actual world entirely to disappear before us. It is not evident why the sense for philosophy should be more generally diffused than that for poetry especially in the classes of men who have not entirely lost their æsthetic senses, either by memory work, which more than anything else kills the productive powers, or by dull speculation, which is so destructive to the creative imagination.

It is unnecessary to take more time for the commonplaces about the sense of truth, or about the complete neglect of results, although one might ask, what other assurance could be respected by one who doubts the most certain of all — that there are things outside of us. We might better take a glance at the so-called claims of the common understanding.

In matters of philosophy the common understanding has indeed no claims at all, excepting those which every object of investigation has, to be fully explained.

Hence we have nothing to do with showing that what is held for the truth is true, but only with revealing the necessity of its illusions. By this it is understood that the objective world belongs only to the necessary limitations, which make the self-consciousness (the I am) possible. For the common understanding it is sufficient if only from this view the necessity of its own is deduced.

For this purpose it is necessary, not only that the inner mechanism of our mental activity and of our necessary ideas be shown, but also that we should see by what peculiarity of our nature it is inevitable that

what is real only in our intuition, must be reflected to us as something present outside us.

Just as natural science makes idealism out of realism, by intellectualizing natural laws into laws of intelligence, or superinduces the formal upon the material, so transcendental philosophy produces realism from idealism, by materializing the laws of intelligence into laws of nature, or by introducing the material into the formal.

THE NECESSITY AND NATURE OF A HIGHEST PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE

By the problem of founding a science of knowledge, which places the subjective first and highest, one is driven, therefore, directly to the highest principle of all knowledge.

All objections to such an absolute highest principle of knowledge are cut off by the idea of transcendental philosophy itself. All of them arise only by failing to see the limits of the first problem of this science, which at the very beginning withdraws from every objective, and considers solely the subjective.

With an absolute principle of being, we have nothing whatever to do, for against this all those objections are valid; we are concerned solely with an absolute principle of knowledge.

Now, it is clearly true that if there were no absolute limit of knowledge, if there were not something which takes us and binds us absolutely in knowledge without our being aware of it, and which, even while we know, does not become, never becomes, an object for

us, just because it is the principle of all knowledge,—then it would be impossible for us to arrive at any knowledge, even a knowledge of particulars.

The transcendental philosopher never asks: What ultimate foundation of our knowledge may lie outside of it? but, What is the ultimate in our knowledge itself, beyond which we cannot go? He seeks the principle of knowledge within knowledge. Hence it is something that can be known.

The assertion that there exists a highest principle of knowledge is not, like that there is an absolute principle of being, a positive, but a negative, limiting proposition, in which only this is involved; that there is some kind of an ultimate from which all knowledge takes its rise, and beyond which there is no knowledge.

DEDUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE ITSELF

We speak of a deduction of the highest principle. There can be no controversy as to whether the principle may be deduced from a higher principle, nor, in general, as to a proof of its content. The proof can only refer to the value of this principle,—can only show that it is the highest principle, and has all the characteristics that such a principle must have.

This deduction can be carried out by very different methods. We choose that one which, although it appears to be the easiest, at the same time allows the true sense of the principle to be most immediately seen.

1. That knowledge is indeed possible,—not this or

that knowledge, but any knowledge, at least a knowledge of ignorance, is granted even by the skeptics. If we know anything, this knowledge is either conditioned or unconditioned. Conditioned? then we know it only as it is connected with something unconditioned. So in every case we arrive at an unconditioned knowledge. (That there must be something in our knowledge that we do not know from something higher, has already been demonstrated in the preceding chapter.)

The only question that remains therefore is, what one knows unconditionally.

I know unconditionally only that, the knowledge of which is conditioned alone by the subjective, and not by an objective. Now it is asserted that only such knowledge as is expressed in identical propositions is conditioned solely by the subjective. For in the judgment $A = A$ entire abstraction is made from the content of the subject A . Whether, indeed, A has reality at all or not, is for this knowledge entirely a matter of indifference. If, therefore, complete abstraction is made of the reality of the subject, then A is considered solely in so far as it is posited in us, and represented by us. Whether there is something outside us which corresponds to this representation we do not at all inquire. The proposition is evident and certain, entirely apart from the inquiry as to whether A is something actually existent, or is simply imagined, or even impossible. For the proposition says only so much as this: When I think A , I think nothing but A . Hence the knowledge in this proposition is conditioned only by my

thinking (the subjective); that is to say, according to the explanation it is unconditioned.

But in all knowledge an objective is thought as in conjunction with the subjective. In the proposition $A = A$, however, there is no such conjunction. All original knowledge in this way goes beyond the identity of thought, and the proposition $A = A$ must itself presuppose such knowledge. When I think A , I think of it, indeed, as A . But how does it come about that I think A ? If it be a freely created idea, then it founds no knowledge; if it be an idea carrying with it a feeling of necessity, then must it have objective reality.

Now, if all propositions in which subject and predicate are mediated, not simply by the identity of thought, but by something foreign to the thought and different from it, are called synthetic, then our whole knowledge consists solely of synthetic propositions, and only in such is there actual knowledge, that is, such as has its object outside of it.

But now synthetic propositions are not unconditioned, that is, certain in themselves, for only the identical or analytical are such. So, in order that there may be certainty in synthetic propositions, and in that way in our entire knowledge, they must be referred back to something unconditioned, that is, to the identity of thought in general,—which, however, contradicts itself.

This contradiction would be resolvable only if in some way a point might be found in which the identical and the synthetical are one;—or some proposi-

tion which, while it is identical, is, at the same time, synthetic; and while it is synthetic, is at the same time identical.

In view of these propositions, in which a wholly foreign objective is in conjunction with a subjective (which occurs in every synthetic judgment $A = B$; the predicate or concept, always in these represents the subjective, and the subject the objective), it is impossible to conceive how certainty can be attained.

(a) Unless there is something absolutely true. For if there were in our knowledge an infinite regress from principle to principle, then, in order to arrive at the feeling of that compulsion (of the certainty of the proposition) we should be obliged to at least unconsciously return through that infinite regress,—and this is evidently absurd. If the series is actually infinite, it can in no way be followed to its end. If it is not infinite, then there is something that is true absolutely. If there is such absolute truth, then must all our knowledge, and every single truth of that knowledge, be bound up with this truth. The vague feeling of that connectedness causes that feeling of necessity, with which we regard any proposition as true. This vague feeling must be reduced to clear concepts by philosophy, by showing the connectedness and the principal immediate steps.

(b) That absolute truth can be nothing but identical knowledge. But since all true knowledge is synthetic, such absolute truth, because it is an identical knowledge, must also necessarily be a synthetic knowledge. So if absolute truth exists, there must also be a point

where the synthetic knowledge arises directly from the identical knowledge, and the identical from the synthetic.

In order to solve the problem of finding such a point, without doubt we must penetrate still more deeply into the opposition between identical and synthetic propositions.

In every proposition two concepts are compared with one another, that is, they are posited as either alike or unlike one another. In the identical propositions the thought is simply compared with itself. The synthetic proposition, on the contrary, goes beyond the thought as such, since, when I think of the subject of a proposition I do not also think the predicate, for the predicate is added to the subject. The object of the thought is not merely determined by its being thought; it is regarded as real, for the real is precisely what cannot be created by merely thinking.

Now, if an identical proposition is one in which the concept is compared only with the concept, and a synthetic proposition one in which the concept is compared with the object as different from it, then the problem of finding a point at which the identical knowledge is at the same time synthetic, is the same as finding a point at which the object and its concept, the reality and its representation, are originally, simply, and without any mediation, one.

That this problem is identical with that of finding a principle of all knowledge, may be still more briefly demonstrated. How the representation and the object can harmonize is entirely inexplicable, unless in

knowledge itself there is a point where the two are originally one, or where there is a perfect identity of being and of representation.

Now, since the representation is the subjective and the being is the objective, the problem most accurately stated is, to find the point at which subject and object are immediately one.

Thus limiting the problem more and more, is about equivalent to solving it. The immediate identity of subject and object can exist only where the represented is at the same time the representing, and the perceived is the perceiving. But this identity of the represented with the representing exists only in self-consciousness,—so that the point sought is found in self-consciousness.

If now we return to our fundamental principle of identity, $A = A$, we find that we can derive our principle immediately from it. In every identical proposition, it was maintained, the thought is compared with itself,—which without doubt is done by means of an act of thought. Therefore the proposition $A = A$ presupposes a thought, which becomes immediately an object to itself. But an act of thought which is its own object exists only in self-consciousness. For how we can come from a pure proposition of logic to something real is indeed incomprehensible, but it is certainly comprehensible how, by reflecting upon the act of thought we can find in it something real; for example, how from the logical function of judgment the categories are derived, and, in the same manner,

the act of self-consciousness from every identical proposition.

The ego is nothing distinct from the thought of it; the thought of the Ego and the Ego itself are absolutely one. The ego therefore is nothing apart from the thought; it is no thing, no affair, but is forever the non-objective. This is to be understood as follows. The Ego is object, it is true, but only for itself, and it is therefore not originally in the world of objects. It first becomes an object only by making itself its own object. It is not the object of something outside it, but always only of itself.

Everything that is not Ego, is originally object, and therefore is not an object to itself, but to something outside it that perceives it. The original objective is always only something known, and is never a knower. The Ego becomes known only through its own self-knowledge. Matter is called self-less for this very reason, that it has nothing in itself, but exists solely as something perceived in a perception foreign to it.

If the Ego is no thing, no affair, one cannot then inquire about any predicate of it. It has no predicate but this, that it is no thing. The character of the Ego, in fact, consists in its having no other predicate, than that of self-consciousness.

By means of the proposition $I = I$, therefore, the proposition $A = A$ is transformed into a synthetic proposition, and we have found the point at which the identical knowledge arises immediately from the syn-

thetical, and the synthetical knowledge from the identical. But at this point also there is found the principle of all knowledge. In the proposition $I = I$, therefore, the principle of all knowledge must be expressed, since in truth this proposition is the only one possible, that is at the same time identical and synthetical.

The proposition $I = I$ at the same time fulfills the second requirement which is made of the principle of knowledge,—that it establish at once both the form and the content of knowledge. For the highest formal fundamental principle $A = A$ is of course possible only through the act which is expressed in the proposition $I = I$, that is, through the act of thinking that becomes its own object, and is identical with itself. The proposition $I = I$ is therefore so far from being conditioned by the fundamental proposition of identity, that on the contrary the latter is conditioned by the former. For if I were not I , then also A could not be A , since the equality which is posited in that proposition expresses only an equality between the subject which judges, and that in which A is posited as an object, that is to say, an equality between the Ego as subject and as object.

The contradiction which has been resolved by the preceding deduction, is this: the science of knowledge cannot proceed from anything objective, for it begins indeed with an universal doubt of the reality of the objective. Hence the unconditioned-certain exists for it only in the absolute non-objective, which also shows the non-objectivity of the identical propositions as the

solely unconditioned-certain. But how, out of the original non-objective the objective arises, could not be conceived, unless that non-objective were an Ego, that is, a principle that becomes its own object. Only that which is not originally object can make itself the object, and in that way become an object. From this original duality in itself there arises from the Ego every objective that enters consciousness; and it is only that original identity in duality which brings unity and coherence into all synthetic knowledge.

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ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

CHAPTER XI

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

1788-1860

Schopenhauer is most popularly known by his pessimism; but this, a matter of abnormal temperament rather than of demonstration, is of less importance than another aspect of his thought, his metaphysical doctrine of the will. The Will, in Kant and his immediate followers, still remained as subsidiary to the reason, or was treated mainly with reference to its formal aspects. But Schopenhauer tried to go more deeply, and found reality itself in the deeper layers of consciousness, in the instincts and feelings. It was not merely that through the practical will, as for Kant, the world's *meaning* was discovered, but in the will Schopenhauer saw the substance and form of reality itself. The thing-in-itself we contain within us, he said, in the form of the blind, restless and irresistible will. Although he was in one sense an idealist, in his philosophy nature and consciousness both assumed realistic traits, in the sense that reality was now sought in something in part inaccessible to consciousness.

Schopenhauer accepted the critical philosophy of Kant, declaring Kant to be the greatest philosopher the world had produced; he was also influenced by Plato, and, more than any other modern thinker, by the teachings of Hindu philosophy. But for Kant's successors he had little sympathy, and scant courtesy.

The philosophical disciples of Schopenhauer have been few, but his influence has steadily increased, especially among

those who adhere to scientific concepts, particularly biological conceptions, in philosophy.

**From "The Fourfold Root of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason" ¹**

WE purpose showing further on that the Principles of Sufficient Reason is an expression common to several *a priori* notions. Meanwhile, it must be stated under some formula or other. I choose Wolf's as being the most comprehensive: *Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam non sit*. Nothing is without reason for its being.

Page 5.

To seek a proof for the Principle of Sufficient Reason is, moreover, an especially flagrant absurdity, which shows a want of reflection. Every proof is a demonstration of the reason for a judgment which has been pronounced, and which receives the predicate *true* in virtue precisely of that demonstration. This necessity for a reason is exactly what the Principle of Sufficient Reason expresses. Now if we require a proof of it, or, in other words, a demonstration of its reason, we thereby already assume it to be true, nay, we found our demand precisely upon that assumption, and thus we find ourselves involved in a circle of exacting a proof of our right to exact a proof.

Page 27.

¹ *On the Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature*: two essays by Arthur Schopenhauer, translated by Mrs. Karl Hillebrand, 1903.

From the summary given in the preceding chapter we gather, that two distinct applications of the principle of sufficient reason have been recognized, although very gradually, very tardily, and not without frequent relapses into error and confusion; the one being its application to judgments, which, to be true, must have a reason; the other, its application to changes in material objects, which must always have a cause. In both cases we find the principle of sufficient reason authorizing us to ask *why?* a quality which is essential to it. But are all the cases in which it authorizes us to ask *why* comprised in these two relations? If I ask: Why are the three sides of this triangle equal? the answer is: Because the three angles are so. Now, is the equality of the angles the cause of the equality of the sides? No; for here we have to do with no change, consequently with no effect which must have a cause. Is it merely a logical reason? No; for the equality of the angle is not only a proof of the equality of the sides, it is not only the foundation of a judgment; mere conceptions alone would never suffice to explain why the sides must be equal, because the angles are so; for the conception of the equality of the sides is not contained in that of the equality of the angles. Here therefore we have no connection between conceptions and judgments, but between sides and angles. The equality of the angles is not the *direct*, but the *indirect* reason, by which we know the equality of the sides; for it is the reason why a thing is such as it is (in this case, that the sides are equal): the angles being equal, the sides must therefore be equal. Here we

have a necessary connection between angles and sides, not a direct, necessary connection between two judgments. Or again, if I ask why *infecta facta*, but never *facta infecta fieri possunt*, consequently why the past is absolutely irrevocable, the future inevitable, even this does not admit of purely logical proof by means of mere abstract conceptions, nor does it belong either to casuality, which only rules *occurrences* within Time, not Time itself. The present hour hurled the preceding one into the bottomless pit of the past, not through causality, but immediately, through its mere existence, which existence was nevertheless inevitable. It is impossible to make this comprehensible or even clearer by means of mere conceptions; we recognize it, on the contrary, quite directly and instinctively, just as we recognize the difference between right and left and all that depends upon it; for instance, that our left glove will not fit our right hand, etc., etc.

Now, as all those cases in which the principle of sufficient reason finds its application cannot therefore be reduced to logical reason and consequence and to cause and effect, the law of specification cannot have been sufficiently attended to in this classification. The law of homogeneity, however, obliges us to assume, that these cases cannot differ to infinity, but that they may be reduced to certain species. Now, before attempting this classification, it will be necessary to determine what is peculiar to the principle of sufficient reason in all cases, as its special characteristic: because the conception of the genus must always be determined before the conception of the species.

Our knowing consciousness, which manifests itself as outer and inner Sensibility (or receptivity) and as Understanding and Reason, subdivides itself into Subject and Object and contains nothing else. To be Object for the Subject and to be our representation are the same thing. All our representations stand towards one another in a regulated connection, which may be determined *a priori*, and on account of which, nothing existing separately and independently, nothing single or detached, can become an Object for us.

It is this connection which is expressed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason in its generality. Now, although, as may be gathered from what has gone before, this connection assumes different forms according to the different kinds of objects, which forms are differently expressed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason; still the connection retains what is common to all these forms, and this is expressed in a general and abstract way by our principle. The relations upon which it is founded, and which will be more closely indicated in this treatise, are what I call the Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Now, on closer inspection, according to the laws of homogeneity and of specification, these relations separate into distinct species, which differ widely from each other. Their number, however, may be reduced to *four*, according to the *four* classes into which everything that can become an object for us — that is to say, all our representations — may be divided. These classes will be stated and considered in the following four chapters.

We shall see the Principle of Sufficient Reason

appear under a different form in each of them; but it will also show itself under all as the same principle and as derived from the said root, precisely because it admits of being expressed as above.

Pages 28-30.

There exists accordingly a *fourfold* necessity, in conformity with the *four* forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason:

1. *Logical necessity*, according to the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, in virtue of which, when once we have admitted the premises, we must absolutely admit the conclusion.

2. *Physical necessity*, according to the law of causality, in virtue of which, as soon as the cause presents itself, the effect must infallibly follow.

3. *Mathematical necessity*, according to the principle of sufficient reason of being, in virtue of which every relation which is stated in a true geometrical theorem is as that theorem affirms it to be, and every correct calculation remains irrefutable.

4. *Moral necessity*, in virtue of which, every human being, every animal even, is *compelled*, as soon as a motive presents itself, to do that which alone is in accordance with the inborn and immutable character of the individual. This action now follows its cause therefore as infallibly as every other effect, though it is less easy here to predict what that effect will be than in other cases, because of the difficulty we have in fathoming and completely knowing the individual empirical character and its allotted sphere of knowl-

edge, which is indeed a very different thing from ascertaining the chemical properties of a neutral salt and predicting its reaction.

Page 182.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is the *principle of all explanation*: to explain a thing means, to reduce its given existence or connection to some form or other of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in accordance with which form that existence or connection necessarily is that which it is. The Principle of Sufficient Reason itself, *i. e.* the connection expressed by it in any of its forms, cannot therefore be further explained; because there exists no principle by which to explain the source of all explanation; just as the eye is unable to see itself, though it sees everything else. . . .

In each science, moreover, we find one of the forms of that principle predominating over the others as its guiding thread. Thus in pure Mathematics the reason of being is the chief guiding-thread, (although the exposition of the proofs proceeds according to the reason of knowing only); in applied Mathematics the law of causality appears together with it, but in Physics, Chemistry, Geology, etc., that law entirely predominates. The principle of sufficient reason in knowing finds vigorous application throughout all the sciences, for in all of them the particular is known through the general; but in Botany, Zoölogy, Mineralogy, and other classifying sciences, it is the chief guide and predominates absolutely. The law of motives (*motivation*) is the chief guide in History,

Politics, Pragmatic Psychology, etc., etc., when we consider all motives and maxims, whatever they may be, as data for explaining actions — but when we make those motives and maxims the object-matter of investigation from the point of view of their value and origin, the law of motives becomes the guide to Ethics.

Pages 184-185.

I have endeavored in this treatise to show that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is a common expression for four completely different relations, each of which is founded upon a particular law given *a priori* (the principle of sufficient reason being a synthetical *a priori* principle). Now, according to the principle of *homogeneity*, we are compelled to assume that these four laws, discovered according to the principle of specification, as they agree in being expressed by one and the same term, must necessarily spring from one and the same original quality of our whole cognitive faculty as their common root, which we should accordingly have to look upon as the innermost germ of all dependence, relativity, instability, and limitation of the objects of our consciousness — itself limited to Sensibility, Understanding, Reason, Subject and Object. . . . The general meaning of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, may, in the main, be brought back to this: that every thing existing no matter when or where, exists *by reason of something else*. Now, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is nevertheless *a priori* in all its forms: that is, it has its root in our intellect, therefore it must not be applied to the totality of exist-

ent things, the Universe, including that intellect in which it presents itself. For a world like this, which presents itself in virtue of *a priori* forms, is just on that account mere phenomenon; consequently that which holds good with reference to it as the result of these forms, cannot be applied to the world itself, *i. e.* to the thing in itself, representing itself in that world. Therefore we cannot say, "The world and all things in it exist by reason of something else"; and this proposition is precisely the Cosmological Proof.

Pages 186-187.

From "The Will in Nature"

I break silence after seventeen years, in order to point out to the few who, in advance of the age, may have given their attention to my philosophy, sundry corroborations which have been contributed to it by unbiased empiricists, unacquainted with my writings, who, in pursuing their own road in search of merely empirical knowledge, discovered at its extreme end what my doctrine has propounded as the Metaphysical, from which the explanation of experience as a whole must come. This circumstance is the more encouraging, as it confers upon my system a distinction over all hitherto existing ones; for all the other systems, even the latest,—that of Kant—still leave a wide gap between their results and experience, and are far from coming down directly to, and into contact with, experience. By this my Metaphysic proves itself to be the only one having an extreme point in common with the physical sciences; a point up to which these sciences

come to meet it by their own paths, so as really to connect themselves and to harmonize with it. Moreover, this is not brought about by twisting and straining the empirical sciences in order to adapt them to Metaphysic, nor by Metaphysic having been secretly abstracted from them beforehand and then *à la* Schelling, finding *a priori* what it had learnt *a posteriori*. On the contrary, both meet at the same point of their own accord, yet without collusion. My system, therefore, far from soaring above all reality and all experience, descends to the firm ground of actuality, where its lessons are continued by the Physical Sciences.

Now the extraneous and empirical corroborations I am about to bring forward, all concern the kernel and chief point of my doctrine, its Metaphysic proper. They concern, that is, the paradoxical fundamental truth,

that, what Kant opposed as *thing in itself* to mere *phenomenon* — called more decidedly by me *representation* — and what he held to be absolutely unknowable, that this *thing in itself*, this substratum of all phenomena, and therefore of the whole of Nature, is nothing but what we know directly and intimately, and find within ourselves as *the will*;

that, accordingly, this *will*, far from being inseparable from, and even a mere result of, *knowledge*, differs radically and entirely from and is quite independent of knowledge, which is secondary and of later origin; and can consequently subsist and manifest itself without knowledge; a thing which actually

takes place throughout the whole of Nature, from the animal kingdom downwards ;

that this *will*, being the one and only thing in itself, the sole truly real, primary, metaphysical thing in a world in which everything else is only phenomenon — *i. e.* mere representation — gives all things, whatever they may be, the power to exist and to act ;

that accordingly, not only the voluntary actions of animals, but the organic mechanism, nay even the shape and quality of their living body, the vegetation of plants, and finally even in inorganic Nature, crystallization, and in general every primary force, which manifests itself in physical and chemical phenomena, not excepting Gravity,— that all this, I say, in itself, *i. e.* independently of phenomenon (which only means, independently of our brain and its representations), is absolutely identical with the *will* we find within us and know as intimately as we can know anything ;

that further, the individual manifestations of the will are set in motion by *motives* in beings gifted with an intellect, but no less by *stimuli* in the organic life of animals and of plants, and finally in all inorganic Nature, by *causes* in the narrowest sense of the word — these distinctions applying exclusively to phenomena ;

that, on the other hand, knowledge with its substratum, the intellect, is a merely secondary phenomenon, differing completely from the will, only accompanying its higher degrees of objectivation, and not essential to it ; which, as it depends upon the manifes-

tations of the will in the animal organism, is therefore physical, and not, like the will, metaphysical;

that we are never able therefore to infer absence of will from absence of knowledge; for the will may be pointed out even in all phenomena of unconscious Nature, whether in plants or in inorganic bodies; in short,

that the will is not conditioned by knowledge, as has hitherto been universally assumed, although knowledge is conditioned by the will.

Pages 215-218.

From "The World as Will and Idea" ¹

"The world is my idea:"—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels the earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, *i. e.*, only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself. If any truth can be asserted *a priori*, it is this: for it is the expression of the most general form of all possible and thinkable experience: a form which is more general than time, or space, or causality, for they all presuppose it; and each of these, which we have seen to be just so many modes of the principle of sufficient reason, is valid

¹ *The World as Will and Idea*, by Arthur Schopenhauer, translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 1888.

only for a particular class of ideas ; whereas the antithesis of object and subject is the common form of all these classes, is that form under which alone any idea of whatever kind it may be, abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical, is possible and thinkable. No truth therefore is more certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof than this, that all that exists for knowledge and therefore this whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea. This is obviously true of the past and the future, as well as of the present, of what is furthest off, as of what is near ; for it is true of time and space themselves, in which alone these distinctions arise. All that in any way belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the subject, and exists only for the subject. The world is idea.

Vol. I, pages 3-4.

I here conclude the second principal division of my exposition, in the hope that, so far as it is possible in the case of an entirely new thought, which cannot be quite free from traces of the individuality in which it originated, I have succeeded in conveying to the reader the complete certainty that this world in which we live and have our being is in its whole nature through and through *will*, and at the same time through and through *idea*; that this idea, as such, already presupposes a form, object and subject, is therefore relative; and if we ask what remains if we take away this form and all those forms which are subordinate

to it, and which express the principle of sufficient reason, the answer must be that as something *toto genere* different from idea, this can be nothing but *will*, which is thus properly the *thing-in-itself*. Every one finds that he himself is this will, in which the real nature of the world consists, and he also finds that he is the knowing subject, whose idea the whole world is, the world which exists only in relation to his consciousness, as its necessary supporter. Every one is thus himself in a double aspect the whole world, the microcosm; finds both sides whole and complete in himself. And what he thus recognizes as his own real being also exhausts the being of the whole world — the macrocosm; thus the world, like man, is through and through *will*, and through and through *idea*, and nothing more than this. So we see the philosophy of Thales, which concerned the macrocosm, unite at this point with the philosophy of Socrates, which dealt with the microcosm, for the object of both is found to be the same. But all the knowledge that has been communicated in the two first books will gain greater completeness, and consequently greater certainty, from the two following books, in which I hope that several questions that have more or less distinctly arisen in the course of our work will also be sufficiently answered.

In the meantime *one* such question may be more particularly considered, for it can only properly arise so long as one has not fully penetrated the meaning of the foregoing exposition, and may so far serve as an illustration of it. It is this: Every will is a will towards something, has an object, and end of its will-

ing; what then is the final end, or towards what is that will striving that is exhibited to us as the being-in-itself of the world? This question rests, like so many others, upon the confusion of the thing-in-itself with the manifestation. The principle of sufficient reason, of which the law of motivation is also a form, extends only to the latter, not to the former. It is only of phenomena, of individual things, that a ground can be given, never of the will itself, nor of the Idea in which it adequately objectifies itself. So then of every particular movement or change of any kind in nature, a cause is to be sought, that is, a condition that of necessity produced it, but never of the natural force itself which is revealed in this and innumerable similar phenomena; and it is therefore simple misunderstanding, arising from want of consideration, to ask for a cause of gravity, electricity, and so on. Only if one had somehow shown that gravity and electricity were not original special forces of nature, but only the manifestations of a more general force already known, would it be allowable to ask for the cause which made this force produce the phenomena of gravity or of electricity here. All this has been explained at length above. In the same way every particular act of will of a knowing individual (which is itself only a manifestation of will as the thing-in-itself) has necessarily a motive without which that act would never have occurred; but just as material causes contain merely the determination that at this time, in this place, and in this manner, a manifestation of this or that natural force must take place, so the motive determines only

the act of will of a knowing being, at this time, in this place, and under these circumstances, as a particular act, but by no means determines that that being wills in general or wills in this manner; this is the expression of his intelligible character, which, as will itself, the thing-in-itself, is without ground, for it lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore every man has permanent aims and motives by which he guides his conduct, and he can always give an account of his particular actions; but if he were asked why he wills at all, or why in general he wills to exist, he would have no answer, and the question would indeed seem to him meaningless; and this would be just the expression of his consciousness that he himself is nothing but will, whose willing stands by itself and requires more particular determination by motives only in its individual acts at each point of time.

In fact, freedom from all aim, from all limits, belongs to the nature of the will, which is an endless striving. This was already touched on above in the reference to centrifugal force. It also discloses itself in its simplest form in the lowest grade of the objectification of will, in gravitation, which we see constantly exerting itself, though a final goal is obviously impossible for it. For if, according to its will, all existing matter were collected in one mass, yet within this mass gravity, ever striving towards the center, would still wage war with impenetrability as rigidity or elasticity. The tendency of matter can therefore only be confined, never completed or appeased. But this is precisely the case with all tendencies of all

phenomena of will. Every attained end is also the beginning of a new course, and so on *ad infinitum*. The plant raises its manifestation from the seed through the stem and the leaf to the blossom and the fruit, which again is the beginning of a new seed, a new individual, that runs through the old course, and so on through endless time. Such also is the life of the animal; procreation is its highest point, and after attaining to it, the life of the first individual quickly or slowly sinks, while a new life insures to nature the endurance of the species, and repeats the same phenomena. Indeed, the constant renewal of the matter of every organism is also to be regarded as merely the manifestation of this continual pressure and change, and physiologists are now ceasing to hold that it is the necessary reparation of the matter wasted in motion for the possible wearing out of the machine can by no means be equivalent to the support it is constantly receiving through nourishment. Eternal becoming, endless flux, characterizes the revelation of the inner nature of will. Finally, the same thing shows itself in human endeavors and desires, which always delude us by presenting their satisfaction as the final end of will. As soon as we attain to them they no longer appear the same, and therefore they soon grow stale, are forgotten, and though not openly disowned, are yet always thrown aside as vanished illusions. We are fortunate enough if there still remains something to wish for and to strive after, that the game may be kept up of constant transition from desire to satisfaction, and from satisfaction to a new de-

sire, the rapid course of which is called happiness, and the slow course sorrow, and does not sink into that stagnation that shows itself in fearful *ennui* that paralyzes life, vain yearning without a definite object, deadening languor. According to all this, when the will is enlightened by knowledge, it always knows what it wills now and here, never what it wills in general; every particular act of will has its end, the whole will has none; just as every particular phenomenon of nature is determined by a sufficient cause so far as concerns its appearance in this place at this time, but the force which manifests itself in it has no general cause, for it belongs to the thing-in-itself, to the groundless will. The single example of self-knowledge of the will as a whole is the idea as a whole, the whole world of perception. It is the objectification, the revelation, the mirror of the will. What the will expresses in it will be the subject of our further consideration.

Pages 211-215.

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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

CHAPTER XII

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

1770-1831.

Many, perhaps most, students of philosophy would still maintain that Hegel, considered all in all, is the greatest of philosophers. Although much of his writing seems artificial, although he has carried his doctrine of the identity of contraries to extremes that seem wholly unjustifiable, and to some even absurd, yet for the sweep and grandeur of his conception of a spiritual world, the penetration of his thought, the wealth and detail of his treatment of all the fields of human experience, he stands first among philosophers; he is still a storehouse of thoughts to which we must continually turn, of principles that we must interpret in the light of new scientific achievements.

Hegel's system takes rise from Kant's, although his immediate point of departure appears to be Fichte's science of knowledge. But in the act of knowledge Hegel finds not merely the explanation of the relation of subject and object, and the notion of freedom, but a *movement* and *progress* which not only connects all human knowledge and experience, but affords a clue to the whole process by which Spirit realizes itself objectively in nature and in history, and then returns out of its otherness to complete reality and wholeness. The principles of the idealism which he taught, in their general aspects, and in their application to the problems of history and life, are not difficult to grasp, but the system as a whole, because of its technique and terminology, and

its audacious paradoxes, is the most difficult of all philosophical reading.

Hegel's great importance in philosophy lies not only in the fact that he is the greatest figure of idealism, and that all future idealism must go back to him for its most fundamental principles, but that his system, more than any other, advances upon those who have sought merely to determine the *nature* of reality. For Hegel strove to realize in thought not merely the *nature* of the universe, but the principles of its movement and activity, to express all the rich fullness of life itself. He is thus the great meeting place of all those genetic, functional and evolutionary methods and principles that are beginning to prevail in the sciences, both of nature and mind. It is in this field, the philosophy of the world's lawfulness, that he is supreme and almost alone among philosophers. A great work of the philosophy of the future, it seems certain, must be the organization and interpretation of the results of the sciences in terms of the Hegelian concepts, or in terms that can be stated only by continuing, in *some way*, the work of Hegel.

From "The Logic of the Encyclopedia" ¹

DIALECTIC

It is of the highest importance to ascertain and understand rightly the nature of Dialectic. Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work. It is also the soul of all knowledge which is truly scientific. In the popular way of looking at things, the refusal to be bound by

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, translated from *The Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, by Wm. Wallace. 1892. The Clarendon Press.

the abstract deliverances of understanding appears as fairness, which, according to the proverb, Live and let live, demands that each should have its turn; we admit the one, but we admit the other also. But when we look more closely, we find that the limitations of the finite do not merely come from without; that its own nature is the cause of its abrogation, and that by its own act it passes into its counterpart. We say, for instance, that man is mortal, and seem to think that the ground of his death is in external circumstances only; so that if this way of looking were correct, man would have two special properties, vitality and — also — mortality. But the true view of the matter is that life, as life, involves the germ of death, and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-suppression.

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Apart from this general objectivity of Dialectic, we find traces of its presence in each of the particular provinces and phases of the natural and the spiritual world. Take as an illustration the motion of the heavenly bodies. At this moment the planet stands in this spot, but implicitly it is the possibility of being in another spot; and that possibility of being otherwise the planet brings into existence by moving. Similarly the "physical" elements prove to be Dialectical. The process of meteorological action is the exhibition of their Dialectic. It is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every other natural process, and, as it were, forces nature out of itself. To illustrate the presence

of Dialectic in the spiritual world, especially in the provinces of law and morality, we have only to recollect how general experience shows us the extreme of one state or action suddenly shifting into its opposite; a Dialectic which is recognized in many ways in common proverbs. Thus *summum jus summa injuria*: which means, that to drive an abstract right to its extremity is to do a wrong. In political life, as everyone knows, extreme anarchy and extreme despotism naturally lead to one another. The perception of Dialectic in the province of individual Ethics is seen in the well-known adages, Pride comes before a fall; Too much wit outwits itself. Even feeling, bodily as well as mental, has its Dialectic. Everyone knows how the extremes of pain and pleasure pass into each other; the heart overflowing with joy seeks relief in tears, and the deepest melancholy will at times betray its presence by a smile.

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LOGIC

Logic is subdivided into *three* parts: (1) The Doctrine of Being; (2) The Doctrine of Essence; (3) The Doctrine of Notion and Idea,—that is, into the Theory of Thought; (1) In its immediacy: the notion implicit and in germ. (2) In its reflection and meditation: the being-for-self and show of the notion. (3) In its return into itself, and its developed abiding by itself: the notion in and for itself.

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING

Being is the notion implicit only: its special forms have the predicate "is"; when they are distinguished they are each of them an "other": and the shape which dialectic takes in them, *i. e.*, their further specialization is a passing over into another. This further determination, or specialization, is at once a forthputting and in that way a disengaging of the notion implicit in being; and at the same time the withdrawing of being inwards, its sinking deeper into itself. Thus the explication of the notion in the sphere of being does two things; it brings out the totality of being, and it abolishes the immediacy of being, or the form of being as such.

Being itself and the special sub-categories of it which follow, as well as those of logic in general, may be looked upon as definitions of the Absolute, or metaphysical definitions of God: at least the first and third category in every triad may,—the first, where the thought-form of the triad is formulated in its simplicity, and the third, being the return from differentiation to a simple self-reference. For a metaphysical definition of God is the expression of His nature in thoughts as such; and logic embraces all thoughts so long as they continue in the thought-form. The second sub-category in each triad, where the grade of thought is in its differentiation, gives, on the other hand, a definition of the finite. The objection to the form of definition is that it implies a something in the mind's eye on which these predicates may

fasten. Thus even the Absolute (though it purports to express God in the style and character of thought) in comparison with its predicate (which really and distinctly expresses in thought what the subject does not), is as yet only an inchoate pretended thought — the indeterminate subject of predicates yet to come. The thought, which is here the matter of sole importance, is contained only in the predicate: and hence the propositional form, like the said subject, viz. the Absolute, is a mere superfluity.

Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity, and measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus *e. g.* a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker. Measure, the third grade of being, which is the unity of the first two, is a qualitative quantity. All things have their measure: *i. e.* the quantitative terms of their existence, their being so or so great, does not matter within certain limits; but when these limits are exceeded by an additional more or less, the things cease to be what they were. From measure follows the advance to the second subdivision of the idea, Essence.

The three forms of being here mentioned, just because they are the first, are also the poorest, *i. e.* the

most abstract. Immediate (sensible) consciousness, in so far as it simultaneously includes an intellectual element, is especially restricted to the abstract categories of quality and quantity. The sensuous consciousness is in ordinary estimation the most concrete and thus also the richest; but that is only true as regards materials, whereas, in reference to the thought it contains, it is really the poorest and most abstract.

A. Quality.

(a) *Being*. Pure *Being* makes the beginning: because it is on the one hand pure thought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate; and the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined.

All doubts and admonitions, which might be brought against beginning the science with abstract empty being, will disappear, if we only perceive what a beginning naturally implies. It is possible to define being as " $I = I$," as Absolute Indifference or Identity, and so on. Where it is felt necessary to begin either with what is absolutely certain, *i. e.* the certainty of oneself, or with a definition or intuition of the absolute truth, these and other forms of the kind may be looked on as if they must be the first. But each of these forms contains a mediation, and hence cannot be the real first: for all mediation implies advance made from a first on to a second, and proceeding from something different. If $I = I$, or even the intellectual intuition, are really taken to mean no more than the first, they are in this mere immediacy iden-

tical with being; while conversely, pure being, if abstract no longer, but including in it mediation, is pure thought or intuition.

If we enunciate Being as a predicate of the Absolute, we get the first definition of the latter. The Absolute is Being. This is (in thought) the absolutely initial definition, the most abstract and stinted. It is the definition given by the Eleatics, but at the same time is also the well-known definition of God as the sum of all realities. It means, in short, that we are to set aside that limitation which is in every reality, so that God shall be only the real in all reality, the superlatively real. Or, if we reject reality, as implying a reflection, we get a more immediate or unreflected statement of the same thing, when Jacobi says that the God of Spinoza is the *principium* of being in all existence.

(1) When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but thought in its merest indeterminateness; for we cannot determine unless there is both one and another; and in the beginning there is yet no other. The indeterminate, as we here have it, is the blank we begin with, not a featurelessness reached by abstraction, not the elimination of all character, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite character, and is the very first of all. And this we call Being. It is not to be felt, or perceived by sense, or pictured in imagination; it is only and merely thought, and as such it forms the beginning. Essence also is indeterminate, but in another sense; it has traversed the process of mediation and contains implicit the determination it has absorbed.

(2) In the history of philosophy the different stages of the logical Idea assume the shape of successive systems, each based on a particular definition of the Absolute. As the logical Idea is seen to unfold itself in a process from the abstract to the concrete, so in the history of philosophy the earliest systems are the most abstract, and thus at the same time the poorest. The relation too of the earlier to the later systems of philosophy is much like the relation of the corresponding stages of the logical Idea: in other words, the earlier are preserved in the latter; but subordinated and submerged. This is the true meaning of a much misunderstood phenomenon in the history of philosophy — the refutation of one system by another, of an earlier by a later. Most commonly the refutation is taken in a purely negative sense to mean that the system refuted has ceased to count for anything, has been set aside and done for. Were it so, the history of philosophy would be of all studies most saddening, displaying, as it does, the refutation of every system which time has brought forth. Now, although it may be admitted that every philosophy has been refuted, it must be in an equal degree maintained that no philosophy has been refuted, nay, or can be refuted. And that in two ways. For, first, every philosophy that deserves the name always embodies the Idea: and secondly, every system represents one particular factor or particular stage in the evolution of the Idea. The refutation of a philosophy, therefore, only means that its barriers are crossed, and, its special principle reduced to a factor in the completer

principle that follows. Thus the history of philosophy, in its true meaning, deals not with a past, but with an eternal and veritable present: and, in its results, resembles not a museum of the aberrations of the human intellect, but a Pantheon of Godlike figures. These figures of Gods are the various stages of the Idea, as they come forward one after another in dialectical development. To the historian of philosophy, it belongs to point out more precisely, how far the gradual evolution of his theme coincides with, or swerves from, the dialectical unfolding of the pure logical Idea. It is sufficient to mention here, that logic begins where the proper history of philosophy begins. Philosophy began in the Eleatic school, especially with Parmenides. Parmenides, who conceives the Absolute as Being, says that "Being alone is and Nothing is not." Such was the true starting-point of philosophy, which is always knowledge by thought; and here for the first time we find pure thought seized and made an object to itself.

Men indeed thought from the beginning: (for thus only were they distinguished from the animals). But thousands of years had to elapse before they came to apprehend thought in its purity, and to see in it the truly objective. The Eleatics are celebrated as daring thinkers. But this nominal admiration is often accompanied by the remark that they went too far, when they made Being alone true, and denied the truth of every other object of consciousness. We must go further than mere Being, it is true; and yet it is absurd to speak of the other contents of our conscious-

ness as somewhat as if it were outside and beside Being, or to say that there are other things, as well as Being. The true state of the case is rather as follows: Being, as Being, is nothing fixed or ultimate; it yields to dialectic and sinks into its opposite, which also taken immediately, is Nothing. After all, the point is, that Being is the first pure Thought; whatever else you may begin with (the $I = I$, the absolute indifference, or God himself), you begin with a figure of materialized conception, not a product of thought; and that, so far as its thought-content is concerned, such beginning is merely Being.

But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just Nothing.

(1) Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute; the Absolute is the Nought. In fact, this definition is implied in saying that the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so without content,—or in saying that God is only the supreme Being, and nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same negativity as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle, as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same abstraction.

(2) If the opposition in thought is stated in this immediacy as Being and Nothing, the shock of its nullity is too great not to stimulate the attempt to fix Being and secure it against the transition into Nothing. With this intent, reflection has recourse to the plan of discovering some fixed predicate for Being, to mark

it off from Nothing. Thus we find Being identified with what persists amid all change, with *matter*, susceptible of innumerable determinations,—or even, unreflectingly, with a single existence, any chance object of the senses or of the mind. But every additional and more concrete characterization causes Being to lose that integrity and simplicity it has in the beginning. Only in, and by virtue of, this mere generality is it Nothing, something inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention or *meaning*.

All that is wanted is to realize that these beginnings are nothing but these empty abstractions, one as empty as the other. The instinct that induces us to attach a settled import to Being, or to both, is the very necessity which leads to the onward movement of Being and Nothing, and gives them a true or concrete significance. This advance is the logical deduction and the movement of thought exhibited in the sequel. The reflection which finds a profounder connotation for Being and Nothing is nothing but logical thought, through which such connotation is evolved, not, however, in an accidental, but a necessary way. Every signification, therefore, in which they afterwards appear, is only a more precise specification and truer definition of the Absolute. And when that is done, the mere abstract Being and Nothing are replaced by a concrete in which both these elements form an organic part. The supreme form of Nought as a separate principle would be Freedom: but Freedom is negativity in that stage, when it sinks self-absorbed to su-

preme intensity, and is itself an affirmation, and even absolute affirmation.

The distinction between Being and Nought is, in the first place, only implicit, and not yet actually made; they only *ought* to be distinguished. A distinction of course implies two things, and that one of them possesses an attribute which is not found in the other. Being, however, is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nought. Hence the distinction between the two is only meant to be; it is a quite nominal distinction, which is at the same time no distinction. In all other cases of difference there is some common point which comprehends both things. Suppose, *e. g.*, we speak of two different species: the genus forms a common ground for both. But in the case of mere Being and Nothing, distinction is without a bottom to stand upon: hence there can be no distinction, both determinations being the same bottomlessness. If it be replied that Being and Nothing are both of them thoughts, so that thought may be reckoned common ground, the objector forgets that Being is not a particular or definite thought, and hence, being quite indeterminate, is a thought not to be distinguished from Nothing. It is natural, too, for us to represent Being as absolute riches, and nothing as absolute poverty. But if when we view the whole world we can only say that everything *is*, and nothing more, we are neglecting all speciality, and, instead of absolute plenitude, we have absolute emptiness. The same stricture is applicable to those who define God to be mere Being; a definition not a whit better than that of the Buddhists, who make

God to be Nought, and who from that principle draw the further conclusion that self-annihilation is the means by which man becomes God.

Nothing, if it be thus immediate and equal to itself, is also conversely the same as Being is. The truth of Being and of Nothing is accordingly the unity of the two: and this unity is *Becoming*.

The proposition that Being and Nothing is the same seems so paradoxical to the imagination or understanding, that it is perhaps taken for a joke. And indeed it is one of the hardest things thought expects itself to do: for Being and Nothing exhibit the fundamental contrast in all its immediacy,—that is, without the one term being invested with any attribute which would involve its connection with the other. This attribute, however, as the above paragraph points out, is implicit in them,—the attribute which is just the same in both. So far the deduction of their unity is completely analytical: indeed, the whole progress of philosophizing in every case, if it be a methodical, that is to say, a necessary, progress, merely renders explicit what is implicit in a notion. It is as correct, however, to say that Being and Nothing are altogether different, as to assert their unity. The one is *not* what the other is. But since the distinction has not at this point assumed definite shape (Being and Nothing are still the immediate), it is, in the way that they have it, something unutterable, which we merely mean.

No great expenditure of wit is needed to make fun of the maxim that Being and Nothing are the same, or rather to adduce absurdities which, it is erroneously

asserted, are the consequences and illustrations of that maxim.

If Being and Nought are identical, say these objectors, it follows that it makes no difference whether my home, my property, the air I breathe, this city, the sun, the law, mind, God, are or are not. Now, in some of these cases the objectors foist in private aims, the utility a thing has for me, and then ask whether it be all the same to me if the thing exist and if it do not. For that matter, indeed, the teaching of philosophy is precisely what frees man from the endless crowd of finite aims and intentions, by making him so insensible to them, that their existence or non-existence is to him a matter of indifference. But it is never to be forgotten that, once mention something substantial, and you thereby create a connection with other existences and other purposes which are *ex hypothesi* worth having: and on such hypothesis it comes to depend whether the Being and not-Being of a determinate subject are the same or not. A substantial distinction is in these cases secretly substituted for the empty distinction of Being and Nought. In others of the cases referred to, it is virtually absolute existences and vital ideas and aims, which are placed under the mere category of Being or not-Being. But there is more to be said of these concrete objects, than that they merely are or are not. Barren abstractions, like Being and Nothing,—the initial categories which, for that reason, are the scantiest anywhere to be found—are utterly inadequate to the nature of these objects. Substantial truth is something far above these abstrac-

tions and their oppositions. And always when a concrete existence is disguised under the name of Being and not-Being, empty-headedness makes its usual mistake of speaking about, and having in the mind an image of, something else than what is in question: and in this place the question is about abstract Being and Nothing.

It may perhaps be said that nobody can form a notion of the unity of Being and Nought. As for that, the notion of the unity is stated in the sections preceding, and that is all: apprehend that, and you have comprehended this unity. What the objector really means by comprehension — by a notion — is more than his language properly implies; he wants a richer and more complex state of mind, a pictorial conception which will propound the notion as a concrete case, and one more familiar to the ordinary operations of thought. And so long as incomprehensibility means only the want of habituation for the effort needed to grasp an abstract thought, free from all sensuous admixture, and to seize a speculative truth, the reply to the criticism is, that philosophical knowledge is undoubtedly distinct in kind from the mode of knowledge best known in common life, as well as from that which reigns in the other sciences. But if to have no notion merely means that we cannot represent in imagination the oneness of Being and Nought, the statement is far from being true; for everyone has countless ways of envisaging this unity. To say that we have no such conception can only mean, that in none of these images do we recognize the notion in

question, and that we are not aware that they exemplify it. The readiest example of it is Becoming. Everyone has a mental idea of Becoming, and will even allow that it is *one* idea; he will further allow that, when it is analyzed, it involves the attribute of Being, and also what is the very reverse of Being, viz. Nothing: and that these two attributes lie undivided in the one idea: so that Becoming is the unity of Being and Nothing.—Another tolerably plain example is a Beginning. In its beginning the thing is not yet, but it is more than merely Nothing, for its Being is already in the beginning. Beginning is itself a case of Becoming; only the former term is employed with an eye to the further advance. If we were to adapt logic to the more usual method of the sciences, we might start with the representation of a Beginning as abstractly thought, or with Beginning as such, and then analyze this representation; and perhaps people would more readily admit, as a result of this analysis, that Being and Nothing present themselves as undivided in unity.

It remains to note that such phrases as “Being and Nothing are the Same,” or, “The unity of Being and Nothing,” like all other such unities, that of subject and object, and others—give rise to reasonable objection. They misrepresent the facts by giving an exclusive prominence to the unity, and leaving the difference which undoubtedly exists in it (because it is Being and Nothing, for example, the unity of which is declared) without any express mention or notice. It accordingly seems as if the diversity had been unduly

put out of court and neglected. The fact is, no speculative principle can be correctly expressed by any such propositional form, for the unity has to be conceived *in* the diversity, which is all the while present and explicit. "To become" is the true expression for the resultant of "to be" and "not to be"; it is the unity of the two; but not only is it the unity, it is also inherent unrest,—the unity, which is no mere reference-to-self and therefore without movement, but which, through the diversity of Being and Nothing that is in it, is at war within itself. Determinate being, on the other hand, is this unity, or Becoming in this form of unity: hence all that "is there and so," is one-sided and finite. The opposition between the two factors seems to have vanished; it is only implied in the unity, it is not explicitly put in it.

The maxim of Becoming, that Being is the passage into Nought, and Nought the passage into Being, is controverted by the maxim of Pantheism, the doctrine of the eternity of matter, that from nothing comes nothing, and that something can only come out of something. The ancients saw plainly that the maxim, "From nothing comes nothing, from something something," really abolishes Becoming; for what it comes from and what it becomes are one and the same. Thus explained, the proposition is the maxim of abstract identity as upheld by the understanding. It cannot but seem strange, therefore, to hear such maxims as, "Out of nothing comes nothing: Out of something comes something," calmly taught in these days, without the teacher being in the least aware that they are

the basis of Pantheism, and even without his knowing that the ancients have exhausted all that is to be said about them.

Becoming is the first concrete thought, and therefore the first notion: whereas Being and Nought are empty abstractions. The notion of Being, therefore, of which we sometimes speak, must mean Becoming; not the mere point of Being, which is empty Nothing, any more than Nothing, which is empty Being. In Being then, we have Nothing, and in Nothing, Being: but this Being which does not lose itself in Nothing is Becoming.

Nor must we omit the distinction, while we emphasize the unity of Becoming: without that distinction we should once more return to abstract Being. Becoming is only the explicit statement of what Being is in its truth.

We often hear it maintained that thought is opposed to being. Now, in the face of such a statement, our first question ought to be, what is meant by being. If we understand being, as it is defined by reflexion, all that we can say of it is that it is what is wholly identical and affirmative. And if we then look at thought, it cannot escape us that thought also is at least what is absolutely identical with itself. Both, therefore, being as well as thought, have the same attribute. This identity of being and thought is not, however, to be taken in a concrete sense, as if we could say that a stone, so far as it has being, is the same as a thinking man. A concrete thing is always very different from the abstract category as such. And in the case of Be-

ing, we are speaking of nothing concrete: for Being is the utterly abstract. So far, then, the question regarding the *being* of God — a being which is in itself concrete above all measure — is of slight importance.

As the first concrete thought-term, Becoming is the first adequate vehicle of truth. In the history of philosophy, this stage of theological idea finds its analogue in the system of Heracleitus. When Heracleitus says "All is flowing," he enunciates Becoming as the fundamental feature of all existence, whereas the Eleatics, as already remarked, saw the only truth in Being, rigid, processless Being. Glancing at the principle of the Eleatics, Heracleitus then goes on to say: Being no more is than not-Being: a statement expressing the negativity of abstract Being, and its identity with not-Being, as made explicit in Becoming: both abstractions being alike untenable. This may be looked at as an instance of the real refutation of one system by another. To refute a Philosophy is to exhibit the dialectical movement in its principle, and thus reduce it to a constituent member of a higher concrete form of the Idea. Even Becoming, however, taken at its best on its own ground, is an extremely poor term; it needs to grow in depth and weight of meaning. Such deepened force we find *e. g.* in Life. Life is a Becoming; but that is not enough to exhaust the notion of Life. A still higher form is found in Mind. Here too is Becoming, but richer and more intensive than mere logical Becoming. The elements, whose unity constitutes mind, are not the bare ab-

stracts of Being and of Nought, but the system of the logical Idea and of Nature.

B. Being Determinate.

In Becoming the Being which is one with Nothing, and the Nothing which is one with Being, are only vanishing factors; they are and they are not. Thus, by its inherent contradiction, Becoming collapses into the unity in which the two elements are absorbed. This result is accordingly *Being Determinate* (Being there and so).

In this first example we must call to mind, once for all, what was stated in Section 82, and in the note there: the only way to secure any growth and progress in knowledge is to hold results fast in their truth. There is absolutely nothing whatever in which we cannot and must not point to contradictions or opposite attributes; and the abstraction made by understanding therefore means a forcible insistence on a single aspect, and a real effort to obscure and remove all consciousness of the other attribute which is involved. Whenever such contradiction, then, is discovered in any object or notion, the usual inference is, *Hence* this object is *Nothing*. Thus Zeno, who first showed the contradiction native to motion, concluded that there is no motion: and the ancients, who recognized origin and de cease, the two species of Becoming, as untrue categories, made use of the expression that the One or Absolute neither arises nor perishes. Such a style of dialectic looks only at the negative aspect of its result, and fails to notice, what is

at the same time really present, the definite result, in the present case a pure nothing, but a Nothing which includes Being, and in like manner, a Being which includes Nothing. Hence Being Determinate is (1) the unity of Being and Nothing, in which we get rid of the immediacy in these determinations, and their contradiction vanishes in their mutual connection — the unity in which they are only constituent elements. And (2) since the result is the abolition of the contradiction, it comes in the shape of a simple unity with itself: that is to say, it also is Being, but Being with negation or determinateness: it is Becoming expressly put in the form of one of its elements, viz., Being.

Even our ordinary conception of Becoming implies that somewhat comes out of it, and that Becoming therefore has a result. But this conception gives rise to the question, how Becoming does not remain mere Becoming, but has a result? The answer to this question follows from what Becoming has already shown itself to be. Becoming always contains Being and Nothing in such a way, that these two are always changing into each other, and reciprocally canceling each other, Thus Becoming stands before us in utter restlessness — unable however to maintain itself in this abstract restlessness: for since Being and Nothing vanish in Becoming (and that is the very notion of Becoming,) the latter must vanish also. Becoming is as it were a fire, which dies out in itself, when it consumes its material. The result of this process, however, is not an empty nothing, but Being identical with

the negation,— what we call Being Determinate (being then and there) : the primary import of which evidently is that it *has become*.

(a) Determinate Being is Being with a character or mode—which simply *is*; and such un-mediated character is *quality*. And as reflected into itself in this its character or mode, Determinate Being is a somewhat, an existent.—The categories, which issue by a closer analysis of Determinate Being, need only be mentioned brievly.

Quality may be described as the determinate mode immediate and identical with Being, as distinguished from Quantity (to come afterwards), which, although a mode of Being, is no longer immediately identical with Being, but a mode indifferent and external to it. A Something is what it is in virtue of its quality, and losing its quality it ceases to be what it is. Quality, moreover, is completely a category only of the finite, and for that reason too it has its proper place in Nature, not in the world of Mind. Thus, for example, in Nature what are styled the elementary bodies, oxygen, nitrogen, etc., should be regarded as existing qualities. But in the sphere of Mind, Quality appears in a subordinate way only, and not as if its qualitative-ness could exhaust any specific aspect of mind. If, for example, we consider the subjective mind, which forms the object of psychology, we may describe what is called (moral and mental) character, as in logical language identical with Quality. This, however, does not mean that character is a mode of being which pervades the soul, and is immediately identical with it,

as is the case in the natural world with the elementary bodies before mentioned. Yet a more distinct manifestation of Quality as such, in mind even, is found in the case of besotted or morbid conditions, especially in states of passion and when the passion rises to derangement. The state of mind of a deranged person, being one mass of jealousy, fear, etc., may suitably be described as Quality.

Quality, as determinateness which is, as contrasted with the Negation which is involved in it, but distinguished from it, is *Reality*. Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but, as a determinate being and somewhat, is only a form on such being — it is as Otherness. Since this otherness, through a determination of Quality itself, is in the first instance distinct from it, Quality is *Being-for-Another* — an expansion of the mere point of Determinate Being, or of Somewhat. The Being as such of Quality, contrasted with this reference to somewhat else is *Being-by-self*.

The foundation of all determinateness is negation (as Spinoza says, *Omnis determinatio est negatio*.) The unreflecting observer supposes that determinate things are merely positive, and pins them down under the form of being. Mere being however is not the end of the matter: — it is, as we have already seen, utter emptiness and instability besides. Still, when abstract being is confused in this way with being modified and determinate, it implies some perception of the fact that, though in determinate being there is involved an element of negation, this element is at first wrapped up, as it were, and only comes to the

front and received its due in Being-for-self. If we go on to consider Determinate Being as a determinateness which *is*, we get in this way what is called Reality. We speak, for example, of the reality of a plan or purpose, meaning thereby that they are no longer inner and subjective, but have passed into being-there-and-then. In the same sense the body may be called the reality of the soul, and the law the reality of freedom, and the world altogether the reality of the divine idea. The word 'reality' is however used in another acceptation to mean that something behaves conformably to its essential characteristic or notion. For example, we use the expression: This is a real occupation: This is a real man. Here the term does not merely mean outward and immediate existence; but rather that some existence agrees with its notion. In which sense, be it added, reality is not distinct from the ideality which we shall in the first instance become acquainted with in the shape of Being-for-self.

Pages 156-172.

From "The Philosophy of History" ¹

We have therefore to mention here: (1) The abstract characteristics of the nature of Spirit. (2) What means Spirit uses in order to realize its idea. (3) Lastly, we must consider the shape which the perfect embodiment of Spirit assumes — the State.

(1) The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite — *Matter*. As the essence

¹ From *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, by G. W. F. Hegel, translated by J. Sibree, 1902.

of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence, of Spirit is Freedom. All will readily assent to the doctrine that Spirit, among other properties, is also endowed with Freedom; but philosophy teaches that all the qualities of Spirit exist only through Freedom; that all are but means for attaining Freedom; that all seek and produce this and this alone. It is a result of speculative Philosophy, that Freedom is the sole truth of Spirit. Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency towards a central point. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that *exclude* each other. It seeks its Unity; and therefore exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging towards its opposite [an indivisible point.] If it could attain this, it would be matter no longer, it would have perished. It strives after the realization of its Idea; for in Unit it exists *ideally*. Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its center in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists *in* and *with* itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; Spirit is *self-contained existence*. Now this is Freedom, exactly. For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of anything external. I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness — consciousness of one's own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact *that I know*; secondly *what I know*. In *self-consciousness* these are merged in

one; for Spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realize itself; to make itself *actually* that which it is *potentially*. According to this abstract definition it may be said of Universal History, that it is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the tree, and the taste and form of its fruits, so do the first traces of Spirit virtually contain the whole of that History.

The destiny of the spiritual World, and,—since this is the *substantial World*, while the physical remains subordinate to it, or, in the language of speculation, has no truth *as against* the spiritual,—the *final cause of the world at large*, we allege to be the *consciousness* of its own freedom, on the part of the Spirit, and *ipso facto*, the *reality* of that freedom. But that this term ‘Freedom,’ without further qualification, is an indefinite, and incalculable, ambiguous term; and that while that which it represents is the *ne plus ultra* of attainment, it is liable to an infinity of misunderstandings, confusions and errors, and to become the occasion for all imaginable excesses;—has never been more clearly known and felt than in modern times. Yet, for the present, we must content ourselves with the term itself without farther definition. Attention was also directed to the importance of the infinite difference between a principle in the abstract, and its realization in the concrete. In the process before us, the essential nature of freedom,—which involves in it ab-

solute necessity,—is to be displayed as coming to a consciousness of itself, (for it is in its very nature, self-consciousness) and thereby realizing its existence. Itself is its own object of attainment, and the sole aim of Spirit. This result it is, at which the process of the World's History has been continually aiming; and to which the sacrifices that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar of the earth, through the long lapse of ages, have been offered. This is the only aim that sees itself realized and fulfilled: the only hope of repose amid the ceaseless change of events and conditions, and the sole efficient principle that pervades them. This final aim is God's purpose with the world; but God is the absolutely perfect Being, and can, therefore, will nothing other than himself — his own Will. The Nature of His Will,—that is His Nature itself, is what we here call the Idea of Freedom; translating the language of Religion into that of Thought. The question, then, which we may next put, is: What means does this principle of Freedom use for its realization? This is the second point we have to consider.

The question of the *means* by which Freedom develops itself to a World, conducts us to the phenomenon of History itself. Although Freedom is, primarily, an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are external and phenomenal; presenting themselves in History to our sensuous vision. The first glance at History convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their characters, and talents; and impresses us with the belief that such needs,

passions, and interests are the sole springs of action — the efficient agents in this scene of activity. . . .

This vast congeries of volitions, interests, and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the World-Spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it. And this aim is none other than finding itself — coming to itself — and contemplating itself in concrete actuality. But that those manifestations of vitality on the part of individuals and peoples, in which they seek and satisfy their own purposes, are, at the same time, the means and instruments of a higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing,—which they realize unconsciously,—might be made a matter of question; rather has been questioned, and in every variety of form negatived, decried, and condemned as mere dreaming and “Philosophy.” But on this point I announced my view at the very outset, and asserted our hypothesis,—which, however, will appear in the sequel, in the form of a legitimate inference, and our belief that Reason governs the world, and has consequently governed its history. In relation to this independently universal and substantial existence—all else is subordinate, subservient to it, and the means for its development. The Union of Universal Abstract Existence generally with the Individual, the Subjective, that this alone is Truth, belongs to the department of speculation, and is treated in this general form in Logic. But in the process of the World’s History itself—as still incomplete,—the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of desire and interest. While

these limited sentiments are still unconscious of the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them and is realizing itself through them. The question also assumes the form of the union of *Freedom* and *Necessity*; the latent abstract process of Spirit being regarded as *Necessity*, while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their interest, belongs to the domain of *Freedom*. As the metaphysical connection *i. e.* the connection in the Idea) of these forms of thought, belongs to Logic, it would be out of place to analyze it here. The chief and cardinal points only shall be mentioned.

Philosophy shows that the Idea advances to an infinite antithesis; that, viz. between the Idea in its free, universal form—in which it exists for itself—and the contrasted form of abstract introversion, reflection on itself, which is formal existence-for-self, personality, formal freedom, such as belongs to Spirit only. The universal Idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things on the one side, and as the abstract essence of free volition on the other side. This reflection of the mind on itself is individual self-consciousness—the polar opposite of the Idea in its general form, and therefore existing in absolute limitation. This polar opposite is consequently limitation, particularization, for the universal absolute thing; it is the side of its *definite existence*; the sphere of its formal reality, the sphere of the reverence paid to God. To comprehend the absolute connection of this antithesis, is the profound task of metaphysics. This Limitation originates all forms of particularity of

whatever kind. The formal volition (of which we have spoken) wills itself; desires to make its own personality valid in all that it purposes and does; even the pious individual wishes to be saved and happy. This pole of the antithesis, existing for itself, is — in contrast with the Absolute Universal Being — a special separate existence, taking cognizance of specialty only, and willing that alone. In short it plays its part in the region of mere phenomena. This is the sphere of particular purposes, in effecting which individuals exert themselves on behalf of their individuality — give it full play and objective realization. This is also the sphere of happiness and its opposite. He is happy who finds his condition suited to his special character, will, and fancy, and so enjoys himself in that condition. The History of the World is not the theater of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony,—periods when the antithesis is in abeyance. Reflection on self,—the Freedom above described — is abstractly defined as the formal element of the activity of the absolute Idea. The realizing *activity* of which we have spoken is the middle term of the Syllogism, one of whose extremes is the Universal essence, the *Idea*, which reposes in the penetralia of Spirit; and the other, the complex of external things,—objective matter. That activity is the medium by which the universal latent principle is translated into the domain of objectivity.

These observations may suffice in reference to the means which the World-Spirit uses for realizing its

Idea. Stated simply and abstractly, this mediation involves the activity of personal existences in whom Reason is present as their absolute, substantial being; but a basis, in the first instance, still obscure and unknown to them. But the subject becomes more complicated and difficult when we regard individuals not merely in their aspect of activity, but more concretely, in conjunction with a particular manifestation of that activity in their religion and morality,—forms of existence which are intimately connected with Reason, and share in its absolute claims. Here the relation of mere means to an end disappears, and the chief bearings of this seeming difficulty in reference to the absolute aim of Spirit, have been briefly considered.

The third point to be analyzed is, therefore,—what is the object to be realized by these means: *i. e.* what is the form it assumes in the realm of reality. We have spoken of *means*; but in the carrying out of a subjective, limited aim, we have also to take into consideration the element of a *material*, either already present or which has to be procured. Thus the question would arise: What is the material in which the Ideal of Reason is wrought out? The primary answer would be,—Personality itself—human desires—Subjectivity generally. In human knowledge and volition, as its material element, Reason attains positive existence. We have considered subjective volition where it has an object which is the truth and essence of a reality, viz. where it constitutes a great world-historical passion. As a subjective will, occupied with limited passions, it is dependent, and can gratify its

desires only within the limits of this dependence. But the subjective will has also a substantial life — a reality, — in which it moves in the region of *essential* being, and has the essential itself as the object of its existence. This essential being is the union of the *subjective* with the *rational* Will: it is the moral Whole, the *State*, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognizing, believing in and willing that which is common to the Whole. And this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its gratification and enjoyment through that common will; as if this were a means provided for its benefit; as if the individual, in his relations to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this universal limitation — the mutual constraint of all — might secure a small space of liberty for each. Rather, we affirm, are Law, Morality, Government, and they alone, the positive reality and completion of Freedom. Freedom of a low and limited order, is mere caprice; which finds its exercise in the sphere of particular and limited desires.

Subjective volition — passion — is that which sets men in activity, that which effects “practical” realization. The Idea is the inner spring of action; the State is the actually existing, realized moral life. For it is the Unity of the universal, essential Will, with that of the individual; and this is “Morality.” The Individual living in this unity has a moral life; possesses a value that consists in this substantiality alone. Sophocles in his *Antigone* says, “The divine com-

mands are not of yesterday, nor of to-day; no, they have an infinite existence, and no one could say whence they came." The laws of morality are not accidental, but are the essentially rational. It is the very object of the State, that what is essential in the practical activity of men, and in their dispositions, should be duly recognized; that it should have a manifest existence, and maintain its position. It is the absolute interest of Reason that this moral Whole should exist; and herein lies the justification and merit of heroes who have founded states,—however rude these may have been. In the history of the World, only those peoples can come under our notice which form a state. For it must be understood that this latter is the realization of Freedom, *i. e.* of the absolute final aim, and that it exists for its own sake. It must further be understood that all the worth which the human being possesses — all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State. For his spiritual reality consists in this, that his own essence — Reason — is objectively present to him, that it possesses objective immediate existence for him. Thus only is he fully conscious; thus only is he a partaker of morality — of a just and moral social and political life. For Truth is the Unity of the universal and subjective Will; and the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements. The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of History in a more definite shape than before; that in which Freedom obtains objectivity, and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity. For law is

the objectivity of Spirit; volition in its true form. Only that will which obeys law is free; for it obeys itself — it is independent and so free. When the State or our country constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective will of man submits to laws, — the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes. The Rational has necessary existence, as being the reality and substance of things, and we are free in recognizing it as law, and following it as the substance of our own being. The objective and the subjective will are then reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole. For the morality of the State is not of that ethical reflective kind, in which one's conviction bears sway; this latter is rather the peculiarity of the modern time, while the true antique morality is based on the principle of abiding by one's duty (to the State at large). An Athenian citizen did what was required of him, as it were from instinct: but if I reflect on the object of my activity, I must have the consciousness that my will has been called into exercise. But morality is duty — substantial Right — a "second nature" as it has been justly called; for the *first* nature of man is his primary merely animal existence.

At an earlier stage of the discussion we established the two elemental considerations: first, the *idea* of freedom as the absolute and final aim; secondly, the *means* for realizing it, *i. e.* the subjective side of knowledge and will, with its life, movement, and activity. We then recognized the State as the moral Whole and the

Reality of Freedom, and consequently as the objective unity of these two elements. For although we make this distinction into two aspects for our consideration, it must be remarked that they are intimately connected; and that their connection is involved in the idea of each when examined separately. We have, on the one hand, recognized the Idea in the definite form of Freedom, conscious of and willing itself,—having itself alone as its object; involving at the same time, the pure and simple Idea of Reason, and likewise, that which we have called subject — self-consciousness — Spirit actually existing in the World. If, on the other hand, we consider subjectivity, we find that subjective knowledge and will is Thought. But by the very act of thoughtful cognition and volition, I will the universal object — the substance of Absolute Reason. We observe, therefore, an essential union between the objective side — the Idea — and the subjective side — the personality that conceives and wills it. The *objective* existence of this union is the State, which is therefore the basis and center of the other concrete elements of the life of a people,—of Art, of Law, of Morals, of Religion, of Science. All the activity of Spirit has only this object, the becoming conscious of this union, *i. e.*, of its own Freedom. Among the forms of this conscious union *Religion* occupies the highest position. In it, Spirit — rising above the limitations of temporal and secular existence — becomes conscious of the Absolute Spirit, and in this consciousness of the self-existent Being, renounces its individual interest; it lays this aside in Devotion — a state of mind in which

it refuses to occupy itself any longer with the limited and particular. By Sacrifice man expresses his renunciation of his property, his will, his individual feelings. The religious concentration of the soul appears in the form of feeling; it nevertheless passes also into reflection; a form of worship (*cultus*) is the result of reflection. The second form of the union of the objective and subjective in the human spirit is *Art*. This advances farther into the realm of the actual and sensuous than Religion. In its noblest walk it is occupied with representing, not indeed, the Spirit of God, but certainly the Form of God; and in its secondary aims, that which is divine and spiritual generally. Its office is to render visible the Divine; presenting it to the imaginative and intuitive faculty. But the True is the object not only of conception and feeling, as in Religion,—and of intuition, as in Art,—but also of the thinking faculty; and this gives us the third form of the union in question — *Philosophy*. This is consequently the highest, freest, and wisest phase. Of course we are not intending to investigate these three phases here; they have only suggested themselves in virtue of their occupying the same general ground as the object here considered—the State.

Summing up what has been said of the State, we find that we have been led to call its vital principle, as actuating the individuals who compose it,—Morality. The State, its laws, its arrangements, constitute the rights of its members; its natural features, its moun-

tains, air, and waters, are *their* country, their fatherland, their outward material property; the history of this State, *their* deeds; what their ancestors have produced belongs to them and lives in their memory. All is their possession, just as they are possessed by it; for it constitutes their existence, their being.

Their imagination is occupied with the ideas thus presented, while the adoption of these laws, and of a fatherland so conditioned is the expression of their will. It is this matured totality which thus constitutes *one* Being, the Spirit of *one* People. To it the individual members belong; each unit is the Son of his Nation, and at the same time — in so far as the State to which he belongs is undergoing development — the Son of his Age. None remains behind it, still less advances beyond it. This spiritual Being (the Spirit of his Time) is his; he is a representative of it; it is that in which he originated, and in which he lives. Among the Athenians the word Athens had a double import; suggesting primarily, a complex of political institutions, but no less, in the second place, that Goddess who represented the Spirit of the People and its unity.

This Spirit of a People is a *determinate* and particular Spirit, and is, as just stated, further modified by the degree of its historical development. This Spirit, then, constitutes the basis and substance of those other forms of a nation's consciousness, which have been noticed. For Spirit in its self-consciousness must become an object of contemplation to itself, and objectivity involves, in the first instance, the rise

of differences which make up a total of distinct spheres of objective spirit, in the same way as the Soul exists only as the complex of its faculties, which in their form of concentration in a simple unity produce that Soul. It is thus *One Individuality* which, presented in its essence as God, is honored and enjoyed in *Religion*; which is exhibited as an object of sensuous contemplation in *Art*; and is apprehended as an intellectual conception in *Philosophy*. In virtue of the original identity of their essence, purport, and object, these various forms are inseparably united with the Spirit of the State. Only in connection with this particular religion, can this particular political constitution exist; just as in such or such a State, such or such a Philosophy or order of Art.

The remark next in order is, that each particular National genius is to be treated as only One Individual in the process of Universal History. For that history is the exhibition of the divine, absolute development of Spirit in its highest forms,—that gradation by which it attains its truth and consciousness of itself. The forms which these grades of progress assume are the characteristic “National Spirits” of History, the peculiar tenor of their moral life, of their Government, their Art, Religion, and Science. To realize these grades is the boundless impulse of the World-Spirit — the goal of its irresistible urging; for this division into organic members, and the full development of each, is its Idea. Universal History is exclusively occupied with showing how Spirit comes to a recognition and adoption of the Truth: the dawn of knowledge appears; it begins

to discover salient principles, and at last it arrives at full consciousness.

Having, therefore, learned the abstract characteristics of the nature of Spirit, the means which it uses to realize its Idea, and the shape assumed by it in its complete realization in phenomenal existence,—namely, the State, nothing further remains for this introductory section to contemplate, but — *the course of the World's History*.

Pages 17–56.

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HERBERT SPENCER

CHAPTER XIII

HERBERT SPENCER

·1820-1903

Spencer's philosophy, as he himself has written, is an elaboration of principles discovered incidentally in the course of observation. The whole system is rather a philosophy of the sciences than a metaphysical system; and it is this fact, and its *method*, that constitute its great importance. So far as his thought is merely a culmination of English relativism, empiricism, and materialism (that is, on its metaphysical side), it would probably be regarded by almost all present thinkers as very faulty, lacking especially on account of his want of knowledge of the history of metaphysics.

Spencer, like Hegel, though in a very different manner, undertook to express in first principles, not the static or substantive aspects of the world, but its reality as a great, moving, concrete actuality. He aimed to establish the most fundamental laws of the universe in its *creative* and *dynamic* aspects, and the result is his famous law of evolution. His synthetic method, the method of combining deduction from self-evident principles with induction from the data of the sciences, is a richer and more fruitful method than was attempted by any other philosopher, however lacking in precision and however impossible of complete and universal application it may be. This system, like Hegel's, seems to point toward a philosophy of the future that will be not merely analytic, epistemological, and psychological, but will also deal objectively with the universe in its concrete fullness; with its values as well as its existents; with the laws

of its relations and of its progress and developments; with the significance of its historical moments and its individuals:—in a word with its whole *meaning*.

From the "First Principles of Philosophy" ¹

THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY

THUS every one of these conceptions [of philosophy] implies belief in a possible way of knowing things more completely than they are known through simple experiences, mechanically accumulated in memory or heaped up in cyclopædias. Though in the extent of the sphere which they have supposed Philosophy to fill, men have differed and still differ very widely; yet there is a real if unavowed agreement among them in signifying by this title a knowledge which transcends ordinary knowledge. That which remains as the common element in these conceptions of Philosophy, after the elimination of their discordant elements, is — *knowledge of the highest degree of generality*. We see this tacitly asserted by the simultaneous inclusion of God, Nature and Man, within its scope; or still more distinctly by the division of Philosophy as a whole into Theological, Physical, Ethical, etc. For that which characterizes the genus of which these are species, must be something more general than that which distinguishes any one species.

What must be the specific shape here given to this conception? The range of intelligence we find to be

¹ *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy*, by Herbert Spencer, 1869.

limited to the relative. Though persistently conscious of a Power manifested to us, we have abandoned as futile the attempt to learn anything respecting the nature of that Power; and so have shut out Philosophy from much of the domain supposed to belong to it. The domain left is that occupied by Science. Science concerns itself with the co-existences and sequences among phenomena; grouping these at first into generalizations of a simple or low order, and rising gradually to higher and more extended generalizations. But if so, where remains any subject-matter for Philosophy?

The reply is — Philosophy may still properly be the title retained for knowledge of the highest generality. Science means merely the family of the Sciences — stands for nothing more than the sum of knowledge formed of their contributions; and ignores the knowledge constituted by the *fusion* of all these contributions into a whole. As usage has defined it, Science consists of truths existing more or less separated; and does not recognize these truths as entirely integrated. . . .

The truths of Philosophy thus bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths, that each of these bears to lower scientific truths. As each widest generalization of Science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalizations of its own division; so the generalizations of Philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalizations of Science. It is therefore a knowledge the extreme opposite in kind to that which experience first accumulates. It is the final

product of that process which begins with a mere colligation of crude observations, goes on establishing propositions that are broader and more separated from particular cases, and ends in universal propositions. Or to bring the definition to its simplest and clearest form:—Knowledge of the lowest kind is *un-unified* knowledge; Science is *partially-unified* knowledge; Philosophy is *completely-unified* knowledge.

Pages 131-135.

ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC NOTIONS

Ultimate scientific ideas, then, are all representative of realities that cannot be comprehended. After no matter how great a progress in the colligation of facts, and the establishment of generalizations ever wider and wider,—after the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths that are larger and deeper, has been carried no matter how far, the fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as ever. The explanation of that which is explicable, does but bring out into greater clearness the inexplicableness of that which remains behind. Alike in the external and the internal worlds, the man of science sees himself in the midst of perpetual changes of which he can discover neither the beginning nor the end. If, tracing back the evolution of things, he allows himself to entertain the hypothesis that the Universe once existed in a diffused form, he finds it utterly impossible to conceive how this came to be so; and equally, if he speculates on the future, he can assign no limit to the grand succession of phenomena ever unfolding themselves be-

fore him. In like manner, if he looks inward, he perceives that both ends of the thread of consciousness are beyond his grasp; nay, even beyond his power to think of as having existed or as existing in time to come. When, again, he turns from the succession of phenomena, 'external or internal, to their intrinsic nature, he is just as much at fault. Supposing him in every case able to resolve the appearances, properties, and movements of things, into manifestations of Force in Space and Time; he still finds that Force, Space and Time pass all understanding. Similarly, though the analysis of mental actions may finally bring him down to sensations as the original materials out of which all thought is woven, yet he is little forwarder; for he can give no account either of sensations themselves or of that something which is conscious of sensations. Objective and subjective things he thus ascertains to be alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis. In all directions his investigations eventually bring him face to face with an insoluble enigma: and he ever more clearly perceives it to be an insoluble enigma. He learns at once the greatness and the littleness of the human intellect—its power in dealing with all that comes within the range of experience; its impotence in dealing with all that transcends experience. He realizes with a special vividness the utter incomprehensibleness of the simplest fact, considered in itself. He more than any other, truly knows that in its ultimate essence nothing can be known.

So rounding off the argument, we find its result brought into complete coalescence with the conclusion reached in Part I; where, independently of any inquiry like the foregoing, we dealt with the relation between the Knowable and the Unknowable.

It was there shown by analysis of both our religious and our scientific ideas, that while knowledge of the cause which produces effects on our consciousness is impossible, the existence of a cause for these effects is a datum of consciousness. We saw that the belief in a Power of which no limit in Time or Space can be conceived, is that fundamental element in religion which survives all its changes of form. We saw that all Philosophies avowedly or tacitly recognize this same ultimate truth; that while the Relativist rightly repudiates those definite assertions which the Absolutist makes respecting existence transcending perception, he is yet at last compelled to unite with him in predicating existence transcending perception. And this inexpugnable consciousness in which Religion and Philosophy are at one with Common Sense, proved to be likewise that on which all exact Science is based. We found that subjective Science can give no account of those conditioned modes of being which constitute consciousness, without postulating unconditioned being. And we found that objective Science can give no account of the world which we know as external, without regarding its changes of form as manifestations of something that continues constant under all forms. This is also the implication to which we are now led back by our completed synthesis. The recog-

nition of a persistent Force, ever changing its manifestations, but unchanged in quantity throughout all past time and all future time, is that which we find alone makes possible each concrete interpretation, and at last unifies all concrete interpretations. Not, indeed, that this coincidence adds to the strength of the argument as a logical structure. Our synthesis has proceeded by taking for granted at every step this ultimate truth; and the ultimate truth cannot, therefore be regarded as in any sense an outcome of the synthesis. Nevertheless, the coincidence yields a verification. For when treating of the data of Philosophy, it was pointed out that we cannot take even a first step without making assumptions; and that the only course is to proceed with them as provisional, until they are proved true by the congruity of all the results reached. This congruity we here see to be perfect and all-embracing — holding throughout that entire structure of definite consciousness of relations which we call Knowledge, and harmonizing with it that indefinite consciousness of existence transcending relations which forms the essence of Religion.

Towards some result of this order, inquiry, scientific, metaphysical, and theological, has been, and still is, manifestly advancing. The coalescence of polytheistic conceptions into the monotheistic conception, and the reduction of the monotheistic conception to a more and more general form in which personal superintendence becomes merged in universal immanence, clearly shows this advance. It is equally shown in the fading away of old theories about “essences,”

"potentialities," "occult virtues," etc.; in the abandonment of such doctrines as those of "Platonic Ideas," "Preëstablished Harmonies," and the like; and in the tendency towards the identification of Being as present to us in consciousness, with Being as otherwise conditioned beyond consciousness. Still more conspicuous is it in the progress of Science; which, from the beginning has been grouping isolated facts under laws, uniting special laws under more general laws, and so reaching on to laws of higher and higher generality; until the conception of universal laws has become familiar to it.

Pages 551-553.

It is true that their purely relative character [of the conceptions of Matter, Motion, and Force] has been repeatedly insisted upon; but the liability to misinterpretation is so great, that notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, there will probably have arisen in not a few minds, the conviction that the solutions which have been given, along with those to be derived from them, are essentially materialistic. Having, throughout life, constantly heard the charge of materialism made against those who ascribed the more involved phenomena to agencies like those which produce the simplest phenomena, most persons have acquired repugnance to such modes of interpretation; and the universal application of them, even though it is premised that the solutions they give can be but relative, will probably rouse more or less of the habitual feeling. Such an attitude of mind, however, is signifi-

cant, not so much of a reverence for the Unknown Cause, as of an irreverence for those familiar forms in which the Unknown Cause is manifested to us. Men who have not risen above that vulgar conception which unites with Matter the contemptuous epithets "gross" and "brute," may naturally feel dismay at the proposal to reduce the phenomena of Life, of Mind, and of Society, to a level with those which they think so degraded. But whoever remembers that the forms of existence which the uncultivated speak of with so much scorn, are shown by the man of science to be the more marvelous in their attributes the more they are investigated, and are also proved to be in their ultimate natures absolutely incomprehensible — as absolutely incomprehensible as sensation, or the conscious something which perceives it — whoever clearly recognizes this truth, will see that the course proposed does not imply a degradation of the so-called higher, but an elevation if the so-called lower. Perceiving as he will, that the Materialist and Spiritualist controversy is a mere war of words, in which the disputants are equally absurd — each thinking he understands that which it is impossible for any man to understand — he will perceive how utterly groundless is the fear referred to. Being fully convinced that whatever nomenclature is used, the ultimate mystery must remain the same, he will be as ready to formulate all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, as in any other terms; and will rather, indeed, anticipate, that only in a doctrine which recognizes the Unknown Cause as coex-

tensive with all orders of phenomena, can there be a consistent Religion, or a consistent Philosophy.

Though it is impossible to prevent misrepresentations, especially when the questions involved are of a kind that excite so much animus, yet to guard against them as far as may be, it will be well to make a succinct and emphatic re-statement of the Philosophico-Religious doctrine which pervades the foregoing pages. Over and over again it has been shown, in various ways, that the deepest truths we can reach, are simply statements of the widest uniformities in our experience of the relations of Matter, Motion, and Force; and that Matter, Motion, and Force are but symbols of the Unknown Reality. A Power of which the nature remains forever inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time or Space can be imagined, works in us certain effects. These effects have certain likenesses of kind, the most general of which we class together under the names of Matter, Motion, and Force; and between these effects there are likenesses of connection, the most constant of which we class as laws of the highest certainty. Analysis reduces these several kinds of effect to one kind of effect; and these several kinds of uniformity to one kind of uniformity. And the highest achievement of Science is the interpretation of all orders of phenomena, as differently-conditioned manifestations of this one kind of effect, under differently-conditioned modes of this one kind of uniformity. But when Science has done this, it has done nothing more than systematize our experience; and has in no degree extended the limits

of our experience. We can say no more than before, whether the uniformities are as absolutely necessary, as they have become to our thought relatively necessary. The utmost possibility for us is an interpretation of the process of things as it presents itself to our limited consciousness; but how this process is related to the actual process we are unable to conceive, much less to know. Similarly, it must be remembered that while the connection between the phenomenal order and the ontological order is for ever inscrutable; so is the connection between the conditioned forms of being and the unconditioned form of being for ever inscrutable. The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our own complex symbols of thought, to the simplest symbols; and when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms the symbols remain symbols still. Hence the reasonings contained in the foregoing pages afford no support to either of the antagonistic hypotheses respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic; and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic. Any argument which is apparently furnished to either hypothesis, is neutralized by as good an argument furnished to the other. The Materialist, seeing it to be a necessary deduction from the law of correlation, that what exists in consciousness under the form of feeling, is transformable into an equivalent of mechanical motion, and by consequence into equivalents of all the other forces which matter exhibits; may consider it

therefore demonstrated that the phenomena of consciousness are material phenomena. But the Spiritualist, setting out with the same data, may argue with equal cogency, that if the forces displayed by matter are cognizable only under the shape of those equivalent amounts of consciousness which they produce, it is to be inferred that these forces, when existing out of consciousness, are of the same intrinsic nature, as when existing in consciousness; and that so is justified the spiritualistic conception of the external world, as consisting of something essentially identical with what we call mind. Manifestly, the establishment of correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, may be used to assimilate either to the other; according as we set out with one or other term. But he who rightly interprets the doctrine contained in this work, will see that neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknowable Reality which underlies both.

Pages 556-559.

OUR BELIEF IN THE ABSOLUTE

There still remains the final question — What must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from

our minds everything but the relative? Or must we also believe in something beyond the relative?

The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure negation, or as a non-existence. "The *absolute* is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability," writes Sir William Hamilton. "The *Absolute* and the *Infinite*," says Mr. Mansel, "are thus, like the *Inconceivable* and the *Imperceptible*, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible." From each of which extracts may be deduced the conclusion, that since reason cannot warrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable only as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything beyond phenomena.

Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave error. If the premise be granted, the inference must doubtless be admitted; but the premise, in the form presented by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages, the arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute is unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing; yet there remains to be stated a qualification, which saves us from that skepticism otherwise necessitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine our-

selves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate its more general or psychological aspect, we find that these propositions are imperfect statements of the truth: omitting, or rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak specifically: Besides that *definite* consciousness of which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an *indefinite* consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete; and yet which are still real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.

Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there *is* an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something. Similarly with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they

are appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable. Strike out from the argument the terms Unconditioned, Infinite, Absolute, with their equivalents, and in place of them write, "negation of conceivability," or "absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible," and you find that the argument becomes nonsense. Truly to realize in thought any one of the propositions of which the argument consists, the Unconditioned must be represented as positive and not negative. How, then, can it be a legitimate conclusion from the argument, that our consciousness of it is negative? An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a *definite* consciousness of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an *indefinite* consciousness of it.

Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the necessary conditions of thought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of this which transcends distinct consciousness, is to analyze our conception of the antithesis between Relative and Absolute. It is a doctrine called in question by none, that such antinomies of thought as Whole and Part, Equal and Unequal, Singular and Plural, are necessarily conceived as correlatives: the conception of a part is impossible without the conception of a whole; there can be no idea of equality without one of inequality. And it is admitted that in the same

manner the Relative is itself conceivable as such, only by opposition to the Irrelative or Absolute. Sir William Hamilton, however, in his trenchant (and in most parts unanswerable) criticism on Cousin, contends, in conformity with his position above stated, that one of these correlatives is nothing whatever beyond the negation of the other. "Correlatives," he says, "certainly suggest each other, but correlatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive. In thought contradictories necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of contradictories is one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far from guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing else than its negation. Thus every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not); and the highest positive notion, the notion of the conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the notion of the inconceivable. But though these mutually suggest each other, the positive alone is real; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and in the highest generality, even an abstraction of thought itself." Now, the assertion that of such contradictories, "the negative is *only* an abstraction of the other," is *nothing else* than its negation,"—is not true. In such correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that the negative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive one; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from consciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir William Hamilton is, that the like holds even

with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word. Take for example the Limited and the Unlimited. Our notion of the limited is composed, firstly, of a consciousness of some kind of being, and secondly of a consciousness of the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical notion of the Unlimited, the consciousness of limits is abolished; but not the consciousness of some kind of being. It is quite true that in the absence of conceived limits, this consciousness ceases to be a concept properly so called; but it is none the less true that it remains as a mode of consciousness. If, in such cases, the negative contradictory were, as alleged, "*nothing else*" than the negation of the other, and therefore a mere nonentity, then it would clearly follow that negative contradictories could be used interchangeably; the Unlimited might be thought of as antithetical to the Divisible: and the Indivisible as antithetical to the Limited. While the fact that they cannot be so used, proves that in consciousness the Unlimited and the Indivisible are qualitatively distinct, and therefore positive or real; since distinction cannot exist between nothings. The error (very naturally fallen into by philosophers intent on demonstrating the limits and conditions of consciousness) consists in assuming that consciousness contains *nothing but* limits and conditions; to the entire neglect of that which is limited and conditioned. It is forgotten that there is something which alike forms the raw material of definite thought and remains after the definiteness which thinking gave to it

has been destroyed. Now all this applies by change of terms to the last and highest of these antinomies — that between the Relative and the Non-Relative. We are conscious of the Relative as existence under conditions and limits; it is impossible that these conditions and limits can be thought of apart from something to which they give the form; the abstraction of these conditions and limits, is, by the hypothesis, the abstraction of them *only*; consequently there must be a residuary consciousness of something which fills up their outlines; and this indefinite something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-Relative or Absolute. Impossible though it is to give to this consciousness any qualitative or quantitative expression, whatever, it is not the less certain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible element of thought.

Still more manifest will this truth become when it is observed that our conception of the Relative itself disappears, if our conception of the Absolute is a pure negation. It is admitted, or rather it is contended, by the writers I have quoted above, that contradictions can be known only in relation to each other — that Equality, for instance, is unthinkable apart from its correlative Inequality; and that thus the Relative can itself be conceived only by opposition to the Non-Relative. It is also admitted, or rather contended, that the consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness of both the related members. If we are required to conceive the relation between the Relative and the Non-Relative without being conscious of both, “we are in fact,” (to quote the words of Mr. Mansel dif-

ferently applied) "required to compare that of which we are conscious with that of which we are not conscious; the comparison itself being an act of consciousness, and only possible through the consciousness of both its objects." What then becomes of the assertion that "the Absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability," or as "the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible"? If the Non-Relative or Absolute is present in thought only as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the Relative becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is absent from consciousness. And if this relation is unthinkable then is the Relative itself unthinkable, for want of its antithesis: whence results the disappearance of all thought whatever.

Let me here point out that both Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, do, in other places, distinctly imply that our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, is positive and not negative. The very passage already quoted from Sir William Hamilton, in which he asserts that "the *Absolute* is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability" itself ends with the remark that "by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." The last of these assertions practically admits that which the other denies. By the laws of thought as Sir William Hamilton has inter-

preted them, he finds himself forced to the conclusion that our consciousness of the Absolute is a pure negation. He nevertheless finds that there does exist in consciousness an irresistible conviction of the real "existence of something unconditioned." And he gets over the inconsistency by speaking of this conviction as a "wonderful revelation"—a "belief" with which we are "inspired," thus apparently hinting that it is supernaturally at variance with the laws of thought. Mr. Mansel is betrayed into a like inconsistency. When he says that we are compelled, by the constitution of our minds, to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being,—a belief which appears forced upon us, as the complement of our consciousness of the relative and the finite; "he clearly says by implication that this consciousness is positive and not negative. He tacitly admits that we are obliged to regard the Absolute as something more than a negation,—that our consciousness of it is *not* "the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible."

The supreme importance of this question must be my apology for taxing the reader's attention a little further, in the hope of clearing up the remaining difficulties. The necessarily positive character of our consciousness of the Unconditioned, which, as we have seen, follows from an ultimate law of thought, will be better understood on contemplating the process of thought.

One of the arguments used to prove the relativity of our knowledge is, that we cannot conceive Space or

Time as either limited or unlimited. It is pointed out that when we imagine a limit, there simultaneously arises the consciousness of a space or time existing beyond the limit. This remoter space or time, though not contemplated as definite, is yet contemplated as real. Though we do not form of it a conception proper, since we do not bring it within bounds, there is yet in our minds the unshaped material of a conception. Similarly with our consciousness of cause. We are no more able to form a circumscribed idea of Cause, than of Space or Time; and we are consequently obliged to think of the Cause which transcends the limits of our thought as positive though indefinite. Just in the same manner that on conceiving any bounded space, there arises a nascent consciousness of space outside the bounds; so, when we think of any definite cause, there arises a nascent consciousness of a cause behind it; and in the one case as in the other, this nascent consciousness is in substance like that which suggests it, though without form. The momentum of thought inevitably carries us beyond conditioned existence to unconditioned existence: and this ever persists in us as the body of a thought to which we can give no shape.

Hence our firm belief in objective reality — a belief which metaphysical criticisms cannot for a moment shake. When we are taught that a piece of matter, regarded by us as existing externally, cannot be really known, but that we can know only certain impressions produced on us, we are yet, by the relativity of our thought, compelled to think of these in re-

lation to a positive cause—the notion of a real existence which generated these impressions becomes nascent. If it be proved to us that every notion of a real existence which we can frame, is utterly inconsistent with itself—that matter, however conceived by us, cannot be matter as it actually is, our conception, though transfigured, is not destroyed: there remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far as possible from those special forms under which it was before represented in thought. Though Philosophy condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute—though it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that,—though in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as it arises; yet, as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness, there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes. The continual negation of each particular form and limit, simply results in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits; and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited.

And here we come face to face with the ultimate difficulty—How can there possibly be constituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and limits? If every consciousness of existence is a consciousness of existence as conditioned, then how, after the negation of conditions, can there be any residuum? Though not directly withdrawn by the withdrawal of its conditions, must not the raw material of consciousness be withdrawn by implica-

tion? Must it not vanish when the conditions of its existence vanish? That there must be a solution of this difficulty is manifest; since even those who would put it, do, as already shown, admit that we have some such consciousness; and the solution appears to be that above shadowed forth. Such consciousness is not, and cannot be, constituted by any single mental act; but is the product of many mental acts. In each concept there is an element which persists. It is alike impossible for this element to be absent from consciousness, and for it to be present in consciousness alone; either alternative involves unconsciousness — the one from the want of the substance; the other from the want of the form. But the persistence of this element under successive conditions *necessitates* a sense of it as distinguished from the conditions, and independent of them. The sense of a something that is conditioned in every thought, cannot be got rid of, because the something cannot be got rid of. How, then, must the sense of this something be constituted? Evidently by combining successive concepts deprived of their limits and conditions. We form this indefinite thought, as we form many of our definite thoughts, by the coalescence of a series of thoughts. Let me illustrate this. A large complex object, having attributes too numerous to be represented at once, is yet tolerably well conceived by the union of several representations, each standing for part of its attributes. On thinking of a piano, there first rises in imagination its visual appearance, to which are instantly added (though by separate mental acts) the ideas

of its remote side and of its solid substance. A complete conception, however, involves the strings, the hammers, the dampers, the pedals; and while successively adding these to the conception, the attributes first thought of lapse more or less completely out of consciousness. Nevertheless, the whole group constitutes a representation of the piano. Now as in this case we form a definite concept of a special existence, by imposing limits and conditions in successive acts; so, in the converse case, by taking away the limits and conditions in successive acts, we form an indefinite notion of general existence. By fusing a series of states of consciousness, in each of which, as it arises, the limitations and conditions are abolished, there is produced a consciousness of something unconditioned. To speak more rigorously:—this consciousness is not the abstract of any one group of thoughts, ideas, or conceptions; but it is the abstract of *all* thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. That which is common to them all, and cannot be got rid of, is what we predicate by the word existence. Dissociated as this becomes from each of its modes by the perpetual change of those modes, it remains as an indefinite consciousness of something constant under all modes—of being apart from its appearances. The distinction we feel between special and general existence, is the distinction between that which is changeable in us, and that which is unchangeable. The contrast between the Absolute and the Relative in our minds, is really the contrast between that mental ele-

ment which exists absolutely and those which exist relatively.

By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness or raw material of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence. As we can in successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions, and replace them by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of consciousness which is conditioned anew in every thought; there ever remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and independently of conditions. At the same time that by the laws of thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of absolute existence; we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence: this consciousness being, as we here see, the obverse of our self-consciousness. And since the only possible measure of relative validity among our beliefs, is the degree of their persistence in opposition to the efforts made to change them, it follows that this which persists at all times, under all circumstances, and cannot cease until consciousness ceases, has the highest validity of any.

To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument: We have seen how, in the very assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is Relative, there is in-

volved the assertion that there exists a Non-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument, by which this doctrine is established, the same assumption is made. We have seen how, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the Relative is itself inconceivable, except as related to a real Non-relative. We have seen that unless a real Non-Relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute; and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances: and how, from this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that actuality.

Pages 87-97.

THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE

Before taking a first step in the rational interpretation of phenomena, it is needful to recognize, not only the facts that Matter is indestructible and Motion continuous, but also the fact that Force persists. An attempt to ascertain the laws to which manifestations in general and in detail conform, would be absurd, if the agency to which they are due could either come into existence or cease to exist. The succession of phenomena would in such case be altogether arbitrary; and Science, equally with Philosophy, would be impossible.

Here, indeed, the necessity is even more imperative than in the two preceding cases. For the validity of the proofs given that Matter is indestructible and Mo-

tion continuous, really depends upon the validity of the proof that Force is persistent. An analysis of the reasoning demonstrated that in both cases, the *a posteriori* conclusion involves the assumption that unchanged quantities of Matter and Motion are proved by unchanged manifestations of Force; and in the *a priori* cognition we found this to be the essential constituent. Hence, that the quantity of Force remains always the same, is the fundamental cognition in the absence of which these derivative cognitions must disappear.

But now, on what grounds do we assert the persistence of Force? Inductively we can allege no evidence except such as is presented to us throughout the world of sensible phenomena. No force, however, save that of which we are conscious during our own muscular efforts, is immediately known to us. All other force is mediately known through the changes we attribute to it. Since, then, we cannot infer the persistence of force from our own sensation of it, which does not persist; we must infer it, if it is inferred at all, from the continuity of Motion, and the undiminished ability of Matter to produce certain effects. But to reason thus is manifestly to reason in a circle. It is absurd to allege the indestructibility of Matter, because we find experimentally that under whatever changes of form a given mass of matter exhibits the same gravitation, and then afterwards to argue that gravitation is constant because a given mass of matter exhibits always the same quantity of it. We cannot prove the continuity of Motion by assuming that

Force is persistent, and then prove the persistence of Force by assuming that Motion is continuous.

The data of both objective and subjective science being involved in this question touching the nature of our cognitions that Force is persistent, it will be desirable here to examine it more closely. At the risk of trying the reader's patience, we must reconsider the reasoning through which the indestructibility of Matter and the continuity of Motion are established; that we may see how impossible it is to arrive by parallel reasoning at the persistence of Force. In all three cases the question is one of quantity:—does the Matter, or Motion, or Force, ever diminish in quantity? Quantitative science implies measurement; and measurement implies a unit of measure. The units of measure from which all others of any exactness are derived, are units of linear extension. From these, through the medium of the equal-armed lever or scales, we derive our equal units of weight, or gravitate force. And it is by means of these equal units of extension and equal units of weight, that we make those quantitative comparisons by which the truths of exact science are reached. Throughout the investigations leading the chemist to the conclusion that of the carbon which has disappeared during combustion, no portion has been lost, and that in any compound afterwards formed by the resulting carbonic acid the whole of the original carbon is present, what is his repeatedly assigned proof? That afforded by the scales. In what terms is the verdict of the scales given? In grains—in units of weight—in

units of gravitative force. And what is the total content of the verdict? That as many units of gravitative force as the carbon exhibited at first, it exhibits still. The quantity of matter is asserted to be the same, if the number of units of Force it counterbalances is the same. The validity of the inference, then, depends entirely upon the *constancy of the units of force*. If the force with which the portion of metal called a grain-weight, tends towards the Earth, has varied, the inference that Matter is indestructible is vicious. Everything turns on the truth of the assumption that the gravitation of the weights is persistent; and of this no proof is assigned, or can be assigned. In the reasonings of the astronomer there is a like implication; from which we may draw the like conclusion. No problem in celestial physics can be solved without the assumption of some unit of force. This unit need not be, like a pound or a ton, one of which we can take direct cognizance. It is requisite only that the mutual attraction which some two of the bodies concerned exercise at a given distance, should be taken as one; so that the other attractions with which the problem deals, may be expressed in terms of this one. Such unit being assumed, the momenta which the respective masses will generate in each other in a given time, are calculated; and compounding these with the momenta they already have, their places at the end of that time are predicted. The prediction is verified by observation. From this, either of two inferences may be drawn. Assuming the masses to be fixed, the motion may be proved to

be undiminished; or assuming the motion to be undiminished, the masses may be proved to be fixed. But the validity of one or other inference, depends wholly on the truth of the assumption that the unit of force is unchanged. Let it be supposed that the gravitation of the two bodies toward each other at the given distance, has varied, and the conclusions drawn are no longer true. Nor is it only in their concrete data that the reasonings of terrestrial and celestial physics assume the persistence of Force. They equally assume it in the abstract principle with which they set out; and which they repeat in justification of every step. The equality of action and reaction is taken for granted from beginning to end of either argument; and to assert that action and reaction are equal and opposite, is to assert that Force is persistent. The allegation really amounts to this, that there cannot be an isolated force beginning and ending in nothing; but that any force manifested, implies an equal antecedent force from which it is derived, and against which it is a reaction. Further, that the force so originating cannot disappear without results; but must expend itself in some other manifestation of force, which, in being produced, becomes its reaction; and so on continually. Clearly, then, the persistence of force is an ultimate truth of which no inductive proof is possible.

We might indeed be certain, even in the absence of any such analysis as the foregoing, that there must exist some principle which, as being the basis of science, cannot be established by science. All reasoned-

out conclusions whatever, must rest on some postulate. As before shown, we cannot go on merging derivative truths in those wider and wider truths from which they are derived, without reaching at last a widest truth which can be merged in no other, or derived from no other. And whoever contemplates the relation in which it stands to the truths of science in general, will see that this truth transcending demonstration is the persistence of Force.

Pages 185-189.

THE LAW OF EVOLUTION

These truths holding of all existences, were recognized as of the kind required to constitute what we distinguished as Philosophy. But, on considering them, we perceived that as they stand they do not form anything like a Philosophy; and that a Philosophy cannot be formed by any number of such truths separately known. Each such truth expresses the general law of some one factor by which phenomena, as we habitually experience them, are produced; or, at most, expresses the law of coöperation of some two factors. But knowing what are the elements of a process, is not knowing how these elements combine to affect it. That which alone can unify knowledge must be the law of coöperation of all the factors — a law expressing simultaneously the complex antecedents and the complex consequents which any phenomenon as a whole presents.

A further inference was that Philosophy, as we understand it, must not unify separate concrete phenom-

ena only; and must not stop short with unifying separate classes of concrete phenomena; but must unify all concrete phenomena. If the law of operation of each factor holds true throughout the Cosmos; so, too, must the law of their coöperation. And hence, in comprehending the Cosmos as conforming to this law of coöperation, must consist that highest unification which philosophy seeks.

Descending from this abstract statement to a concrete one, we saw that the law sought must be the law of the continuous redistribution of Matter and Motion. The changes everywhere going on, from those which are slowly altering the structure of our galaxy down to those which constitute a chemical decomposition, are changes in the relative positions of component parts; and everywhere necessarily imply that along with a new arrangement of Matter there has arisen a new arrangement of Motion. Hence we may be certain, *a priori*, that there must be a law of the concomitant redistribution of Matter and Motion, which holds of every change; and which, by thus unifying all changes, must be the basis of a philosophy.

In commencing our search for this universal law of redistribution, we contemplated from another point of view the problem of Philosophy; and saw that its solution could not but be of the nature indicated. It was shown that a Philosophy stands self-convicted of inadequacy, if it does not formulate the whole series of changes passed through by every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the perceptible and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible. If

it begins its explanations with existences that already have concrete forms, or leaves off while they still retain concrete forms; then, manifestly, they had preceding histories, or will have succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is given. And as such preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of possible knowledge, a Philosophy which says nothing about them, falls short of the required unification. Whence we saw it to follow that the formula sought, equally applicable to existences taken singly and in their totality, must be applicable to the whole history of each and to the whole history of all.

By these considerations we were brought within view of the formula. For if it had to comprehend the entire progress from the imperceptible to the perceptible and from the perceptible to the imperceptible; and if it was also to express the continuous redistribution of Matter and Motion, then, obviously, it could be no other than one defining the opposite processes of concentration and diffusion in terms of Matter and Motion. And if so, it must be a statement of the truth that the concentration of Matter implies the dissipation of Motion, and that, conversely, the absorption of Motion implies the diffusion of Matter.

Such, in fact, we found to be the law of the entire cycle of changes passed through by every existence — loss of motion and consequent integration, eventually followed by gain of motion and consequent disintegration. And we saw that besides applying to the whole history of each existence, it applies to each detail of the history. Both processes are going on at

every instant; but always there is a differential result in favor of the first or the second. And every change, even though it be only a transposition of parts, inevitably advances the one process or the other.

Evolution and Dissolution, as we name these opposite transformations, though thus truly defined in their most general characters are but incompletely defined; or rather, while the definition of Dissolution is sufficient, the definition of Evolution is extremely insufficient. Evolution is always an integration of Matter and dissipation of Motion; but it is in most cases much more than this. The primary redistribution of Matter and Motion is usually accompanied by secondary redistributions.

Distinguishing the different kinds of Evolution so produced as simple and compound, we went on to consider under what conditions the secondary redistributions which make Evolution compound, take place. We found that a concentrating aggregate which loses its contained motion rapidly, or integrates quickly, exhibits only simple Evolution; but in proportion as its largeness, or the peculiar composition of its components, hinders the dissipation of its motion, its parts, while undergoing that primary redistribution which results in integration, undergo secondary redistributions producing more or less complexity.

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
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